An analysis of the Federal Land Bank system\u27s debt management, 1947-1961 by Hollenhorst, Jerome John
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1965
An analysis of the Federal Land Bank system's debt
management, 1947-1961
Jerome John Hollenhorst
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hollenhorst, Jerome John, "An analysis of the Federal Land Bank system's debt management, 1947-1961" (1965). Retrospective Theses
and Dissertations. 4013.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/4013
This dissertation has been 65-7619 
microfilmed exactly as received 
HOLLENHORST, Jerome John, 1932-
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL LAND BANK 
SYSTEM'S DEBT MANAGEMENT, 1947-1961. 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 
Ph.D., 1965 
Economics, finance 
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL LAND BANK SYSTEM'S 
DEBT MANAGEMENT, 1947-1961 
by 
Jerome John Hollenhorst 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major Subject: Applied General Economics 
Approved; 
In Charge of Major Work 
Head of Major Department 
eaw of GraSjate College D c 
Iowa State University 
Of Science and Technology 
Ames, Iowa 
1965 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
îî 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1 
II. POTENTIAL OF THE FLB SYSTEM 8 
III. EFFECTS OF FLB LENDING ACTIVITY: 1947-1961 43 
IV. BORROWING ACTIVITY OF THE FLB SYSTEM: 1947-1961 75 
V. OPTIMAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 145 
VI. LITERATURE CITED 173 
VII. APPENDIX A 179 
VIII. APPENDIX B 180a 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Objectives and Scope of the Study 
Historically, the Federal Land Bank system^ was the first of a number of credit 
programs established by the federal government. The organization of the system in 
1916 marked the end of an era in which it was believed that all legitimate credit 
"gaps" in the economy could be closed by currency and banking reform. The institu­
tion of the FLB system set a precedent for federal intervention in the private credit 
markets, especially in the area of real estate credit. The organizational structure and 
the financing arrangements which Congress legislated for the FLB system provided a 
model for subsequent credit programs which were established to serve agriculture as 
well as other sectors of the economy. Other countries have also used the system as a 
model in the establishment of equivalent organizations, and many underdeveloped 
countries are currently studying the role that a similar organization might play in 
fostering economic development. 
In 1916, Congress decided that the establishment of a privately owned, co­
operative type of credit institution was the most appropriate means of accomplishing 
certain reforms in the farm mortgage credit market. The original plan called for 
governmental support and supervision only during the formative years of the system, 
but direct governmental support of the system was continued throughout the 
'Hereafter identified as the FLB system or simply as the system. 
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1916-1947 period. ^  Since 1947, the FLB system has operated without direct govern­
mental support as a federally chartered Institution under the supervision of the Fa mi 
Credit Administration, an independent agency of the federal government. The 
achievement of private ownership in 1947 did not change the basic purpose of the sys­
tem; that is, to intervene in the farm mortgage credit market in order to achieve cer­
tain public policy objectives. 
The operation of the FLB system during the 1947-1961 period as a privately 
owned credit institution with only indirect control by the government raises a number 
of analytical and policy questions. Given the quasi-public status of the FLB system, 
a fundamental issue is whether or not the FLB system is potentially capable of achiev­
ing the public policy objectives which prompted its establishment. Moreover, be­
cause of its status as a financial intermediary established and supervised by the federal 
government, does the FLB system interfere with national stabilization policy? If so, 
is it possible to minimize such interferences without destroying the system's ability to 
achieve its particular objectives? Because of the structure and functions of the FLB 
system, these and similar questions cannot be answered without an intensive analysis 
of its financing methods and policies and the primary purpose of this study to provide 
such an analysis. 
The objective of Chapter II is to provide an appraisal of the potential of the 
^An excellent summary account of the reasons for and the extent of direct 
governmental aid to the FLB system during the 1916-1947 period is given by Larsen 
(27). 
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FLB system. While a definitive analysis of the staictural adequacy of the FLB system 
is not intended; a limited examination of the consistency of the objectives and the 
basic structure of the system is necessary, because an analysis of the particular opera­
tional methods and policies employed would be of little interest if the system was ob­
viously inadequate for the achievement of its goals. This limited examination also 
serves the purpose of identifying, on an a priori basis, the necessary conditions for the 
successful operation of a government sponsored but privately owned credit program 
which attempts to achieve its objectives by direct competition with private lenders. 
Also, this part of the study identifies one of the most difficult financial problems con­
fronting the FLB systemT-the determination of an appropriate maturity distribution of 
its outstanding debt. 
The main purpose of Chapter III is to evaluate the influence of the system on 
the farm mortgage market during the 1947-1961 period in terms of its objectives. How­
ever,. not all of thè objectives of the system are objectively defined, and, therefore, 
the evaluation is primarily intended to serve as a diagnosis of the major problems con­
fronting the operation of the system during the 1947-1961 period. 
Chapter IV focuses on what is considered to be the necessary condition for the 
success of the FLB system: The ability to obtain sufficient funds at a cost which allows 
the system to compete effectively with other farm mortgage lenders. Specifically, 
this chapter is directed toward the following objectives: 
lo The development of data on FLB financing which heretofore have been 
unavailable or found only in scattered sources. 
2. A determination of the structure and behavior of the market for FLB 
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securities. 
3, An evaluation of FLB financing methods and policies with respect to the 
objectives of the system . 
Particular attention is given throughout Chapter IV to what is considered to be 
the major problem of the system's bond financing method; the decision problem in­
volved in the determination of an appropriate maturity distribution of its debt. The 
examination of the FLB system's experience with bond financing is also intended to 
provide an appraisal of the conventional rules-of-thumb and practice in this area of 
debt management. 
Having observed, described, and criticized how the FLB system dealt with the 
maturity distribution problem in practice, the author then seeks in Chapter V to pro­
vide the basis of a decision model that might lead to possible improvement. More 
specifically, the objective is to develop a model designed to take advantage of the 
recent advances made in other areas of financial decision making under uncertainty. 
No pretense is made that this proposal provides a definitive answer to the problem of 
maturity distribution. Indeed, the main objective of the proposal is to provide a new 
approach to the problem which is believed to be logically consistent with the more 
complex analytical framework necessary for effective operation of the system. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter II is largely a descriptive analysis of the objectives and structure of 
the FLB system and concentrates initially on the basic issue of whether or not a pri­
vately owned but federally sponsored credit program is an adequate instrument for the 
5 
achievement of certain public policy objectives. The analysis begins with a descrip­
tion of the objectives of the FLB system. The remainder of Chapter II consists of: 
1. A brief summary of the administrative structure of the system. This in­
cludes only those features which are most relevant to the basic objectives 
of the system. 
2. An g priori examination of the FLB system in terms of its role as a financial 
intermediary. While it was not a major objective of this study to analyze 
all of the possible effects of the FLB system, the conception of the system 
as a financial intermediary serves as a convenient device for identifying 
the relative importance of various aspects of its operation to the attain­
ment of its objectives. 
3. A description of the crucial role of FLB debt management. All of the pre­
vious observations point out the necessary condition for successful FLB 
operation: the ability to acquire sufficient funds at appropriate costs. The 
nature of the decision making problem posed by the FLB system's method of 
bond financing is described. Various strategies that might be utilized are 
briefly reviewed. 
With the above observations in mind, the study then proceeds in Chapter III to 
an appraisal of the performance of the FLB system during the 1947-1961 period. The 
historical data on the farm mortgage market are reviewed and two major conclusions 
emerge. First, there are indications that the functioning of the market has improved 
relative to pre-World War II. Second, the FLB system has contributed to this improve­
ment, but it failed to achieve its full potential because of the substantial increases 
in its loan rates, especially during the latter years of the period. 
The borrowing activities of the system are analyzed in Chapter IV, Tfie ad-" 
vantages and disadvantages of the close association of FLB securities with United 
States government securities are discussed. The investigation of the market for FLB 
securities provides much of the explanation of why the system was not able to achieve 
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its full potential, especially during the last half of the 1950's. More specifically, 
the argument is made that the narrowing of the yield differential between government 
securities and all other securities, the upward drift of interest rates, and the cyclical 
movements of all rates during the post-war period generated difficulties for the financ­
ing of the FLB system which were not always successfully mitigated by the maturity 
distribution policy employed by the system. 
Chapter V begins with on abstract statement of the basic decision problem 
confronting the FLB system in its debt management: Given the ability to sell bonds of 
maturities ranging from short- to long-term, what is the optimal maturity distribution 
of its outstanding debt? The inherent difficulty in this problem is that this decision, 
like other decisions involving the future, is a decision made under conditions of un­
certainty, The types of risks which the system incurs are analyzed, and the argument 
is then made that by focusing on |ust one of these types of risks—opportunity risks— 
the well-known optimal diversification model developed by Markowitz (30) can be 
adapted to the maturity distribution problem of the FLB system. However, it is also 
argued that the Markowitz model incorporates a particular criterion of optimality 
which is not appropriate to debt management decision making. A modification is 
suggested which allows the utilization of the sophisticated computational techniques 
of the Markowitz model but which improves the reasonableness and the usefulness of 
the "output" of the model. While the decision model proposed by this study is in­
tended to be logically consistent and realistically oriented, no pretense is made that 
the proposal is without inherent limitations and difficulties. Some of the more 
obvious problems that would arise in the actual use of the model are discussed, but as 
presented, the model lacks the refinement needed for any attempt at immediate prac­
tical application. 
In general, the analysis of the FLB system's post-war debt management which 
is contained in this volume does not provide a definitive solution to the problem of 
choosing an appropriate "strategy" of FLB debt management. However, it delineates 
the results of actual policies adopted by the FLB system and indicates their implica­
tions. ^  It is hoped that the overall result is information and a proposal which may be 
useful in the future for choosing among possible alternative policies. 
^As a rule, the complex set of influences on which the policies were based 
can only be surmised by the outsider. 
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CHAPTER II. POTENTIAL OF THE FLB SYSTEM 
Objectives of the FLB System 
The use of government loans as instruments of public policy has a long history 
in the United States, Prior to World War I, government credit programs were prin­
cipally motivated by the desire to foster economic development. The first federal 
lending agency, or federally sponsored agency, was the First Bank of the United 
States, established in 1791. It and its successor, the Second Bank of the United 
States, were chartered by Congress, and part of their capital was supplied by the 
federal government. However, the extension of credit was not the basic purpose of 
the government's interest in these banks; the basic concern was to meet the need of 
a central banking authority and thereby to facilitate a more effective use of capital 
in the economy. 
Beginning with the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, government 
credit programs entered a new phase. Government credit facilities were not called 
upon to deal with a general scarcity of capital but, instead, were designed to achieve 
the twin objectives of; (1) channeling additional capital into particular sectors where, 
for institutional or other reasons, it was believed to be insufficient; (2) influencing 
the terms on which credit was made available by existing institutions. 
In the discussion and debate^ immediately preceding the establishment of the 
'Problems of the farm mortgage credit market received their first official at­
tention when President Roosevelt appointed the Country Life Commission in 1908. The 
National Monetary Commission examined the problem in 1909 and was followed by the 
American Commission on Agricultural Credit and (Footnote continued on next page) 
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FLB system, the need for additional capital in agriculture was justified on the grounds 
that it would facilitate economic development. Improvement in the aggregate supply 
was also believed necessary, because certain geographic regions were not properly 
accommodated. Another argument was that the total supply of long-term agricultural 
credit needed to be stabilized, because the sudden declines in the liquidity of finan­
cial institutions which characterized this period often came at times when the credit 
needs of the agricultural sector were either unchanged or perhaps had increased due 
to its unique characteristics. However, the severest criticisms of the farm mortgage 
market as it functioned prior to World War I were directed at the terms on which 
credit was made available. Specifically, it was argued that interest rotes were too 
high, loan maturities too short, and the "small" farmer was subject to undue discrim­
ination by lending institutions. 
Dissatisfaction with the level of rates of interest on farm mortgage loans was 
based primarily on the belief that the agricultural sector was not receiving as favor­
able accommodations as the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy. More­
over, the wide regional variation of interest rates on farm mortgage credit was viewed 
as a detriment to agricultural development. ^ The regional variation in rates was at 
least partly unavoidable because of the uneven economic development that occurred 
(Footnote continued) Cooperation in 1912 and the United States Commission in 1913. 
Willit (72) gives a comprehensive discussion of the reports of these commissions and 
the reactions to them by Congress. 
^A survey of interest rates on farm mortgage loans reported by Thompson (40, 
pp. 34-56) in 1916 revealed that rates in about half of the states were 8 percent or 
more. 
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on a regional basis, but it did arouse criticisms of the existing banking structure. ^ 
The term for which mortgage credit was extended and the method of loan re­
payment was a second source of dissatisfaction. Prior to 1916/ the majority of farm 
mortgage loans were written for 5 years, and the average term varied from between 
3 to 10 years (39, p. 154). The short terms necessitated frequent renewals which 
meant the payment of additional fees as well as uncertainty as to obtaining the re­
newals when needed. The short te mis were accompanied by repayment on a "lump 
sum" basis; that is, the entire amount fell due at one time. 
The criticisms enumerated above formed the basic diagnosis of the imperfec­
tions of the fanm mortgage credit market prior to 1916, The remedy Congress pre­
scribed was the establishment of a new credit institution which would be able to 
provide a stable source of long-term, low-cost mortgage credit with means of repay­
ment especially adapted to the needs of famiers. Moreover, by introducing a new 
credit institution capable of competing with private sources of credit. Congress 
hoped to influence the terms, especially interest rateç and repayment procedures, of 
all comparable loans in the agricultural sector of the economy.^ Thus, the objectives 
^ For example. Sparks asserted in 1932 that "the result of a good banking sys­
tem should be an equality of interest rates upon loans of the same amount and at the 
same time regardless of the distance of the borrower from financial centers" (39, 
p. 148). 
^A, G. Black, the fourth governor of the Farm Credit Administration, sum­
marized the original objectives of the system as follows: "Through the establishment 
of the ^Land Ban^ System it was hoped that interest rates would be lowered, that 
the larger regional variations in rates would be eliminated, and that a dependable 
source of credit would always be available to farmers" (2, p. 43). 
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Congress hoped to achieve by sponsoring the FLB system were consistent in the sense 
that if the system was able to provide a stable source of low-cost mortgage credit with 
appropriate repayment provisions, it would be able to induce private lenders either by 
example or by competition to do likewise. Accomplishment of these.specific objec­
tives would, in turn, contribute to the general objective of improving the market mech­
anism for the allocation of farm mortgage credit. 
The appropriateness of the objectives was not the main issue in the debate and 
discussion that preceded the establishment of the FLB system; the major source of con­
troversy was the methods to be employed in the attainment of the objectives. In par­
ticular, the issue was how governmental intervention could be most suitably effected. 
The Congressional commission sent to Europe in 1912 to study farm credit institutions 
was favorably impressed with the European cooperative type lending agencies, espe­
cially the German landschafts, and recommended the establishment of similar credit 
facilities in the United States.^ 
There was not much doubt at the time that government aid was needed in the 
initial organization, financing and supervision of the system. The basic question was 
whether or not this governmental aid was to be a permanent feature. The original 
^As a compromise to those who opposed a cooperative type of farm credit 
institution, the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 provided for the establishment of 
privately owned joint stock land banks as well as the cooperatively owned FLB sys­
tem. After a slow start, the joint stock land banks' loan volume reached a peak of 
$667 million in 1928 and then declined rapidly. The considerable criticism de­
veloped against these banks lead to a decision to liquidate them in 1933, although 
the process of liquidation was not completed until 1938. For a complete discussion 
of the reasons for their failure see Murray (32) and Schwartz (38). 
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decision was to limit the governmental function only to whatever initial aid was 
needed to get the system going. Once the system was established, it was intended to 
be private insofar as sources of funds and managerial policies were concerned. The 
original concept was later modified because of failure to obtain sufficient capital 
from private sources to permit early withdrawal of government support and because of 
the unexpected and prolonged farm depression following World War I. Although the 
FLB system had virtually completed its program of retirement of government owned 
stock by 1929, the subsequent distress of the agricultural sector during the 1930's 
again necessitated substantial infusions of government funds in order for the system to 
continue and expand its lending operations. With the advent of the agricultural 
prosperity associated with World War II, the original objective of a privately owned 
cooperative type institution was finally realized in June of 1947 when the last of the 
capital subscribed by the federal government was retired, ^ Thus, an analysis of the 
adequacy of an independent privately owned FLB system as an instrument of public 
policy must concentrate on the activities of the system from 1947 to the present. Be­
fore going on, however, it is essential that one point is stressed; that is, the FLB was 
originally established at a time in which agriculture was enjoying prosperity. The 
system was not designed as a relief institution but rather the emphasis was placed on 
improvement in the availability and the terms of long-term agricultural credit, and 
this emphasis is still the raison d' et re of the system. 
^No dividends were paid on capital invested in the FLB system by the govern­
ment, and earnings on this capital in the form of surplus were retained by the system. 
The Economics of the FLB System 
The general theme of the preceding section is that the basic need for a gov­
ernment sponsored credit program such as the FLB system arises from actual or supposed 
"imperfections" in the functioning of the supply side of the private market mechanism. 
Thus, a necessary step in the analysis of the potential of the FLB system is to examine 
the nature of these market imperfections with the intent of defining the necessary con­
ditions for successful intervention by the system. 
The major sources of farm mortgage credit can be classified into three cate­
gories: individuals, private institutions, and the FLB system. In terms of the total 
credit supplied by the first two categories of lenders, a priori reasoning suggests that 
the total volume supplied is an increasing function of the difference between the form 
mortgage rate and the rates of return on nonfarm alternative investments. The private 
institutional lenders in particular are motivated to carefully evaluate alternative op­
portunities and to allocate their loanable funds to the sectors of the economy for which 
the return is highest. Indeed, it has been suggested that the aggregate supply of mort­
gage credit is highly elastic when the farm mortgage rate is significantly higher than 
nonfarm credit rates. However, there are several reasons for expecting the elasticity 
of the supply of farm mortgage credit by private lenders to be less than infinite. 
Greater default risk is incurred by lenders as progressively larger quantities of 
funds drè supplied to any particular sector of the economy, because, among other 
reasons, the increased volume of loans reduces the equity ratio of that sector. 
Loan funds are not perfectly mobile for a number of reasons. There are 
administrative costs involved when a lender shifts from one type of asset to another. 
Lenders seek diversification and require progressively higher rates on any particular 
type of loan in order to change the proportion of their portfolios devoted to that type. 
Intimate knowledge gained through past lending experience in certain sectors of the 
economy may lead to lender preferences for these sectors which could be overcome 
only by substantially higher rates of return in other sectors. 
In general; increasing risk and the lack of credit mobility mitigate the possi­
bility that the aggregate supply of farm mortgage credit is perfectly elastic when 
farm mortgage rates are high relative to nonfarm rates. However, in principle, it is 
possible that an agency such as the FLB system, which because of its quasi-public 
status is not as responsive as private lenders to the above factors, could bring about a 
situation in which aggregate supply is highly elastic. The reason is quite simple: 
since the aggregate supply is the sum of several components, only one of these com­
ponents must provide a highly elastic supply in order for the total supply curve to be 
highly elastic. The limiting case would be an infinitely elastic aggregate supply 
brought about by an infinitely elastic supply of only one of the sources. ^ 
The possibility that FLB system could generate a perfectly elastic supply of 
farm mortgage credit constitutes the analytical substance of its potential to mitigate 
one source of market imperfection—that of private monopoly power. It is a well 
^This does not necessarily imply that the one source "captures the market," 
The same reasons that were listed above as restraints on an infinite supply by private 
lenders would also serve to restrain complete withdrawal from the market. 
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known proposition of economic microtheory that in a market characterized by any 
degree of monopoly power, the equilibrium price will be higher and the quantity 
smaller than if the market was perfectly competitive. In a credit market, monopoly 
implies that not only are interest rates higher and loan volume lower than in a com­
petitive market, but also that the other aspects of the loan contracts are more adverse 
to the borrower than they would be under competitive conditions. 
Obviously, an agency such as the FLB system can alleviate the market imper­
fection due to monopoly power by being able and willing to provide credit on terms 
more advantageous to the borrowers than those offered by the private lenders. It is 
possible that the competition of the system would thereby exert a downward pressure 
on rates or improvement of other terms without necessarily reducing the total volume 
of loans made by the private lenders. But, if the loan rate is pushed significantly 
below nonfarm credit rates, private lenders may decide to shift a portion of their 
lending activity to other sectors of the economy. In this case, the system would have 
to replace the loans withdrawn by private lenders in order to keep the total volume 
constant. But, regardless of the response of private lenders in terms of the amount of 
loanable funds they are willing to supply to the farm mortgage market, the potential 
influence of the FLB system is determined by it, ability to offer credit at a rate lower 
than that of private lenders. 
Another source of imperfection in the farm mortgage market is that of credit 
rationing; that is, a situation in which lenders refuse borrowers additional credit ac­
commodation even though the borrowers are willing to pay the going market rate or 
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more in order to obtain credit. Because of the relevance of credit rationing to the 
influence of the FLB system on the farm mortgage credit market, ^ it is necessary to 
summarize the usual explanations of the phenomenon given in the literature. 
Credit rationing is often explained on the basis of "imperfect" competition. 
These imperfections are analogous to those associated with oligopolistic interdepend­
ence of demand and the "inflexibility" of price resulting from reluctance to jeopard­
ize market position by departures from an established price policy. The classic ex­
ample is the relative constancy of automobile prices in the period immediately 
following World War II when the excess demand was controlled by an informal ration­
ing scheme operated by car dealers rather than by means of price increases. Hodgman 
(20, p. 152), however, has pointed out that the applicability of this type of nonprice 
rationing to credit markets can be questioned. In the automobile market, buyers can 
make specific comparisons on the basis of publicly quoted sellers' prices, and this 
inhibits customer discrimination by means of price increases. However, in credit 
markets, loans are usually privately negotiated and individually priced, so that quot­
ing a prohibitive rate on one borrower's loan application does not necessarily affect 
the lender's ability to quote a more favorable rate on another more "creditworthy" 
application. 
Another explanation of credit rationing is based on institutional rigidities. 
Usury laws, for example, establish ceiling interest rates and may cause a lender to 
^Empirical evidence supporting this statement is offered in the next chapter 
of this study. 
ration credit to individuals. Or, legal restraints, such as the "ten percent rule" ap­
plied to national banks, may inhibit the accommodation of a creditworthy customer. 
These and other types of institutional rigidities are perhaps the most obvious cause of 
credit rorioning. 
A third explanation of credit rationing has been proposed by Hodgman (21), 
His explanation is more general than the previous two, because it is independent of 
a particular market structure or institutional characteristics. The essence of Hodg­
man's argument can be best presented by the means of a simple diagram, although his 
formal presentation is much more elegant and complete. 
In Figure 1, the line BB' represents a demand for credit derived from a bor­
rower's assessment of the yields expected from a given set of investment projects. The 
line LL' represents the lender's assessment of the yields expected from the same set of 
investment projects. The vertical difference between the two lines represents an in­
consistency of borrower's and lender's expectations. Hodgman (21) argues that this 
inconsistency comes about because the borrower's promise to pay a certain rate on a 
given amount of credit is regarded by the lender as totally unbelievable with the con­
sequence that the expected value of the promised pay-off ceases to increase as an 
offset to increased probabilities of loss. Thus, a borrower may be willing to extend a 
loan of size OA at the rate OG but refuse to increase the loan to OB at the same rate, 
because, in his estimation, the increased return promised by the borrower is not suf­
ficient compensation for the increased risk of bankruptcy. In short, the argument re­
quires the borrower to be more optimistic than the lender about the repayment 
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Fig. 1. Credit rationing illustration 
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potential of a given set of investment opportunities. 
Translating Figure 1 into aggregate terms, lenders would be willing to make 
the volume of credit represented by OA available at the rate OG which would leave 
an "unsatisfied fringe" of AB,, The question remains, however, of how lenders deter­
mine what volume of credit they are willing to lend. In a specific market, such as 
mortgage credit, the determinant may be that of diversification. For example, insur­
ance companies often allocate at the beginning of a year a certain portion of their 
funds for investment in farm mortgage credit with only a rough idea of the actual 
interest rates that will result as the loans are made during the year. Or, insurance 
companies may feel it necessary to provide a certain volume of farm mortgage credit 
in order to promote their policy sales. The basic point is that if credit rationing does 
exist, the volume of credit actually transacted in the market is determined by factors 
other than the market forces of supply and demand. 
If private lenders do engage in the type of credit rationing depicted in Fig­
ure 1, the FLB system can eliminate the unsatisfied demand by extending a volume of 
credit equal to AB at the rate OG. Under these circumstances, the total volume of 
farm mortgage credit used may increase without a change in either the rates or loan 
volume of private lenders. Thus, it is possible that if credit rationing exists, the FLB 
system could accommodate farmers' unsatisfied need for credit by offering the same 
loan rates as private lenders. 
If the system offers lower credit terms than private lenders, the consequences 
are not so easily determined. If the system offered a rate of OF, for example, a 
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quantity of credit equal to OC would be demanded, and assuming that private lenders 
had decided they needed the rate OG in order to make farm mortgage loans, the pri­
vate lenders may withdraw entirely from the market. ^  A more realistic result is that 
private lenders are able to retain some portion of the market even though they charge 
higher rates, because they are able to offer some form of nonprice competition. In­
surance companies, for example, hcve consistently charged higher rates than the FLB 
system and have retained a share of the market by offering higher loan-to-value ratios 
than those offered by the system. However, the greater the differential between the 
private lender's rate and the FLB rate, the greater must be the attractiveness of the 
nonprice inducement offered by the private lenders. This implies that FLB system's 
potential influence on the nonprice aspects of private loans depends to a large ex­
tent on its ability to offer loans at rates below those of private lenders. 
The main conclusions of the above survey of the sources of imperfections in the 
farm mortgage market can now be summarized. The need for intervention by the FLB 
system arises from either the existence of some degree of monopoly power by private 
lenders or from the existence of credit rationing. In either case, the potential influ­
ence of the FLB system on the farm mortgage market is primarily a function of its 
capability to provide loans at interest rates below those of private lenders. To be 
more exact, it should be noted that the system could influence the market by offer­
ing credit at a rate equal to that of private lenders but providing more attractive 
maturities, loan-to-value ratios, etc. However, from the borrower's point of view, 
^The reader is reminded that LL' does not represent a supply of credit curve. 
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these latter features are substitutable for interest rate differentials. For example, the 
FLB system may successfully compete with insurance companies by offsetting a low 
loan-to-value ratio with a high interest rate differential. Thus, in general, the abil­
ity to supply mortgage credit at a cost equal to or less than other lenders is the basic 
condition necessary for effective intervention by the FLB system in the farm mortgage 
credit market. 
Another basic condition for successful intervention by the system is its capabil­
ity of providing the appropriate volume of credit under given circumstances. For ex­
ample, if monopoly power by private lenders exists, the system should provide that 
volume of credit which just matches the amount that would be forthcoming under com­
petitive conditions. Such a statement is almost entirely devoid of operational mean­
ing, however, for there is no obvious method of determining what that amount should 
be. The same problem exists if credit rationing is the source of the market imperfec­
tions. In the situation depicted in Figure 1, for example, elimination of the "unsat­
isfied fringe" by the system does not guarantee that the resultant volume of credit and 
rates correspond to those that would prevail in a perfectly competitive market. These 
considerations imply that it is impossible to set up objective criteria, based on com­
petitive market norms, by which the performance of the system could be evaluated. 
It is possible, however, to identify the type of market imperfection which 
best explains the effect of the FLB system's actions in the market. For example, if 
monopoly power prevails, and the demand for credit is increasing, substantial in­
creases in loans by the system at rates below those of private lenders would tend to 
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reduce the relative share of the market held by private lenders, although rates 
charged by private lenders increase. ^ If credit rationing exists, then it is possible 
for the system to increase the total volume of credit without causing a corresponding 
decrease in the market share of private lenders, but unlike the situation in which 
monopoly power is present, it is less likely that private lenders' rates would increase. 
The reason is that as the total demand shifts outward and to the right, the system ac­
commodates the addition to the "unsatisfied fringe." 
The main conclusion of this section is that unless the system is able to con­
tinuously obtain loanable funds at costs less than or equal to those of private lenders, 
its effectiveness in correcting market imperfections is impaired. By the same token, 
achievement of the objectives of market stabilization and of sectoral-regional equal­
ization of rates ultimately depends on the system's ability to obtain funds at low cost. 
The adequacy of the financing method employed by the system is analyzed in terms 
of this basic condition after a brief survey of the administrative organization of the 
system. 
Administrative Organization of the FLB System^ 
The FLB system is under the supervision of the Farm Credit Administration 
(FCA)—an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal government. 
^This assumes that marginal "cost" schedule of private lenders slopes upwards. 
^The administrative organization of the FLB system has undergone frequent and 
substantial changes since 1916. This section describes only the current status of the 
administrative organization of the system. The evolution of the Fa mi Credit System is 
described more fully by Murray (32, pp. 358-373). 
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The Federal Farm Credit Board is responsible for the general supervision of the FCA, 
and this board consists of thirteen members—one appointed by the Secretary of Agri­
culture and the other twelve by the President of the United States, subject to the con­
sent of the Senate. One member must be appointed from each farm credit district, • 
and all provide their services on a part-time basis. The board selects the Governor of 
the FCA, although the selection must be approved by the President so long as the 
federal government has any capital invested in the various agencies under FCA super-
• • 1 vision. ' 
The organization of the Federal Farm Credit System is analogous to that of the 
Federal Reserve System—regional banks, located in twelve districts owned by member 
institutions but subject to centralized control. The three banks in each district—a 
Federal Land Bank, an Intermediate Credit Bank, and a Bank for Cooperatives—have 
a single board of directors and a general agent who serves as a joint officer for the 
three banks. The general agent and the three presidents of the regional institutions 
administer the day-to-day activities of the banks and also serve as an advisory council 
to the regional farm credit board. 
In order to obtain a loan through the FLB system, a farmer must become a 
member of a Federal Land Bank Association (FLBA)—the local member institution of 
the system. The borrower purchases stock in his local association equal to 5 percent 
^In addition to the FLB system, the FCA supervises 12 Federal Intermediate 
Credit Banks, 13 Banks for Cooperatives, and the sub-organizations associated with 
these banks. The FLB system retired the last of its government capital in 1947, but 
the other agencies have not yet fully achieved private ownership. 
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of his loan, and the local association must then buy an equal amount of stock in the 
FLB of its district. Reflecting the cooperative principle upon which the FLB system is 
based, each FLBA endorses and becomes liable for all loans to its members. 
All loan applications must be approved by the local association's loan com­
mittee and board of directors. The district FLB appraiser appraises the land, while 
t 
the loan committee makes its own appraisal. When a loan application is approved, 
the transaction is completed by the ossociation issuing stock^ to the borrower-member 
and by endorsing the mortgage note to the district FLB. The district bank then issues 
stock to the local FLBA, which is held by the association as security for the loan, and 
also sends a bank draft to the farmer for the amount of the loan less the 5 percent 
stock subscription. 
As a result of the system's quasi-public nature and the equity ideal underlying 
its cooperative organization, the same rate is charged on all loans made within a 
district, regardless of the size of the loan or the financial condition of the borrower. 
However, differences in loan rates between districts are allowed and are supposed to 
reflect risk differentials arising out of the differences in the types of agriculture in 
the various districts. By law, new loan rates in any one district may not exceed by 
more than 1 percent the rate paid on the last series of bonds by the system, except 
with the approval of the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, and in no case 
may sucH loan rates exceed 6 percent, 
'The loan automatically includes the necessary subscription for the associa­
tion's stock. 
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Loans may vary from $100 to $200,000 to any one borrower and may be used 
for land purchase; farm repairs or improvements; equipment, fertilizer, and livestock 
purchases; and for the refinancing of real estate or chattel mortgages. Loans must not 
exceed 65 percent of the appraised "normal value" of the farm property offered as 
security. The amortization period of the loans varies from not less than 5 years to not 
more than 40 years, and repayments may be arranged on the basis of a fixed number of 
one or more installments each year. Most of the loans written by the system have been 
for periods of 20 years or more. The original legislation gave the borrower the privi­
lege to elect partial or full payment of the principal after the mortgage had been in 
effect for 5 years. In the 1930's, the system was authorized to accept "conditional" 
payments which could be used to meet any future payments if the borrower could not 
make the payments when due. These conditional payments draw interest at the same 
rate as that paid on the mortgage. 
Sources of funds 
For the purposes of this study, the system's sources of loanable funds are 
classified as internal and external. Internal sources are those over which the system 
has direct control in the sense that it need not obtain the acquiescence of an outside 
agent in determining the use of these funds. It is clear that the amounts available 
from these internal sources are only partly within the control of the system and are 
in part dependent upon external conditions over which the system has little or no 
control. The internal sources consist of the following: 
1. Funds generated from past lending operations. These consist of repayments 
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and prepayments of the principal of outstanding loans along with the interest payments 
on these loans. 
2. Funds obtained as income on investments. These consist almost entirely of 
interest payments on United States government securities held as part of the system's 
reserves or as lodgment of temporarily surplus funds, ' 
3« Funds available by liquidation of United States government securities. 
This source represents liquidation of surplus reserves accumulated in past periods or 
the liquidation of United States bonds used as a means of holding "forward money." 
External sources are defined as those which involve the agreement of individ­
uals or institutions that are independent of the system. Therefore, these funds are 
available only if the terms of the transaction are acceptable to both transactors. 
The external sources are grouped into the following classifications: 
1. Loans from other banks under the supervision of the Farm, Credit Adminis­
tration. There are a total of 37 banks under the supervision of the Farm Credit 
Administration, and formal procedures for interbank lending and borrowing on a 
temporary basis have been organized.^ 
2. Commercial bank loans. The loans from commercial banks are often 
negotiated by the individual banks within the FLB system and are often collateraled 
^The surplus funds are the result of either an excess of past cash inflows over 
outflows or "forward money" obtained from bond sales. 
^The reported use of this interchange among the three types of banks has 
averaged $200 million per annum (65, p. 103). 
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by United States government securities or FLB bonds. Commercial bank borrowings 
are used primarily as an interim source of funds between bond sales. 
3. Public sale of consolidated FLB bonds. This source of funds is the prin­
cipal one used by the FLB system and differs fundamentally from the other external 
sources because of the debt instrument used. This source also differs from the other 
sources because the contractual agreements are typically of a longer run nature than 
the other external sources. 
The use of bond sales as a method of obtaining funds is of major concern to 
this study. The most obvious reason is that the selling of bonds is the major source of 
funds for the system, ^ and, therefore, the effectiveness of this method of financing 
ultimately determines the overall effectiveness of the system. Another reason for 
concentrating on the FLB system's bond method of borrowing is that it involves a par­
ticular type of decision-making problem which is of general theoretical interest. 
The intermediary function of the FLB system 
The cost of mortgage credit can be conceptually segregated into four separate 
components. First, there is the "true" interest cost, approximated by the rate of re­
turn on government securities. The second component is the cost of risk bearing 
brought about by the possibility of loss of capital and interest. Third, there is the 
cost conjponent of non-liquidity associated with a long-term obligation. Finally, 
^Theoretically, the system could rely on negotiated loans from commercial 
banks (or other financial institutions) for all of its funds, but this would violate the 
intent of Congress as incorporated in the legislation underlying the system. 
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there is the cost of the administrative functions .associated with mortgage credit. The 
FLB system is designed to compete with other mortgage lenders by minimizing the last 
three cost elements by virtue of its role as a financial intermediary between the 
farmer-borrower and the ultimate lender—the purchaser of FLB bonds, 
Gurley and Shaw (18, p. 263) define financial intermediaries as "financial 
institutions whose principal function is the purchase of primary securities and the 
creation of claims on themselves." This definition lumps together commercial banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. Conventional monetary theory, however, dis­
tinguishes between commercial banks, on the one hand, and non-bank financial 
intermediaries, on the other, because only the liabilities of the former are accepted 
as a medium of exchange. 
Financial intermediaries interpose between ultimate borrowers and lenders in 
order to acquire the "primary" securities of the borrowers and to provide "indirect" 
securities for the portfolios of lenders. The incomes of financial intermediaries con­
sist mainly of interest on the primary securities, and their costs are composed mainly 
of interest on indirect securities and administrative expenses. 
The FLB system clearly fits into this conception of financial intermediaries, 
because it acquires primary securities in the form of farm mortgages, and its principal 
source of funds involves the provision of its own securities for investors' portfolios in 
the form of FLB bonds. ^ This conception of the FLB system also stresses the necessary 
TTechnically, the local FLBA acts only as an agent of the district Federal Land 
Bank; that is, the mortgage loan agreement is to the district Federal Land Bank. How­
ever, the local FLBA endorses the loan agreement and shares the borrower's liability. 
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condition for the successful achievement of its objectives; that is, the system must be 
able to keep its costs at levels comparable with those of other mortgage lenders. 
All financial intermediaries have the capability of reducing borrower costs 
from the levels that would prevail if only direct lending took place. In the case of 
the FLB system, this general cost reduction capability is apparent, because the aver­
age rate of return on FLB bonds is always less than the average rate prevailing on 
farm mortgage loans made by individuals. This means that the FLB system must offer 
compensating advantages to induce some investors to accept a smaller total income 
than they could receive by making direct farm mortgage loans. 
An obvious advantage of "indirect" investment in FLB bonds results from the 
system's ability to supply investors the statistical law of large numbers; that is, a 
pooling of default risks. Whereas the individual lender who invests directly in farm 
mortgages must bear the whole risk of each loan made, FLB bonds incorporate the 
consolidated liability of all member-borrowers of the system and thereby represent 
to each investor as certain an investment in farm mortgages as is available to the 
public at large. In effect, the intermediation of the FLB system transfers risk from 
the individual investor to the system, which is able to provide itself self-insurance 
because of the size and nationwide diversity of its total farm mortgage loans. More­
over, the implicit government sponsorship of the FLB system further reduces the de­
fault risk for the individual investor who buys FLB bonds. 
A less obvious advantage offered by the FLB system to individual investors is 
divisibility; that is, the intermediation of the FLB system reduces the minimum unit 
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of investment. Thus, an investor may not be able to buy a $10,000 fa mi mortgage 
loan, but he may be able to buy a $1,000 FLB bond. Moreover, the FLB system's 
ability to provide assets that are more highly divisible than direct farm mortgage 
loans allows an individual investor to more easily spread his total wealth over a 
larger number of different kinds of assets. 
The FLB system also offers investors the advantage of expertize. An investor 
who does not know how to select, or who is unable to administer mortgage loans, in 
effect delegates the responsibility to the FLB system when he purchases an FLB bond. 
By providing this service of expertize to investors, the FLB system is potentially able 
to attract funds that might otherwise be unavailable for farm mortgage investment or 
which would only be available at substantially higher costs. 
Like other financial intermediaries, the FLB system manufactures liquidity for 
the individual investor. The fact that FLB bonds are traded in highly organized secur­
ity markets means that, unlike a direct farm mortgage investment, investors can sell 
FLB bonds on short notice. Moreover, by offering bonds with varying maturities, the 
FLB system enables an investor to more closely match his anticipated future needs for 
cash. Thus, the wealth owner who switches from direct ownership of farm mortgages 
to indirect ownership through FLB bonds is able to enhance his liquidity position. 
These advantages are possible because of the financial intermediary functions 
performed by the FLB system. But, other types of financial intermediaries perform 
the same or other intermediary functions which offer advantages to induce investors 
to engage in indirect lending. Savings deposits in commercial banks, for example. 
represent o more liquid, divisible, and certain asset to an investor than a direct hold­
ing of a farm mortgage. Since the FLB system is basically designed to achieve its 
objectives by competing with other financial intermediaries in the farm mortgage 
market, its effectiveness depends on its ability to obtain loanable funds at costs equal 
to or less than its competitors. It follows that if the'system enjoys reductions in the 
cost of obtaining loanable funds that other financial intermediaries do not, its poten­
tial effectiveness is enhanced. In the absence of such "absolute" advantages, the 
system must then be financed such that its costs of loanable funds are at least compe­
titive with those of other lenders. 
Direct subsidies by the federal government were a source of cost reduction 
that gave the FLB system an advantage over private lenders during the 1916-1947 
period. ^  The FLB system has not received direct subsidies from the federal govern­
ment since it achieved complete member-borrower ownership in 1947, but the system 
does enjoy certain economic advantages by virtue of its being a creation of the gov­
ernment. In the publicity for FLB bonds, for example, prominence is given to the 
fact that the federal government has no obligation for them, direct or indirect. 
Nevertheless, it is the conviction of market people that because FLB securities are 
from an organization created by the government and operating under its supervision, 
in terms of quality, the bonds rank second only to those of the government 
'These subsidies were granted in various forms such as interest free govern­
ment capital, borrowing privileges from the Treasury, and the facilities of the Farm 
Mortgage Corporation. Complete details are given by Larson (27, pp. 12-20). 
Itself. ^  Moreover, the FLB system uses at cost many of the facilities of the United 
States Treasury and the Federal Reserve System. The economy of the use of these 
facilities/ however, is outweighed by the favorable rates on FLB bonds that are at 
least partially attributable to the prestige value of association and identification with 
the federal government. 
Another cost advantage the FLB system has relative to private lenders is its 
exemption from payment of federal corporate income taxes because of its legal status 
as a cooperative. Also, the cooperative principle underlying the operations of the 
FLB system implies that the system lends, not as a profit maximizer, but at its operat­
ing costs without consideration of liquidity loss. Finally, the FLB system's size makes 
possible a realization of any economies of scale that might exist in farm mortgage 
lending. , 
There is little doubt that the FLB system enjoys some cost advantages that 
other financial intermediaries do not, but other financial intermediaries also have 
techniques of obtaining loanable funds which are not available to the system. For 
example, time deposits at FDIC insured commercial banks represent to savers a highly 
liquid asset that is free of both default and market risk. By contrast, although an 
FLB bond is almost entirely free of default risk, it is not free of market risk, and there 
are transactions costs associated with its sale by an investor in the secondary market. 
Analogous comparisons apply to other types of farm mortgage lenders the system is 
^Empirical evidence on this point is given in Chapter IV of this study. 
supposed to influence. Thus, a basic question relevant to the structural adequacy of 
the system is whether or not the cost advantages enjoyed exclusively by the FLB sys­
tem are sufficient to enable it to compete effectively with other lenders in the farm 
mortgage market. 
It is also necessary to examine more closely the system's method of obtaining 
loanable funds, because of all the lenders operating in the farm mortgage market, 
only the FLB system relies directly on the sale of bonds as a source of funds. This 
unique feature of the FLB system is the potential source of an important cost advantage 
of the system over private lenders. But, the bond method of borrowing also presents a 
unique type of decision -making problem—hereafter referred to as the maturity distribu­
tion problem—and inappropriate resolution of this problem by the system may offset 
any cost advantages it enjoys over other types of lenders. 
The Maturity Distribution Problem 
The essence of the maturity distribution problem can be most easily stated by 
making a number of simplifying assumptions. The first is that the supply of funds 
available for investment FLB bonds at each maturity is perfectly elastic; that is, the 
rate of interest paid in any period on bonds of any given maturity is not a function 
either of the amount of any particular maturity issued or of the aggregate amount of 
all maturities. The next assumption is that selling costs are zero regardless of the 
amount sold of any maturity or the aggregate amount sold of all maturities. The third 
assumption is that a given amount of debt is to be financed by bond sales over a given 
period of time. The fourth and final assumption is that there is no uncertainty about 
the level of future interest rates spanning a finite period of time and that ajl borrowers 
and investors know precisely what these rates are going to be. This last assumption is 
a convenient way of isolating the factors that determine the relative effects of short-
and long-term borrowing, but must be dropped for a complete statement of the matur­
ity problem. 
The first case considered is that in which the short-rate corresponds to the 
shortest maturity available, say a "year," and that the long rate corresponds to the 
maturity which spans a "planning period" of n years. All rates are assumed to be 
known with certainty, but suppose the short rate deviates from the long rate. Be­
cause the current short rate, ^  r(0,1), is known as well as all the short rates for the 
subsequent years, the average of the series of short rates can be calculated. Also, 
knowledge of the rates on all maturities intermediate^Èèiwe^n the longest and the 
shortest maturities enables computation of the average rates implied by each of the 
intermediate maturities, assuming that between the time each bond matures and the 
end of the planning period, it is replaced by short borrowing at the known short rates. 
Similarly, it is possible to calculate the average rate implied by every possible suc­
cession of maturities of various lengths. Under these assumptions, the borrower pre­
sumably chooses that chain or sequence of maturities which results in the lowest 
^The notation r(0,1) indicates the rate now prevailing on a 1 year bond; 
r(3,l) indicates a 1 year bond sold at the beginning of th# 3 year, etc. Similarly, 
the longest rate.now prevailing is represented as r(0,n) where n represents the number 
of years within the planning period. 
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average cost,^ This implies that if there are two different sequences, both of which 
have lower average costs than all other sequences, a borrower is indifferent as to 
which sequence is used.^ A simple numerical illustration, however, will suffice to 
demonstrate that there are circumstances in which an individual borrower such as the 
FLB system may not be indifferent. 
Consider a period of 3 years at the end of which a given dollar amount of 
debt is to be retired.^ If it is assumed that the bond maturities are restricted to 1, 
2, and 3 years, a hypothetical set of rates can be arrayed as follows:^ 
r(0,l) = .010 r(1,l) = .020 r(2,1) = .030 
r(0,2) = .015 r(l,2)=.025 
r(0,3) = .020 
The four possible maturity sequences in this illustration can be listed as fol­
lows: 
#1: (0,1)^ ( 1 , 1 ) ( 2 , 1 )  
^2: (0,1)-- (1/2) 
#3: (0,2) — (2,1) 
#4: (0,3) 
^ If compound interest is used, the borrower presumably chooses the sequence 
corresponding to the lowest discounted total cost. 
^The analysis of Treasury debt management given by Musgrave (33, p. 594) 
arrives at this conclusion. 
^By assuming retirement of the debt at the end of the period, the number of 
possible maturity sequences is greatly reduced. 
•^The hypothetical rates correspond to Hick's theory of the term structure of 
interest rates; that is, current long rates are a function of future short rates. 
Thus, if sequence ^2 is followed, the initial offering would be bonds of 1 year matu­
rity at an interest rate of 1 percent; at the end of the initial year, 2 year bonds would 
be offered at a rate of 2.5 percent, and the average cost over the 3 year period would 
be 2 percent. 
The numerical example is constructed such that all 4 of the sequences result in 
thg same average cost of 2 percent, but there are at least two reasons why a borrower 
such as the FLB system may not be indifferent as to which sequence is used. The as­
sumption that a given dollar amount of debt is to be financed over the period is equiv­
alent to stating that all bonds are sold at par; therefore, the pattern of cash outflow 
in the form of total coupon payments varies according to the interest rates of the par­
ticular maturity sequence chosen. This could lead to a technical problem of match­
ing cash inflow from a given amount of loans with the cash outflow if the system is 
unable to match the loan maturities with the bond maturities. For example, if the 
system were to extend a given amount of loans^ with 3 year maturities at the begin­
ning of the-initial period and follow sequence ^1, it should charge at least a 2 per-
cent loan rate in order to cover its financing costs. But, the result would be an 
excess of interest charges over interest income during the third year.^ Of course, 
this excess could be paid out of the "profit" accumulated during the initial year, but 
^The complications introduced by loan amortization and administrative ex­
penses are ignored in this example, 
^This possibility disappears if short rates are equal to long rates over the 
planning period. 
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on thè basis of conventional accounting practice, a loss would be shown for the last 
year which may not be easy to justify. 
There is another consideration which may lead to a preference of one se-
» 
quence over another even if both have the same average cost. Since the FLB system 
seeks to obtain its objectives by competing with other mortgage lenders, it must be 
able to offer equivalent terms on its loans. Thus, if other lenders obtain their loan­
able funds by means other than bond sales, such as insurance companies, their loan 
rates may be more or less independent of the bond market. For example, if the costs 
of funds to some types of financial intermediaries lags behind increases in bond rates, 
the FLB system would be better able to compete in terms of loan rates by following 
that sequence which most closely matches the changes in its competitors' costs. If it 
is known that competitors' costs and loan rates are going to increase by 1 percent per 
year, the system could most easily "keep in step" by following sequence . Differ­
ent assumptions as to competitors' costs and rates would make the other sequences 
preferable, but the point has been made that even in the simple world of certainty, 
the single attribute of interest cost may be an inadequate guide to decisions as to the 
appropriate maturity sequence. This inadequacy becomes even more apparent when 
the assumption of certainty is eliminated. 
In a very real sense, uncertainty is the essence of the system's debt manage­
ment problem. In terms of its lending activity, uncertainty means that the system is 
unable to accurately predict future cash inflows from any given volume of loans out­
standing. Presumably, the amortization schedules incorporated into the existing 
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volume of loan contracts provide a basis for predicting future cash inflows, but the 
liberal loan repayment, prepayment, and refinancing privileges accorded borrowers 
reduces the reliability of such estimates. The problem is complicated further by the 
fact that at any given moment in time the future volume of loan demand is unknown. 
These considerations imply that the system must take into account the attribute of 
flexibility; that is, the degree to which the total debt outstanding can be quickly 
expanded or contracted. 
The busic need for debt flexibility arises from the possibility that the loan 
volume might drop unexpectedly and thereby threaten the system with insolvency. 
But this threat is not solely dependent on the maturity distribution of the system's 
debt; the size of the system's net worth, for example, is of importance in this regard. 
Moreover, there is always the "last resort" possibility of repurchase of the outstand­
ing bonds prior to maturity. 
Aside from the risks of insolvency, flexibility can have an important influ­
ence on the system's effectiveness. For example, by approximately matching the 
maturities of its loans and obligations, the FLB system would minimize difficulties 
which might result if bond interest rates rose and maturing obligations had to be re­
placed with higher coupon securities while rates on outstanding long-term loans re­
mained fixed. But if rates on nonagricultural investment opportunities were to de­
cline, private lenders might offer borrowers mortgage loans at lower rates, and the 
system would then be faced with the problem of refinancing its loans at lower rates, 
even though it would still be obligated on its long-term, high coupon securities. 
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Thus, although the FLB system specializes in long-term mortgage loans, there are 
circumstances in which the lack of debt flexibility could hamper the effectiveness of 
the system. 
Because short-term issues provide more frequent opportunities for debt retire­
ment or expanded offerings than long-term issues, flexibility is directly related to the 
amount, of siiort-term maturities included in a given amount of debt. However, there 
are alternatives to maturity distribution adjustments as a means of adjusting flexibil­
ity; the use of call features and repurchases in the secondary market are examples. 
In temis of its borrowing activities, uncertainty is an integral part of the sys­
tem's maturity decision problem because of the possibility of incurring opportunity 
losses. An opportunity loss is defined as any fall in the market rates between the 
time bonds are issued and the time they mature. For example, suppose at the time 
the system needs additional funds, long rates are equal to short rates, and the system 
decides to issue long-term bonds. If the general level of rates subsequently declines, 
the system loses the advantage it could have gained from the decline in rates if it 
had initially borrowed on short term.^ Of course, precisely the opposite holds if 
rates rise after an initial issue of long-term bonds. 
In general, financing by means of long-temi bonds means that opportunity 
^The loss cannot be recouped by borrowing new funds at the reduced rate 
and using the proceeds to retire the previous, debt by purchases in the secondary 
market because if the debt is retired prior to its original maturity, it would have 
to be purchased at a premium. Thus, nothing is gained, and the benefits of the 
lower rates are lost until the original maturity date of the bonds is reached. 
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risks are higher than if financing is carried out by means of short-temi bonds. But, 
a possible compensating advantage is that financing long provides stability in the 
level of interest costs over time. In view of the objectives of the system, stability 
of interest costs may be highly desirable because of the effects on its competitive 
position relative to other lenders® For example, if the system were to finance 
$10 million of amortized 10-year loans by means of an issue of 10-year bonds, it 
would be able to extend $1 million worth of new or "renewal" loans in each of the 
10 years at the current loan rate regardless of future changes in bond rates. In ef­
fect, the system would be stabilizing future loan rates by extending the maturity of 
its bonds beyond the maturity of its assets, and the "cost" of such stabilization is the 
opportunity risks thereby incurred. By the same token, if the system extends the 
maturity of its loans beyond the maturity of its bonds, it would reduce opportunity 
risks by foregoing the opportunity of stabilizing future loan rates. 
The discussion thus far has not taken into account the influence of the possi­
bility of differentials between the short-term and long-term bonds. On the one hand, 
if current short rates are less than long rates, the system has the opportunity of offer­
ing low loan rates to its borrowers by selling short-term bonds. This is a form of 
speculation, because by borrowing short-to make long-term mortgage loans, the pos­
sibility arises that when the short-term bonds are refunded, the bond rates then pre­
vailing will exceed current loan rates. On the other hand, if short-term bond rates 
^This assumes that the amortization schedules are such that equal payments of 
principal are made in each of the 10 years and that administrative costs do not change. 
exceed long-term bond rates, the system can then sell long-term bonds to match its 
long-term mortgage loans and presumably enjoys the best of all possible worlds. How­
ever, in this last case, the system still incurs opportunity risk in the sense that future 
bond rates, both long and short, may decline below present levels. In summary, in 
attempting to achieve its objectives of cost stabilization and minimization, the system 
must consider both the current and expected future term structure of ratés^ and the 
opportunity risks contained therein. 
The literature on corporate financing and Treasury debt management offers a 
number of different strategies for dealing with the maturity distribution problem. As 
a prelude to an analysis of FLB debt management, the strategies are presented below 
in an extreme, abstract form in order to sharpen contrasts between them. 
The most salient aspects of five alternative debt management strategies are 
outlined here for future reference: 
1. Cyclical Form expectations of the cyclical pattern of 
business activity and of interest rates, and then adjust maturities according to the 
following rules: 
a) Go long in low interest rate periods. 
b) Go short in high interest rate periods. 
2. Trend Form expectations of the average level of long-
term rates over an extended future period, and then adjust maturities as follows: 
^ Hereafter the term structure of rates refers to the relation between short- and 
long-term rates on debt instruments of equal quality. 
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a) Go long when the current long rate is less than the expected 
long rate. 
b) Go short when the current long rate is above the expected 
long rate. 
3. Hedge Form expectations of the future steam of funds flow­
ing from current assets, and then arrange an exactly matching outflow of funds by an 
appropriate arrangement of the maturities on bond issues. 
4. Fixed Pick a certain term to maturity and issue bonds with 
that maturity only. 
5. Current costs minimization Choose maturities which mini­
mize immediate or short-run interest costs. This may involve choosing maturities from 
either the entire range of maturities or from a certain range of maturities. 
CHAPTER HI. EFFECTS OF FLB LENDING ACTIVITY: 1947-1961 
Introduction 
The influence of the FLB system on the farm mortgage credit market during the 
1947-1961 period is evaluated in this chapter. Deficiencies in the available data 
and the previously discussed difficulties of establishing objective criteria preclude the 
use of formal statistical analysis. Instead, this chapter is best described as an analyt­
ical narrative of the system's lending activity which attempts to identify the direction 
if not the magnitude of the system's influence. Primary attention is given to two as­
pects of the farm mortgage market; changes in total loan volume and interest rates. 
This limitation is due to the practical consideration that the data available on loan 
volume and rates are less inadequate than data on loan-to-value ratios, initial pay­
ment requirements, prepayment privileges, maturities, etc. The emphasis on inter­
est rates is also partly due to choice, because it is a basic contention of this study 
that the ability of the system to compete with other lenders on the basis of interest 
rates is a necessary, although not a sufficient, requirement for its success. 
The FLB system's share of the farm mortgage market increased in all but two 
of the years from 1947 to 1950. The rate of increase accelerated appreciably from 
1951 to the end of 1955 and then moderated during the 1956-1961 period. Simulta­
neously, there was a significant realignment among all mortgage lenders over the 
post-war period as a whole as well as within the three sub-periods denoted by the 
different growth rates mentioned above. Thus, in the first part of this chapter, the 
three sub-periods of 1947-1950, 1951-1955, and 1956-1961 provide a convenient 
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breakdown for examining the performance of the system in terms of its contribution to 
improving the functioning of the market by alleviating the effects of monopoly power 
and credit rationing. The second part of this chapter evaluates the influence of the 
system in terms of the specific objectives of interest rate stability and regional-sector 
equaj-ity. Before proceeding, however, it is helpful to examine briefly the major 
factor underlying the demand for farm mortgage credit during the 1947-1961 period. 
Strong foreign and domestic demand for agricultural output continued the 
early post-war rise of prices received by farmers. In 1947, realized net income of 
m 
farm operators was at a record high of $16.8 bill ion--an amount that was one-third 
more than that received in 1945. Continued technological change made it possible 
for farmers to handle larger acreages and, caught between declining prices of output 
and rising costs of production, adoption of new technology became imperative. The 
cost-price squeeze increased after 1947, and realized net income by the end of 1950 
had fallen back to the level attained in 1945. The rate of increase in farm real es­
tate prices declined with the fall in income and the index of farm real estate value 
fell in 1950, but the decline was short and not severe. The outbreak of the Korean 
War In 1950 caused a sharp increase in prices received by farmers, but farm costs 
also rose so that net income continued the decline that began in 1948. 
Prices received by farmers continued to rise in 1951, and while costs also rose 
substantially, net income by the end of 1951 was 16 percent above that of the previ­
ous year. Land values increased with the rise of net income in 1951 but leveled off 
as farm income began a decline that lasted until 1958, However, the index of farm 
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real estate value turned up in 1954 and rose steadily through 1961. 
The increase of farm real estate values from 1955 to 1961 in the face of a gen­
eral downward trend of farm income is the outstanding characteristic of this period. 
Among the factors explaining it, an important one is the increased competition among 
farmers for land to expand their operations. The Department of Agriculture has report­
ed (9, p. 855) that slightly over two-fifths of all land purchases in 1959 were made to 
expand farm size compared with about one-fourth of the total in 1950-1953, The in­
creased scale of production was probably the only feasible way to maintain individual 
farm income in the face of rising costs and falling prices. Non farm uses also exerted 
pressure on farm real estate values. The "urban sprawl," road building, flood con­
trol, and other projects absorbed an increasing share of land use in the 1950's. The 
purchase of form land as an inflation hedge is another factor sometimes mentioned as 
a source of stimulation to farm real estate values. 
Of primary significance to this study is the fact that there was a strong upward 
turn in the demand for farm mortgage credit throughout the 1947-1961 period. Among 
the possible explanations of this increased demand, two seem to predominate: 
1. Adoption of technological innovations required the use of more long-term 
credit in order to operate large sized units as a means of offsetting the effects of the 
"cost-price" squeeze. 
2, Rising land values necessitated larger mortgage loans for ownership trans­
fer purposes. 
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The immediate post-war period; 1947-1950 
Throughout this period, the FLB system was committed to a policy of prevent­
ing an excess supply of mortgage credit from contributing to an inflationary increase 
in land values. The system's annual report of 1945-1946 stressed the need for "sound 
use" of credit in a period of rising prices of both form commodities and farm supplies 
(49, p. 2): 
Illustrative of this is the period after the First World War when many farmers 
went too heavily into debt, both long-term and short-term debt. Many farmers 
with farm mortgages later lost their farms while others were forced to sell needed 
work stock and equipment in order to repay money they owed. 
The hazards of inflation were stressed in each of the subsequent annual reports, 
and by 1950, the unusual suggestion was made that if the existing inflationary pres­
sure increased speculation in farm land, it might be "advisable" to request preventive 
legislation (51, p. 2). In terms of its own operation, however, the system sought to 
restrain increases in the supply of credit by holding down the average size of its 
loans. 
To implement this policy, the system relied mainly on the concept of "normal 
agricultural value" as the basis for conservative farm appraisals. The formal defini­
tion ^  of this concept is devoid of operational meaning without further specification 
of such terms as typical, usual, customary, etc. In practice, the nomial value 
^The system has defined (50, p. 33) this concept as "the amount a typical 
purchaser would, under usual conditions, be willing to pay and be justified in paying 
for the property for customary agricultural uses, including farm home advantages, with 
the expectation of obtaining average production and of receiving normal prices for 
farm commodities." 
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concept is largely a statistical averaging process which, in general, permits farm ap­
praisals to rise relative to current market values in a period of declining land prices 
and to fall relative to current market values in a period of increasing land prices. 
For example, during the period 1947 to 1950 in which land prices were steadily in­
creasing, the average normal value for farms appraised by the system was only 61 per­
cent of the average sale price. 
The implementation of the "restraint policy" in tenns of interest rates caught 
the system on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, substantial increases in FLB 
rates could have restrained the demand for its credit. But higher rates by the system 
would have sanctioned similar rate increases by other lenders and thereby increased 
the relative attractiveness of fa mi mortgage lending. On the other hand, by keeping 
its rates low, the system would tend to anchor farm mortgage rates and thereby reduce 
the incentive for other lenders to increase their lending activity. The system chose 
the latter alternative and attempted to reduce the effects of its low rates on the de­
mand for credit by following the conservative land appraisal practice noted above. 
The magnitude of the system's activity is indicated by the data of Tables 1, 
2, and 3. Although the volume of loans made by the system increased in each of the 
years from 1947-1950, the amount of fa mi mortgage debt outstanding held by the sys­
tem declined in 1947 and continued to decline in 1948 and 1949. The difference in 
the movements of loans made and outstanding debt held by the system is explained by 
the fact that the volume of repayments exceeded that of new loans. In short, the 
system accumulated surplus funds during the period as a whole. 
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Table 1. Farm mortgage loans made or recorded by principal lenders, 1947-1961° 
(millions of dollars) 
Year 
Federal 
land 
banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Commercial 
banks 
Individuals 
and 
miscellaneous Total 
1947 137.3 230.9 487.1 547.5 1,402.8 
1948 148.6 259.2 436.4 562.7 1,406.9 
1949 180.6 276.9 396.5 537.7 1,391.7 
1950 203.1 348.0 471.6 587.7 1,601.4 
1951 211.4 381.6 458.4 670.6 1,722.0 
1952 251.6 345.6 483.7 644.4 1,725.3 
1953 286.1 394.5 484.1 653.1 1,817.8 
1954 302.0 390.3 500.1 666.4 1,858.8 
1955 482.7 507.0 582.0 814.9 2,391.6 
1956 520.9 488.0 527.9 810.5 2,347.3 
1957 403.6 387.5 502.7 887.3 2,181.1 
1958 472.5 390.3 554.9 935.6 2,353.3 
1959 626.3 450.1 605.4 1,051.5 . 2,733.3 
1960 520.2 • 413.3 541.0 1,018.8 2,493.3 
1961 644.3 512.2 623.3 1,102.2 2,892.0 
^Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (46, p. 597). 
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Table 2, Percent of total farm mortgage loans made or recorded by principal lenders, 
1947-1961° 
Federal Individuals 
land Insurance Commercial and 
Year banks companies banks miscellaneous 
1947 9.79 16.46 34.72 39.03 
1948 10.56 18.42 31.02 40.00 
1949 12.98 19.90 28.48 38.64 
1950 12.61 , 21.61 29.29 36.49 
1951 12.28 22.16 26.62 38.94 
1952 14.58 20.03 28.04 37.35 
1953 15.74 21.70 26.63 35.93 
1954 16.25 21.00 26.90 35.85 
1955 20.18 21.20 24.34 34.17 
1956 22.19 20.79 22.49 34.53 
1957 18.50 17.77 23.05 40.68 
1958 20.01 16.59 23.58 39.76 
1959 22.91 16.47 22.15 38.47 
1960 20.86 16.58 21.70 40.86 
1961 22.28 17.71 21.55 38.11 
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 1. 
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Table 3, Farm mortgage debt: amount outstanding held by principal lenders, 1947-
1961° (millions of dollars) 
End of 
year 
Federal 
land bank 
system 
Life 
insurance 
companies 
Commercial, 
banks 
Individuals 
and others Total 
1947 976.7 888.7 683.2 2,008.1 4,556.7 
1948 888.9 959.7 840.7 2,069.3 4,758.6 
1949 868.2 1,036.4 900.8 2,212.2 5,017.6 
1950 906.1 1,172.3 937.1 2,311.5 5,327.0 
1951 947.4 1,352.6 1,008.4 2,539.8 5,854.2 
1952 994.1 1,541.9 1,046.9 2,805.8 6,388.7 
1953 1,071.4 1,716.0 1,105.1 3,056.3 6,948.8 
1954 • 1,169.4 1,892.8 1,131.2 3,246.8 7,440.2 
1955 1,266.9 2,051.8 1,210.7 3,415.9 7,945.3 
1956 1,480.2 2,271.8 1,346.3 3,635.9 8,734.2 
1957 1,722.4 2,476.5 1,386.3 3,946.8 9,532.0 
1958 1,897.2 2,579.0 1,414.2 4,152.3 10,042.7 
1959 2,065.4 2,661.2 1,511.9 4,664.9 10,903.4 
1960 2,335.1 2,819.5 1,631.3 4,857.2 11,643.1 
1961 2,539.0 2,974.6 1,691.2 5,131.4 12,336.2 
^Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (46, p. 596). 
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The threat of undue inflation of land values apparently did not discourage in­
creased lending activity by insurance companies during this period, in fact, insur­
ance companies returned to the farm mortgage market as large scale lenders as early 
as 1944. Several motives prompted the increased lending activity of the insurance 
companies during this period. Most companies had worked off the backlog of farm 
real estate inherited from the Great Depression and began to re-evaluate farm loans 
as a means of diversification. The companies were also subject to growing pressures 
for additional investments as policy sales rose rapidly. Although farm mortgage rates 
were at historic lows during this period, the continuation of the "peg" in the Govern­
ment securities market enhanced the attractiveness of farm mortgage lending. In 
contrast to the behavior of insurance companies. Table 1 indicates that commercial 
banks reduced their farm mortgage loans in 1948 and 1949. Although commercial 
bank loans increased in 1950, the loans volume of that year was about 3.2 percent 
less than that of 1947. This represented a sharp reversal of bank behavior from that 
of the 1943-1946 period when the high liquidity positions of farmers as well as record 
levels of farm income had elicited an increasing amount of commercial bank activity 
in the farm mortgage market. 
The divergent lending behavior of insurance companies and commercial banks 
during the 1946-1950 period is at least partly attributable to the policy of the FLB 
system. As indicated in Table 4, by holding its loan rates constant during this period, 
the system acted as a restraining influence on private institutional lenders in te mis of 
the attractiveness of farm mortgage lending relative to non farm investment 
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Table 4. Average interest rates on farm mortgages recorded by principal types of 
lenders, biennial 1947-1961° (percent per annum) 
Year 
Commercial 
banks 
Insurance 
companies 
Federal land 
bank system 
Individuals 
and others 
All 
lenders 
1947 4.87 4.17 4.10 4.12 4.48 
1949 5.25 4.39 4.05 4.92 4.73 
1951 5.29 4.29 4.05 4.69 4.74 
1953 5.52 4.77 4.11 5.24 4.97 
1955 5.50 4.55 4.09 5.18 4.87 
1957 5.86 5.21 4.40 5.27 5.19 
1959 5.89 5.33 5.03 5.57 5.41 
1961 6.17 5.94 5.64 5.74 5.79 
^Source: Data for the years 1947-1955 are from U.S. Department of Agri­
culture (47, p. 26). Data for the years 1957-1961 are from U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (45, p. 126). 
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opportunities. But, this influence was not sufficient to prevent insurance companies 
and commercial banks from increasing their rates over the years 1947 to 1949. How­
ever, despite the fact that the rate increase was larger for commercial banks than for 
insurance companies, commercial banks reduced their loan volume. Apparently the 
commercial banks were attracted by loan opportunities in the area of non-mortgage 
agricultural credit. The volume of bank-held non-real estate agricultural loans rose 
steadily from $1.3 billion in 1947 to $3.1 billion in 1950. Thus, the system's policy 
probably contributed to the shift of banks from real estate to non-real estate credit. 
But, the system's policy was not as successful with insurance companies, because the 
rates on at least two of the alternatives available—corporate bonds and government 
securities—were held relatively constant by the Federal Reserve's "pegging" opera­
tion. The result was that although the rates on their mortgage loans increased less 
than commercial banks, the profitability of additional farm mortgage lending re­
mained about the same for insurance companies. Thus, while it is impossible to 
determine the magnitude of the FLB system's restraining influence, the direction of 
its influence on private institutional lenders is clear. ^  
^ It is also worthy of mention that the average annual (compounded) rate of 
an increase in form real estate values, as measured by the Agriculture Department's 
index, fell from 8.3 percent in the period of 1940-1945 to 6.6 percent in the period 
of 1945-1950. 
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The 1951-1955 period 
In contrast to the conservative lending policy of the 1947-1950 period, the 
system actively promoted an expansion of the aggregate supply of farm mortgage 
credit-during the 1951-1955 period. This shift in policy reflected an increased 
awareness by the system of the substantial expansion of the demand for long-term 
credit due to the increased capital needs of the agricultural industry. From 1951 to 
1955, gross capital expenditures by farm operators were at historically high levels, 
but the traditional source of financing these expenditures, gross income, declined 
continuously from $37.3 billion in 1951 to $33,3 billion in 1955. As indicated in 
Tables 1 and 3, the net effect was a substantial increase in both the annual amount 
of total farm mortgage loans closed and the volume of outstanding farm mortgage debt. 
Of particular interest is the fact that the 1955 volume of loans by the FLB 
system was 128 percent of its loans in 1951, while the percentage increases for insur­
ance companies, commercial banks, and "individuals-and-miscellaneous" was 32 , 27, 
and 22 percent respectively. Table 2 illustrates that there was also a subsequent • 
shift in the market shares of the major categories of lenders—the percent of total loan 
volume by the system increased from 12 percent in 1951 to 20 percent in 1955, while 
the percentage share of all the other lenders fell. 
The realignment of market shares by the various categories of lenders is partly 
explainable in terms of the interest rate data of Table 4, In 1951, there was a dif­
ference of 1,24 percentage points in the loan rate charged by the commercial banks 
and that of the system, but by 1955, this difference had widened to 1,41, The 
differential also increased for all other categories of lenders, although the increase 
was relatively insignificant for that of insurance companies and the FLB system. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to conclude that by being able to hold its loan rate 
constant while substantially increasing its loan volume, the FLB system was able to 
restrain the rate increases of the other categories of lenders. 
The changes that took place in the last few years of the 1951-1955 period 
are of particular interest. Table 4 indicates that the rates charged by all lenders in 
1955 were slightly below those of 1953; yet, the volume of loans closed for each 
lender in 1955 was above that of 1953 and 1954, Thus, we have a situation in which 
the aggregate supply of fanr. mortgage credit must have shifted. 
One possible explanation of the shift in the supply of farm mortgage credit is 
that private institutional lenders were influenced by an increased spread between 
farm and nonfarm loan alternatives. But if the yields on government securities are 
assumed to be representative of nonfarm investment opportunities, this explanation of 
the supply shift is not supported by the data. In fact, the difference between insur­
ance companies' rate on farm mortgages and the yield on long-term government bonds 
declined slightly from 1,72 in 1953 to 1.70 in 1955, The same differential for com­
mercial banks increased moderately from 2,58 in 1953 to 2,66 in 1955, Thus, if it 
is assumed insurance companies act strictly on the basis of rate differentials, they 
would have reduced instead of increased their farm mortgage loans from 1953 to 1955, 
Although the differential did increase for commercial banks, an increase of ,07 per­
centage points hardly seems sufficient to explain a loan expansion of about 20 percent. 
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An explanation of the supply shift in terms of credit rationing appears more 
plausible than one based on interest rate differentials. In Chapter II, it was pointed 
out that if credit rationing prevailed the FLB system could increase the total volume 
of credit by fulfilling the credit demands of the "unsatisfied fringe" and that this 
would not necessarily pull down the rotes charged by private lenders. It was also 
pointed out that credit rationing could result from legal or institutional restraints and 
changes in these restraints could lead to changes in the volume of loans without a 
change in rates. 
In the winter of 1954-1955, the FLB system revised upward its "normal value" 
appraisal criterion. ^  Thus, under the new appraisal criterion the system could make 
larger individual loans than previously and thereby enhanced its competitive position. 
Also, in August, 1954, the Federal Reserve Act was modified to permit larger real 
estate loans for longer terms by national banks.^ The combined effects of these two 
changes are apparent in the data. 
The average size of farm mortgages recorded increased from $6,000 in 1954 
to. $7,100 in 1955. The FLB system had the largest relative increase in size of farm 
T En g berg (6) notes that for the nation as a whole, the new appraisal values 
tended to average about 85 percent of average market values during 1947-1949, 
while the previous appraisal values were about 65 percent of the 1947-1949 average. 
^The changes allowed national banks to make conventional real estate loans 
for periods up to a maximum of 20 years, whereas the previous maximum was 10 years. 
Also, national banks were allowed to lend up to 66 2/3 percent of market value 
instead of the previous limit of 60 percent (12, p. 983). 
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mortgage—from $6,000 in 1954 to $8,000 in 1955, The average size of mortgages 
recorded by insurance companies rose from $13,700 in 1954 to $14,800 in 1955, while 
the increase for commercial banks was from $4,500 in 1954 to $5,000 in 1955.^ 
The 1956-1961 period 
The policy of providing an increasing amount of farm mortgage credit that the 
system initiated in the 1951-1955 period was continued throughout the 1956-1961 
period. But in contrast to the earlier period, the system was not able to hold down 
its loan rates. In fact, the data of Table 4 indicate that from 1955 to 1961, the sys­
tem's loan rates increased more than any other lender. The consequent reduction in 
the spread between the system's rates and those of other lenders weakened the com­
petitive position of the system, and as a result, the system's share of the market did 
not increase in the 1956-1961 period as it had in the 1951-1955 period. 
The deterioration of the system's competitive position caused by the increase 
in its rates probably would have been more severe if Congress had not agreed in late 
1955 to three important amendments to the Federal Farm Loan Act. One amendment 
authorized the system to recognize non farm earnings of farmers in making farm ap­
praisals. The second amendment authorized loans to corporations engaged in farming, 
and the third amendment raised the individual loan limit from $100,000 to $200,000. 
These amendments enabled the system to compete more effectively on a "nonprice" 
basis. 
^ Data taken from (10, p. 830). 
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In 1956/ the system apparently took full advantage of its improved ability to 
compete, because despite a moderate increase in its rates, it was the only source of 
credit that expanded its loan volume over that of the previous year, A further indica­
tion of the impact of the system's improved competitive position is that the decline in 
the loan volume of the "individuals and miscellaneous" category from 1955 to 1956 
was insignificant, while the.decline of the insurance companies and commercial banks 
was substantial. Indeed, one is tempted to speculate that there was a substitution of 
the system's credit for that of other institutional lenders as the increase in.the total 
demand for credit leveled off from 1955 to 1956. 
Whatever the extent of the "nonprice'' advantage the system gained in 1955, 
it was substantially offset in 1957 by the largest year-to-year increase in loan rates 
of the whole post-war period—the average of rates on new loans rose from 4,31 per­
cent in 1956 to 5,17 percent in 1957, The necessity of this increase in rates was 
deplored by the Farm Credit Administration (59, p. 15), but it at least partly explains 
why the system experienced q larger drop in loans from 1956 to 1957 than either of 
the other.two institutional lenders. The system was more affable toward an exact 
reversal of the situation in 1958 and 1959 as total demand for loans again increased 
and the system made only moderate increases in its loan rates, ^  
^After describing the increases in rates on selected Treasury securities that took 
place from 1958 to 1959, the following comment appeared in the annual report (62, 
p. 4): "Their experience during the period of tight money conditions demonstrated 
again the ability of the Farm Credit banks to obtain loan funds in the amounts required 
under varying economic conditions. No bank or association was forced to deny any 
applicant for a loan because of lack of funds," 
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In I960, the yearly average rates on new loans by the system reached the 
post-World War II high of 6 percent. Of equal significance is that the increase from 
1959 to 1960 of ,49 percent was exceeded only by the increase of ,86 percent from 
1956 to 1957. In terms of the system's share of the market, the changes from 1959 
to 1960 are also similar to those of 1956 to 1957; that is, the system's loan volume 
« 
declined more than that of any other category of lender in both periods. In 1961, 
the system recaptured its 1959 share of the market by a substantial reduction in its 
new loan rates. 
Taking the 1956-1961 period as a whole, the evidence discussed above sup­
ports the inference that the system's competitive influence on other mortgage lenders 
was impaired by the substantial increases in its loan rates. A contrast of the 1951-
1955 period with the 1956-1961 period provides additional support for this inference. 
From 1951 to 1955, the system's rates were relatively constant, and its loan volume 
increased proportionately more than the total of all lenders. From 1956 to 1961, how­
ever, the system's rates increased substantially, and the percentage increase of its 
loan volume was approximately the same as that of other lenders. 
FLB lending and regional rate patterns 
One of the specific objectives of the FLB system is to tie together widely dis­
persed farm mortgage credit markets and to thereby create more nearly unifomi regional 
rate patterns. In principle the system is supposed to achieve this objective by being 
able to offer sufficient mortgage credit, at rates which are competitive with those of 
private lenders, to insure that regional rate differentials reflect corresponding risk 
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differentials and not market imperfections. It follows that if the system's ability to 
compete with private lenders is reduced, its ability to influen-cé regional rate varia­
tions is also reduced. 
The data of Table 5 indicate that regional rate variations on farm mortgage 
loans outstanding have increased since 1946. For example, the difference between 
the regions with the lowest average rate and the highest average rate was .7 percent 
in 1947, increased to .9 percent by the mid-year of the 1947-1960 period, and 
climbed to 1,1 percent by the end of 1960,^ During this same period, the differ­
ential between the average rate of all lenders and the rate on total FLB loans de­
clined from slightly less than .5 percent to less than .3 percent. While association 
does not necessarily mean causation. Columns 10 and 11 of Table 5 indicate that the 
average rate of interest on FLB loans outstanding increased more during the period 
1947-1960 than the average rate on loans by all lenders, and this irnplies that the 
system's capability of reducing regional variation was impaired. 
Sectoral rate equality 
Another of the specific objectives of the FLB system is to provide long-term 
credit to farmers at interest rates competitive with rates paid by industry. Tables 6 
through 8 present evidence bearing on the success of the system in accomplishing this 
^The comparisons are based on rates in the Lake States and the Southeast. 
The fact that these two regions maintained the same position relative to the other 
regions during the period suggests that there was no radical shift in the risk charac­
teristics of these regions. 
Table 5. Average interest rates on farm mortgage loans outstanding, by farming regions, 1947-1960 (percent) 
Average rates for all lenders" Rate on 
North­ Lake Com Appa­ South­ Delta Southern Moun­ Pa­ United FLB loans 
east States Belt lachian east States Plains tain cific States outstanding" 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) on 
1947 4,7 4.3 4.4 4.9 5,0 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.5 4,2 
1948 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.7 • 4.5 4.1 
1949 4.6 4,3 4.3 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.1 
1950 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.9 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.5 4,1 
1951 4\7 4.3 4.3 5.0 5.1 4.7 4,5 4.7 4.7 4.5 4,1 
1952 4.7 4.3 4.3 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.1 
1953 4.7 4.3 4.3 5,0 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.1 
1954 4.7 4.3 4.4 5.0 5,2 4.9 -4.5 4.7 4.9 4.6 4.1 
1955 4.8 4,3 4.4 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.1 
1956 4.8 4.3 4.5 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.7 4.1 
1957 4.9 4.4 4.5 5.2 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.1 
1958 4.9 4.4 4.5 5.2 5.6 5.2 4.7 4,9 5.0 4.8 4.2 
1959 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.3 5.7 5.3 4.8 4,9 5.1 4.9 4.4 
1960 5.0 4.6 4.7 5.4 5.7 5.4 4.9 5,0 5.2 5.0 4.6 
1961 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.4 5.7 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.3 5,0 4.8 
"Source: Cols. 1 to 10, U.S. Department of Agriculture (44, p. 592), 
^Source: Col. 11, Table 10 of this study. 
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Table 6. Interest rates on farm mortgages recorded: average rates, by principal type 
of lenders, selected years, 1910-1961° (percent) 
Federal 
Land Bank Commercial Insurance All 
Year system banks Individuals Others companies lenders 
1910 6.68 6.34 6.82 5.62 6.39 
1911 6.74 6.42 6.49 5.85 6.43 
1912 6.63 6.41 6.84 5.89 6.43 
1913 6.69 6.25 6.75 6.05 6.36 
1914 6.67 6.31 6.61 5.91 6.38 
1915 6.69 6.28 6.66 6.11 6.39 
1916 6.68 6.30 6.42 5.76 6.32 
1917 5.05 6.55 6.27 6.31 5.61 6.22 
1918 5.45 6.78 6.30 6.55 5.92 6.31 
1919 5.50 6.82 6.30 6.47 6.09 6.36 
1920 5.50 6.93 6.28 6.73 6.07 6.40 
1921 5.88 7.57 6.73 7.34 6.50 6.95 
1922 , 5.71 7.28 6.68 6.93 6.29 6.67 
1923 5.50 7.01 6.49 6.67 5.51 6.33 
1924 5.50 6.91 6.48 6.47 5.67 6.34 
1925 5.46 6.80 6.45 6.51 5.52 6.29 
1926 5.30. 6.83 6.44 6.44 5.50 6.26 
1927 5.11 6.80 6.34 6.39 5.55 6.22 
1928 5.05 6.71 6.30 6.41 5.54 6.23 
1929 5.32 6.78 6.32 6.46 5.62 6.30 
1930 5.63 6.85 6.27 6.47 5.82 6.36 
1931 5.63 6.86 6.27 6.49 5.85 6.38 
1932 5.61 6.83 6.15 6.64 5.87 6.38 
1945 4.31 5.14 4.68 4.51 4.26 4.69 
1947 4.10 4.87 4.52 4.12 4.17 4.48 
1949 4.05 5.25 4.75 4.92 . 4.39 4.73 
1951 4.05 5.29 4.90 4.69 4.29 4.74 
1953 4.11 5.52 5.02 5.24 4.77 4.97 
1955 4.09 5.50 5.04 5.18 4.55 4.87 
1957 4.40 5.86 5.17 5.27 5.21 5.19 
1959 5.03 5.89 5.28 5.57 5.33 5.41 
1961 5.64 6.17 5.52 5.74 5.94 5.79 
^Source: Data for the years 1910-1955 (47, p. 26). Data for the years 1956-
1961 (45, p. 70). 
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Table 7. Yields on high grade corporate bonds by term to maturity, selected years, 
1910-1961° (percent) 
• Year 5 years 10 years 20 years 40 years 
1910 4.10 3.99 3.87 3.80 
1911 4.05 4.01 3.94 3.90 
1912 4.00 3.96 3.91 3.90 
1913 4.31 4.12 4.02 4.00 
1914 4.45 4.32 4.16 4.10 
1915 4.39 4.31 4.20 4.15 
1916 4.03 4.05 4.05 4.05 
1917 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 
1918 5.25 5.05 4.82 4.75 
1919 5.16 4.97 4.81 4.75 
1920 5.72 5.43 5,17 5.10 
1921 6.21 5.73 5,31 5.15 
1922 5.19 5.06 4.85 4.64 
1923 4.90 4.80 4.68 4.60 
1924 4.90 4.80 4.69 4.65 
1925 4.46 4.50 4.50 4.50 
1926 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 
1927 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 
1928 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 
1929 4.72 4.57 4.45 4.40 
1930 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 
1931 3.90 4.03 4.10 4.10 
1932 4.58 4.70 4.70 4.70 
1945 1.53 2.14 2.55 2.55 
1947 1.65 2.08 2.40 2.55 
1949 1.92 2.32 2.62 2.80 
1951 2.22 2.39 2.59 2.72 
1953 _ 2.75 2.88 3.05 3.22 
1955 2.70 2.80 2.95 3.10 
1957 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.78 
1959 3.80 4.03 4.10 3.75 
1961 3.75 4.00 4.12 n.a. 
°The data for the years 1910-1942 are taken from (5, p, 29). The data for 
the years 1943-1961 are taken from (35, p. 120), 
64 
Table 8» Differences between interest rates charged by selected lenders on farm 
mortgages recorded and yields on high grade corporate bonds, 1910-1961° 
(percent) 
Year 5 years 10 years 20 years 40 years 
Insurance companies 
1910 1.52 1.62 1.75 1.82 
1911 1.80 1.84 1.91 1.95 
1912 1.89 1.93 1.98 1.99 
1913 1.74 1.93 2.05 2.05 
1914 1.46 1.59 1.75 1.81 
1915 1.72 1.80 2.91 1.96 
1916 1.73 1.45 1.56 1.61 
1917 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 
1918 .67 .87 1.10 1.17 
1919 .93 1.12 1.28 1.34 
1920 .35 .64 .90 .97 
1921 .29 .69 1.19 1.45 
1922 1.10 1.23 1.44 1.65 
1923 .61 .69 .83 .91 
1924 .77 .87 .98 1.02 
1925 1,06 1.02 1.02 1.02 
1926 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
1927 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
1928 1.49 1.49: 1.49 1.49 
1929 .90 1.05 1.17 ' • 1.22 
1930 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 
1931 1.95 1.85 ' 1.75 1.75 
1945 2.73 2.12 1.71 1.71 
1947 2.52 2.09 1.82 1.62 
1949 2.47 2.07 1.77 1.59 
1951 2.17 2.00 1.80 1.67 
1953 1.85 1.89 1.72 1.55 
1955 1.65 1.75 1.60 1.45 
^Source: Computed from the data given in Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Year 5 years 10 years 20 years 40 years 
Insurance companies 
1957 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.43 
1959 1.53 1.30 1.23 1.58 
1961 2.19 1.94 1.82 n.a. 
Federal Land Banks 
1917 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1918 .20 .40 .63 .70 
1919 .34 .53 .69 .75 
1920 .22 .07 .33 .40 
1921 .33 .15 .57 .73 
1922 .52 .65 .86 .07 
1923 .60 .70 .82 .90 
1924 .60 .70 .81 .85 
1925 1.00 .96 .96 .96 
1926 .90 .90 .90 .90 
1927 .81 .81 .81 .81 
1928 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1929 .60 .75 .87 .92 
1930 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
1931 1.73 , 1.60 1.53 1.53 
1945 2.78 2.17 1.76 1.76 
1947 2.45 2.02 1.70 1.55 
1949 2.13 1.73 1.43 1.25 
1951 1.83 1.66 1.46 1.33 
1953 1.36 1.23 1.06 .89 
1955 1.19 1.29 1.14 ,99 
1957 .90 .90 .90 .62 
1959 1.23 1.00 .93 1.28 
1961 1.89 1.64 1.52 n.a. 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Year 5 years 10 years 20 years 40 years 
All lenders 
1910 2.29 3.40 2.52 2.59 
1911 2.38 2.42 •- 2.49 2.53 
1912 2.43 2.47 2.52 2.53 
1913 2,05 2.24 2.34 -2.36 
1914 3.93 2.06 2.22 2.28 
1915 2.00 2.08 2.19 2.24 
1916 2.29 2.27 2.27 2.27 
1917 2.17 2.17 ' 2,17 2.17 
1918 1.06 1.26 1.49 1.56 
1919 1.20 1.39 1.55 1.61 
1920 .68 .97 1.33 1.30 
1921 .74 1.22 1.64 1.80 
1922 1.48 1.61 1.82 2.03 
1923 1.43 1.53 1.65 1.73 
1924 1.44 1.54 1.65 1.69 
1925 1.82 1.79 1.79 1.79 
1926 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 
1927 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 
1928 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.18 
1929 1.58 1.73 1.85 1.90 
1930 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 
1931 2.48 2.35 2.28 2.28 
1932 1.80 1.68 1.63 1.68 
1945 3.16 2.55 2.14 2.14 
1947 2.83 2.40 2.08 1.93 
1949 2.81 2.41 2.11 2.93 
1951 2.52 2.35 2.15 2.02 
1953 2.22 1.09 1.92 1.75 
1955 2.17 2.07 1.92 1.77 
1957 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.41 
1959 1.61 1.38 1.31 1.66 
1961 2.04 1.79 1.67 n.a. 
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objective» Table 6 exhibits interest rates charged on farm mortgages recorded for two 
periods—1910 to 1932 and 1945 to 1957. The 1933-1944 period is excluded because 
during this time the operation of the FLB system was dominated by other objectives 
derived from the depression and World War II. Table 7 presents yields on high grade 
corporate bonds by term to maturity. If these yields are assumed to approximate the 
cost to industry of long-term borrowing, a comparison with agriculture can be made 
by taking the differences between these yields and the interest rates on farm mortgage 
credit extended by various lenders. The differences for insurance companies, the FLB 
system, and the average for all lenders are given in Table 8, The most striking fea­
ture of Table 8 is that on the average, the differences for the FLB's are less than one 
percentage point for the 1917-1932 period but greater than one percentage point for 
the 1945-1961 period. 
The data of Table 8 suggest some inferences about the effects the establish­
ment of the FLB had on other lenders. Insurance companies are of particular interest, 
since they are usually regarded as the closest competitors of the FLB, Maturities of 
farm mortgages held by insurance companies averaged about 7,5 years for the 1910-
1930 period. Hence, the appropriate "opportunity cost" of the funds devoted to farm 
mortgage credit by life insurance companies is the yield on corporate bonds of 10 year 
maturity. Table 8 indicates that the difference on farm mortgage loans by insurance 
companies were substantially lower during the 1917-1927 period than they were in the 
previous 7 years. Apparently, this decline did not deter life insurance companies 
from Investing in farm mortgages, because their holdings increased from $861 million 
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in 1917 to $2,123 million by the end of 1927 (42, p. 386). Moreover, farm mort­
gages made up about 16 percent of the admitted assets of insurance companies in 1920 
and about 20 percent in 1925 (22, p, 90). 
A comparison of the 1917-1932 period and the 1945-1957 period reveals that 
the differences between interest rates on farm mortgages and the yields on high grade 
corporate bonds increased during the latter period for all types of lenders.^ For both 
\ .... 
periods, the differences for the FLB remained lower, on the average, than those of 
any other lender, but the FLB differences show a greater absolute increase than those 
of other lenders between the periods. 
The differences for other lenders follow the same pattern as that of the FLB 
system. Table 8 shows that in the 1945-1957 period, the differences for all lenders 
are closer to the levels of the 1910-1916 period than the 1917-1932 period. A 
similar conclusion applies to the differences for insurance companies alone. The 
average maturity of form mortgage loans by insurance companies was about 18 years 
for the 1945-1957 period. Therefore, the most appropriate "opportunity cost" is 
that of yields on 20 year corporate bonds. The differences for the 20 year maturities 
of 1945-1957 are about the same as those of the 10 year maturities of the 1910-1916 
period. This lends support to the hypothesis that the FLB system has not been able to 
"force" the insurance companies and other lenders to make farm mortgage funds 
^The relatively larger increase in the shorter maturity groups is partly ex­
plained by the shift in the relationship between yields for the two periods; that is, 
short-term yields were generally lower than long-term periods in the 1945-1957 
period, while the reverse was quite often true for the 1917-1932 period. 
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available at rates which are appreciably better in a relative sense than during the 
1910-1917 period. 
Table 9 presents additional evidence relevant to the success of the system in 
accomplishing its objective of providing long-term agricultural credit at rates compe­
titive with those paid by the industrial sector of the economy. Moody's Investor's 
Service has compiled monthly averages of offering yields on new corporate issues 
(other than convertibles, issues with warrants and equipment trusts), weighted by 
amounts offered. These data are a closer approximation to the actual cost of funds to 
corporate business than the basic yield data of Table 7, Taking the 1951-1961 period 
as a whole, the data of Table 9 illustrate that the increase in the corporate yields is 
approximately equal to the increase in FLB rates. This indicates that the system has 
not been able to offset the general increase of interest rates that occurred during the 
11 year period. 
Stability of FLB loan rates 
The data of Table 9 also reveal that while on an overall basis FLB loan rates 
were more stable than those on newly issued corporate bonds, FLB rates declined only 
in the most recent recession, while the corporate' yields declined in all three of the 
recessions included in the 11 year period. Actually, Table 9 does not give an ade­
quate representation of the movements in FLB interest rates during the last decade, be­
cause the use of annual averages obscures the number and the size of fluctuations that 
have occurred. The extent of such fluctuations are of importance, because they 
represent one measure of the stabilizing influence of the system on the farm mortgage 
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Table 9« Yearly averages of yields on newly issued corporate bonds and rates on new 
FLB loanS/ 1951-1961 (percent) 
Year Newly issued Aaa corporate bonds New FLB loans'^ 
1951 3.07 4.11 
1952 3.12 4.17 
1953 3.15 4.17 
1954 3.00 4.17 
1955 3.15 4.17 
1956 3.56 4.31 
1957 4.43 5.17 
1958 4.05 5.24 
1959 4.76 5.51 
1960 4.77 6.00 
1961 4.53 5.64 
^Source: Newly issued yields were originally supplied in mimeograph form 
through the courtesy of Moody's Investor's Service and are now published monthly in 
Moody's Bond Survey. 
^The interest rates on new FLB loans given in this table differ from the rates 
on FLB mortgage loans given in Table 4^ because the former data represent averages 
on new loans for entire year, while the latter data are based on fann mortgages 
recorded during the first quarter of each year. Source: U.S. Department of Agri­
culture {A6, p. 588)o 
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market. 
The major fluctuations in FLB interest rates took place during the last half of 
the 1950'so During the first half of the 1950's, as well as the last half of the 1940's, 
FLB rates were held relatively constant. Thus, up to June 1, 1956, farmers in all 
• . . 
districts were paying 4 percent on new loans except for the Springfield district where 
the rate was 4.5 percent and the Columbia district where it was 5 percent. 
However, each of the twelve banks subsequently increased rates on new mort­
gage loans, so that by June 30, 1957, farmers were paying 5 percent on new loans 
obtained through the local associations in eight districts and 5.5 percent in the other 
four districts. Further advances in rates were made in the last half of 1957, and by 
December 31, 1957, three banks were charging 6 percent and the remaining nine 
banks 5.5 percent. 
In the first half of 1958, some of the banks reduced their rates, and by 
June 30, 1958, four banks were charging 5.5 percent; seven banks were charging 
5 percent; and one bank was charging 4.5 percent. ^  But, rates were increased again 
during the first half of 1959, so that by June 30, 1959, one bank was charging 
5.75 percent; ten were charging 5.5 percent; and one bank was charging 5 percent 
on new loans. Thus, the reductions carried out in 1958 were offset so that interest 
rate levels of mid-1959 approximated those of the end of 1957. Further increases 
^In most instances, when a bank lowered its interest rate on new loans, it 
likewise reduced the rate on all outstanding loans which had previously been written 
at the higher rates. 
were effected in the first half of I960, and by the end of June, 1960, all of the banks, 
were charging 6 percent—the legal ceiling permitted by law at that time. A year 
later, ten of the banks had reduced their rates to 5.5 percent; one bank had gone to 
5,75 percent; and one bank continued to charge 6 percent. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the immediate post-war period, the FLB system served as a mechanism for 
diverting funds away from the farm sector because its volume of new loans was less 
than the volume of repayments. While this policy of restraint was not sufficient to 
elicit a similar response from the other lenders, it undoubtedly contributed to prevent­
ing a credit expansion of the type that occurred in the farm mortgage market in 
similar circumstances following World War I. 
The extent of the expansionary policy followed by the system from 1951 to 
1955 is indicated by the fact that its 1955 loan volume was more than twice as large 
as its 1951 volume, while the total loans by all lenders increased by about 40 percent. 
Because the system was able to hold its rates relatively constant while substantially 
increasing its share of the market, the system tended to hold down the rates charged 
by other lenders. This influence of the system on other lenders was of particular sig­
nificance in the years 1953 through 1955 when all lenders substantially expanded 
their loan volume while keeping their rates relatively constant. In short, the system 
was relatively successful in promoting an overall expansion of the volume of long-term 
agricultural credit without significant increases in rates. 
The performance of the system from 1956 to 1961 was quite different from the 
previous period. An obvious difference is that the rates charged by the system in­
creased substantially; indeed, the system's rates increased more than any other lender 
for the period as a whole. As a result, the difference between the system's rates and 
those of other lenders was reduced, and this, in turn, tended to slow down the rate 
of growth of the system's share of the market. Also, unlike the previous periods, the 
annual loan volume of the FLB system fluctuated substantially. In 1956, the expan­
sion of FLB lending over the previous year helped to offset the decline by other 
lenders, but the reductions of FLB lending from 1956 to 1957 and 1959 to 1960 were 
larger than those of any other category of lenders. Thus, relative to the previous 
periods, the FLB system was a much less effective stabilizing influence both in terms 
of loan volume and interest rates. 
In terms of its specific objectives, the system's performance was less satis­
factory in the latter half of the 1947-1961 period than in the earlier half. The de­
cline of the differential between the system's loan rates and those of other lenders 
impaired its ability to reduce regional rate differentials. The evidence presented also 
indicated that although there was only a slight increase in the spreads between the 
rates of interest at which credit was made available to the industrial sector and the 
rates at which credit was made available to the agricultural sector, neither was the 
system able to reduce them. Finally, the increased volatility of the system's rates 
^This conclusion needs to be qualified. The spread between industrial and 
agricultural long-term credit rates may have been at the economic optimum level 
at the beginning of the period. Therefore, judging the system in terms of its ability 
to reduce the spread may be unreasonable. 
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in the last part of the 1947-1961 period indicates the difficulties experienced by 
the system in achieving its goal of providing credit at low and stable rates. 
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CHAPTER IV. BORROWING ACTIVITY OF THE FLB SYSTEM: 1947-1961 
Introduction 
The main argument of the previous chapter is that the effectiveness of the FLB 
system's intervention in the farm mortgage market was impaired by the substantial in­
creases in its loan rates that occurred in the 1947-1961 period. The primary purpose 
of this chapter is to determine the extent to which these increases were caused by 
circumstances beyond the control of the system and to what extent the increases were 
caused by the debt management decisions of the system. 
The first part of the chapter gives a brief description of the increases that oc­
curred in the system's borrowing costs and a comparison of these increases with those 
experienced by other types of financial intermediaries. Then follows an analysis of 
the characteristics and behavior of the market for FLB securities in which particular 
attention is given to any changes which may have had a significant influence on the 
borrowing costs of the system. The next part of the chapter concentrates on the spe­
cific debt management actions taken by the system and attempts to provide an evalu­
ation of the results of these actions on the changes in the system's borrowing costs. 
Changes in FLB Borrowing Costs: 1947-1961 
If the performance of FLB system was judged according to the standards of a 
private profit-seeking institution, the substantial decline in the "spread" between 
loan rates and bond rates indicated by the data of Table 10 would lead to a pessi­
mistic conclusion. But in view of the system's goal of providing credit to its members 
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Table 10. Average interest rate on FLB loans and bonds outstanding, June 30, 1947-
1961 (percent) 
Rate of interest Rate of interest 
Year • on loans® on bonds 
1947 4.2 1.55 
1948 4.1 1.55 
1949 4.1 1.62 
1950 4.1 1.62 
1951 4.1 1.71 
1952 4.1 2.09 
1953 4.1 2.44 
1954 4.1 2.37 
1955 4.1 2.46 
1956 4.1 2.83 
1957 4.1 3.59 
1958 4.2 3.45 
1959 4.4 3.90 
1960 4.6 4.12 
1961 4.8 4.08 
^Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (44, p. 70). 
^Based on bonds outstanding at end of each year. Beginning 1950 represents 
net cost to banks. Based on face rates prior to 1950. Source; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (46, p. 588). 
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at low costs, the reduction of the spread can be interpreted as an indication of the 
system's success. However, this interpretation must be qualified. Table 11 indicates 
that although the system has been able to significantly reduce the ratio of operating 
expense to gross income, the ratio of interest expense to gross income increased by 
almost threefold. 
In terms of the efficiency of the system as a financial intermediary, the rele­
vant question for this study is whether or not the increase in the system's cost of bor-
* 
rowing is similar to that of other financial intermediaries. The comparisons of the 
costs of obtaining funds contained in Table 12 shed some light on this question. The 
comparison between the costs of funds to the FLB system and to insured commercial 
banks is of particular interest, since of all the private financial intermediaries in­
cluded in Table 12, commercial banks are the only active rivals of the system in the 
farm mortgage credit market. There is no evidence of a pronounced downward trend 
in the differential between the cost of funds to the system and commercial banks. ^  
However, the data of Table 12 do indicate that the cost of funds to the system has 
varied considerably on a cyclical basis, while the cost of money to the private finan­
cial intemiediaries has risen at a relatively stable rate. 
A comparison of the borrowing costs of the Treasury and the FLB system 
^The data of Table 12 do not take into account the other costs incurred by 
either the private financial intermediaries or the FLB system. In the case of com­
mercial banks, a study published by the American Bankers' Association (1, p. 41) 
suggests that since 1956, minimum overhead costs of handling savings deposits by 
commercial banks probably total 0.4 percent of the deposits per annum. 
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Table 11. Distribution of gross income dollar, FLBs and FLBAs consolidated, years 
ended June 30, 1948-1961° (cents) 
Interest Operating Dividends Retained 
Year expense expense to members earnings 
1948 27 39 8 26 
1949 28 39 10 23 
1950 29 38 9 24 
1951 29 38 9 24 
1952 31 37 8 24 
1953 39 36 8 17 
1954 43 35 7 15 
1955 44 34 6 16 
1956 46 32 6 16 
1957 53 28 5 14 
1958 64 25 3 8 
1959 61 23 4 12 
1960 68 20 2 10 
1961 71 18 3 9 
^Source: The data were compiled and supplied by the Finance Division, 
Farm Credit Administration, Washington, D.C. 
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Table 12, Cost of money comparisons: FLB system, commercial and mutual savings 
banks, and savings and loan associations (percent) 
Cost of money to the 
Average annual return paid on savings FLB system from sale 
deposits and shares" of securities^ 
Savings Insured Mutual 
and loan commercial savings 
Year associations banks banks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1951 2.6 1.0 2.0 2.55 
1952 2.7 1.2 2.3 2.68 
1953 2,8 1.2 2.4 2.80 
1954 2.9 . 1.3 2.5 2.28 
1955 2,9 1.4 2.6 2.97 
1956 3.0 1.5 2.8 3.55 
1957 3.3 2.1 2.9 4.37 
1958 3.3 2.2 3.1 3.14 
1959 3.5 2.4 3.2 4.52 
1960 3.9 2.6 3.6 4.62 
1961 4.1 2.8 .3.7 4.10 
Averages: 
1951-1960 3.2 1.8 2,8 3.42 
"Source: The data of Columns 1 through 3 are based on the following defi­
nitions: Column 1—effective rate of dividends, i.e., dividends distributed relative 
to average savings capital, based on data of members of FHLB system; Column 2— 
effective interest rate, based on data of Federal Reserve Board and FDIC; Column 3 
—"per deposit" rates reported by the Association of Mutual Savings Banks. The 
information is summarized in (67, p. 16). 
^Source: The data of Column 4 is the weighted average of the interest costs 
and selling-group commissions for securities sold during each year and were computed 
from the data given in Table 31 of this study. 
provides another measure of the relative efficiency of the system as a financial inter­
mediary. As indicated by the data of Table 13, at the end of 1951, the average 
interest rate on FLB bonds outstanding was below the average interest rate on market­
able Treasury securities. However, the rate on FLB bonds outstanding rose substan­
tially faster than the rate on Treasury securities throughout the 1951-1961 period. 
The data of Table 13 also indicate that both rates increased at a relatively moderate 
pace until 1955 and then accelerated. 
While the above comparisons of costs are admittedly inadequate as an ulti­
mate basis for judging the efficiency of the borrowing activity of the FLB system, 
they do indicate two general conclusions. First, the interest costs of the FLB system 
were more unstable in the 1947-1961 period than those of an important group of 
private financial intermediaries. This implies that because the system has to rely on 
bond sales for its funds, it is subject to an inherent element of cost instability. The 
second major conclusion is that despite the quasi-governmental status of the system, 
it has not been able to duplicate on a relative basis the borrowing cost performance 
of the Treasury, The implication is that either the quality status of the system's 
bonds deteriorated relative to Treasury securities or the system's debt management was 
not as successful as the Treasury's in terms of holding down interest costs. 
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Table 13. Average interest rate on total marketable 
outstanding: 1951-1961 (percent) 
Treasury securities and FLB bonds 
Year 
Marketable Treasury 
securities® 
FLB bonds 
outstanding^ 
1951 1.981 1.71 
1952 2.051 2.09 
1953 2.207 2.44 
1954 2.043 2.37 
1955 2.079 2.46 
1956 2.427 2.83 
1957 2.707 3.59 
1958 2.546 3.45 
1959 2.891 3.90 
1960 3.449 4.12 
1961 3.063 4.08 
°Based on securities outstanding at the end of each year. Source: U.S. 
Treasury Department (69, p. 13; 70, p. 22), 
^Source: Table 10 of this study. 
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The Market for FLB Securities 
The FLB system is but one of several Federal instrumentalities^ which issue 
securities known in the bond market as "Agency paper" or "Agency securities." 
These securities are not guaranteed either as to interest or principal by the govern­
ment, although the legislation authorizing the operation of each agency implies a 
government interest, and it is widely felt that Congress is at least morally obligated 
to redeem these issues in the event of imminent default. 
In almost all cases. Agency issues are placed directly with a "selling-group" 
which then sells them to customers at a predetermined price that allows a commission 
to the group members. This marketing technique was originally introduced by the 
Farm Credit Administration and apparently is quite economical in terms of marketing 
costs. The FLB system employs the selling-group technique and has estimated (65, 
p. 41) its total selling costs per $1,000 par in recent years as ranging from $1,16 for 
1 -year bonds to $3.66 for 12-15 year bonds,^ By contrast, data covering a 20-year 
period gathered by Halsey, Stuart, and Company iridicate that selling costs for high 
^The other major agencies are the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks, the Banks for Cooperatives, and the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, 
^In addition to commissions, selling costs to FLB system include its share of 
the cost of the Fiscal Agent's office, printing costs, and costs paid for services per­
formed by the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks. The system estimates such 
costs as about $0.16 per $1,000 of bonds offered, while the selling commissions 
(per $1,000) paid in recent years have been as follows: 1-year bonds—$1,00; 
5-year bonds—$2,50; 10-year bonds--$3.00; 12-15 year bonds—$3,50. 
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quality (Aaa and Aa) corporate bonds averaged (per $1,000 par value) about $6.54 
for issues sold under competitive bidding and about $9.80 for issues sold by means of 
direct negotiation. 
Compared to the volume of Treasury or corporate bonds outstanding, total 
Agency securities are relatively small, but the data of Table 14 indicate that in 
recent years the Agencies have engaged in borrowing operations on a scale which has 
become increasingly important in terms of the effect on the money and capital mar­
kets. In 1959, for example, the net demand for funds by these Agencies amounted to 
slightly more than $2 billion. Moreover, the outstanding marketable debt of these 
Agencies has increased by about $6 billion since 1949, and because a substantial 
proportion of the total is in the form of short-term securities, the refinancing opera­
tions of these Agencies must be taken in account by Federal Reserve and Treasury 
officials in carrying out their responsibilities. However, a detailed examination of 
the effects of aggregate Agency financing is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, 
attention is focused on the post-World War II developments in the market for Agency 
securities which have had a direct influence on the financing costs of the FLB system. 
One of the most significant post-war developments in the Agency securities 
market is the reduction in the proportion of outstanding securities held by commercial 
banks and the increased proportion held by the consumer-and-nonprofit^ and the 
^The consumer-and-nonprofit sector is defined (13, p. 846) as including 
individuals, personal trusts, and non-profit institutions serving individuals such as 
foundations, private schools, hospitals, labor unions, etc. 
Table 14, Holdings of outstanding nonguaranteed federal obligations^ by economic sectors, 1949-1960^^ (amounts 
outstanding, end-of-year, in billions of dollars) 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
1. Consumer & non-profit .2 ,2 .3 ,3 .3 .3 .9 1.2 1.9 1.6 3.1 3.1 
2. Corporate business — —  .1 ,1 .3 .4 .8 .6 1.2 1.1 
3. State & local government — —  —  —  .1 .1 .2 ,3 .4 .3 .4 .4 
4. Commercial banks 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1,3 1.4 1.8 1,6 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.6 
5. Mutual savings banks Qc Qc Oc Oc .1 ,2 .3 .3 .4 .5 
6. Savings and loan 
associations — — - - .1 .1 .3 .5 .5 .6 .7 
7. Insurance companies Qc Oc 0= . 1  .1 ,2 .3 .3 .4 .5 
Total ^  1.5 1.9 2 ,2  2.1 2.1 2.1 3.6 4,2 6.3 5.8 8.0 7.9 
^Includes securities issued by Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Land Banks, Federal Home 
Loan Banks, Federal Intennediate Credit Banks, the Banks for Cooperatives, and several smaller agencies. 
^Source: Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors (11, p. 84). 
^Less than $50 million, 
^Details may not add to totals because of rounding or statistical discrepancy. 
85 
non-financial corporate business sectors. The first sector's increased interest in Agen­
cy securities parallels the increased need of the investors in this category for suitable 
investment outlets for their funds. Moreover, yields on marketable securities in 
general have advanced relatively faster than those on time deposits, savings bonds, 
and saving and loan shares, and this has supplemented.the increased interest of indi­
vidual and non-profit institutions in Agency securities. The growth of corporate cash 
flows during the post-war period greatly increased the quantity of corporate cash 
available for short-term investment. Moreover, corporate cash budgeting has made 
great strides in the past decade, and many corporations have found it profitable to 
operate with lower cash balances while temporarily investing funds earmarked for 
future use. Comprehensive and detailed data on the activity of corporations in the 
Agency market are not available. However, on the basis of several surveys of the 
marketable security portfolios of 100 of the largest non-financial corporations, 
Jacobs (23) reports that in the past few years, an increasing fraction of such port­
folios have been invested in non-Treasury securities, although Treasury securities re­
main as the most important single category. Of more specific interest to. this study is 
Jacobs' estimate (23, p. 350) that the percentage distribution of Agency issues in the 
composite security portfolios of these TOO corporations rose from 1.08 in 1951 to 
2,75 in 1957. 
One of the reasons Agency securities are attractive investments for corporate 
treasurers is that although default risk is practically zero. Agency securities gener­
ally provide somewhat higher yields than direct obligation of the Treasury. One study 
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(65, p. 15) estimates the difference as ranging between 25 and 50 basis points. An­
other reason for the attractiveness of Agency securities is their high degree of mar­
ketability, An indication of this is the increased interest government securities 
dealers have shown in Agency securities. Data gathered for a study of the dealers' 
market for government securities by the Joint Economic Committee and reproduced in 
Table 15 indicate that dealer positions in Agency issues have been substantial during 
the 1947-1958 period. Moreover, the number of dealers who take positions and 
actively trade these issues has also increased. The Joint Economic Committee study 
(66, p. 36) suggests that one reason for the increased interest in Agency issues by 
government securities dealers is the failure of the long-term government securities 
market to develop into a more active trading market and that Agency securities have 
partially filled this gap. 
Because of the growth in Agency securities outstanding and the fact that these 
are somewhat higher-yielding substitutes for government securities, there exists the 
possibility that the increased activity of the Agencies has exerted an upward pull on 
market rates of interest for direct Treasury obligations. However, in view of the much 
larger volume of Treasury issues, the effect of rate changes on Treasury securities 
upon the rates the Agencies have to pay is undoubtedly more important than the ef­
fect of changes in.Agency rates on direct Treasury securities. Indeed, it can be 
safely asserted that Treasury financing activities are a dominant influence of the mar­
ket for Agency securities. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the market relation­
ships between Treasury and FLB bonds. 
Table 15. Aggregate dealer positions by type of security, selected years, 1947-1948° (millions of dollars) 
Item 1947 1950 1952 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Government securities 292.0 752.9 1,274.1 929.5 828.2 1,672.2 1,371.3 
Municipals 8.2 29.9 70.2 62.2 41.9 74.4 110.7 
Others^ 36.8 64.6 111.1 115.9 93.0 122.5 54.7 
^Source: U.S. Joint Economic Committee (66, p. 37). 
bjhis classification is principally Agency issues, although it includes both guaranteed and non-guaranteed 
obligations issued by Government corporations and Agencies. 
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Relationship of FLB and Treasury securities 
As already pointed out, FLB bonds are in a class known in the market as 
"Federal Agency" obligations. In the publicity for FLB securities, the fact that the 
federal government has no direct obligation for them is stressed. Nevertheless, be­
cause FLB bonds are securities of a corporation created and supervised by the federal 
government and because of the historical association of the FLB system with the 
federal government, it is reasonable to hypothesize that in terms of quality, the mar­
ket would rank FLB securities as closer to Treasury obligations than to corporate 
securities. 
One test of this hypothesis is to compare the offering yields of FLB securities 
with those of corporate and Treasury issues. Table 16 presents the simple correlation 
coefficients among offering yields on FLB bonds and the yields on a variety of corpo­
rate and Treasury securities. Correlation coefficients were computed for the FLB 
yields and the corporate and Treasury issues on a monthly basis for the years 1951-
1961. The first row is the most interesting of Table 16, because it shows that the cor­
relation coefficients of FLB bond yields (X^) with the various government yields (X5, 
X^, X7, Xg) are all greater than .9, while the correlation coefficients of FLB bond 
yields with the yields on the corporate issues (X2, X3, X^ are all less than .9. This 
difference in the correlation coefficients implies that the FLB bonds are more closely 
associated with government securities than with corporate securities. 
Another measure of the position of FLB bonds in the market is the size of the 
yield differential between government and FLB securities. The extent of this 
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Table 16o Simple correlations among various interest rates (based on 51 monthly 
observations, 1951-1961) 
X, X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 Xg 
Xl 1 .875 .858 .821 .918 .908 .941 .934 
X2 1 .981 .964 .792 .778 .855 .922 
X3 1 .980 .771 .756 .843 .911 
X4 1 .719 .700 .800 .888 
X5 1 .998 ,978 .915 
X6 1 .970 .901 
X7 1 .966 
X8 1 
Variable Source 
Xl = Offering yields of FLB bonds Table 29 of this study 
X2 = Monthly averages of yields on newly 
issued Aao corporate bonds (Moody 
ratings) 
X3 = Monthly averages of Friday yields of 
recently issued Aaa corporate bonds 
(Moody ratings) 
X4 = Average monthly yields on Aaa cor­
porate bonds (Moody ratings) 
X5 = Monthly average of market yields 
on Treasury 3 month bills 
X^ - Monthly average of rates on new 
issues of Treasury 3 month bills 
X7 = Monthly average of market yields 9 
to 12 month Treasury issues 
Xg = Monthly averages of market yields on 
3 to 5 year Treasury issues 
Supplied through the courtesy of 
Moody's Investor's Service, New York, 
N.Y. 
Mortimer Kaplan (25, p, 108) 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues, 
1951-1961 
Federal Reserve, Bulletin, various issues, 
1951-1961 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues, 
1951-1961 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues, 
1951-1961 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues, 
1951-1961 
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differential is of particular interest to this study, because it is one indication of the 
degree of substitutability of FLB and Treasury securities. The reasons for changes in 
the yield differential are also of interest because of the implications for appropriate 
debt management policies. 
A primary difficulty in attempting to measure the yield differential between 
the offering yields on FLB bonds and those of Treasury issues is that the wide range of 
maturities of FLB bond offerings precluded a comparison with any of the regularly pub­
lished series of Treasury securities' yields. However, the Treasury does publish in its 
monthly bulletin a set of yield curves for its outstanding securities. These curves are 
based on the closing bid quotations of the last day of each month. Although the 
curves are fitted by eye, they represent the best available source of information on 
the prevailing yields of various maturities of outstanding Treasury issues. 
The first step in the procedure used to compare the offering yields of FLB 
bonds with those of Treasury issues was to reproduce by the Xerox process the pub­
lished Treasury yield curves for the date closest to the FLB offering. This copy was 
then placed on a draftsman's board, and an "engineer's scale" was used to measure 
the yield of Treasury securities which corresponded to the term of the particular FLB 
offering under consideration. Since the Treasury generally has both fixed maturity 
and callable issues outstanding, measurements were made of the yields from both 
curves whenever possible. These measurements are given in Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 17. 
Table 17, Comparison of offering yields on FLB bonds with yields on outstanding U.S. 
Treasury securities, 1945-1962 
FLB bond issues" 
Far amount Face Offering yield 
Offering (millions of rate Term in years (percent per annum 
date dollars) (percent) (approx.) to first call date) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1-9-45 114 2 1/4 8-10 2.20 
7-17-45 176 1 1/2 3-5 1.30 
12-17-45 214 1 1/2 5-7 1.42 
4-16-46 217 1 1/4 4—6 1.25 
9-13-49 215 1 3/4 6-8 1.71 
10-18-51 70 2 1/2 3 2.50 
4-15-52 228.3 2 5/8 4 2.63 
12-9-52 100.5 2 1/2 1 5/6 2.64 
12-9-52 131 2 3/4 5 1/3 2.83 
10-14-53 75.5 2 3/4 1 1/4 2.65 
4-14-54 71 2 1/4 5 2.25 
7-14-54 123 2 1/4 5 1/2 2.23 
10-13-54 184.2 2 1/4 4 2.25 
1-13-55 106.5 2 1/2 5 1/3 2.75 
^Source: Table 31 of this study. 
^Source: Computed from Treasury data by the method described in the preced­
ing text. 
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Estimated yields to maturity on 
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities^ 
Fixed maturity Callable issues 
(percent per annum) (percent per annum) 
(6) (7) 
Yield differentials 
Fixed maturity 
Col. 5 minus 
Col. 6 
(8) 
Callable issues 
Col. 5 minus 
Col. 7 
(9) 
—  —  1.90 .30 
1.25 — —  .15 
— —  1.32 .10 
1.10 1.18 .15 .07 
1.57 .14 
1.90 2.07 .60 .43 
1.83 2.02 
o
 
00 
.61 
2.14 2.22 .50 .42 
2.37 2.39 .46 .44 
1.79 1.98 .86 .67 
1.78 1.85 .47 .40 
1.93 2.10 .30 .13 
1.90 2.08 .35 .17 
2.32 2.28 .43 .47 
Table 17 (Continued) 
FLB bond issues^ 
Par amount Face Offering yield 
Offering (millions of rate Term in years (percent per annum 
date dollars) (percent) (approx.) to first call date) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
9-13-55 130 2 7/8 11/12 3.01 
1-26-56 130 3 1 3.00 
4-12-56 170 3.30 1 3.30 
4-12-56 60 3.53 15 3..50 
8-29-56 135 3 3/4 5/6 3.75 
8-29-56 110 3 7/8 16 3.92 
1-30-57 140 3 7/8 1 3.93 
1-30-57 72 4 1/8 10-15 4.13 
4-10-57 78 3 7/8 1 3.88 
4-10-57 125 4 5 4.00 
6-27-57 123 4 3/8 1 4.51 
6-27-57 60 4 5/8 12 4.63 
9-18-57 140 4 5/8 1 1/3 4.76 
9-18-57 75 4 1/2 10-13 4.53 
1-29-58 83 3 3/8 3 1/12 3.33 
1-29-58 83 3 1/2 12 1/12 3.53 
4-16-58 122 2 3/4 5 2.75 
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Estimated yields to maturity on 
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities^ 
Yield differentials 
Fixed maturity Callable issues 
Fixed maturity 
(percent per annum) 
(6) 
Callable issues 
(percent per annum) 
(7) 
Col. 5 minus 
Col. 6 
(8) 
Col. 5 m 
Col. ; 
(9) 
2.30 — —  .71 
2.45 —  —  .55 — —  
3.00 .30 — —  
—  —  3.04 — —  .46 
3 . n  —  —  .64 — —  
—  —  3.25 — —  .67 
3.28 3.16 .65 .77 
3.21 — —  .92 
3.46 3.37 .42 .51 
3.55 3.52 .45 .48 
3.73 3.68 .78 .83 
3.82 — —  .81 
4.10 4.03 .66 .73 
4.01 3.82 .52 .71 
2.70 2.64 .63 .69 
3.26 3.05 .27 .48 
2.42 2.36 .33 .39 
Table 17 (Continued) 
FLB bond issues" 
Par amount Face Offering yield 
Offering (millions of rate Term in years (percent per annum 
date dollars) (percent) (approx.) to first call date) 
(1) • (2) . (3) (4) (5) 
4-16-58 108 3 1/4 8 3.14 
7-1-58 164 1 3/4 1 1/4 1.90 
10-15-58 120 3 1/2 1/2 3.50 
10-15-58 120 4 2 5/6 4.00 
1-20-59 89 3 3/4 1 3.75 
1-20-59 100 4 3/8 10 1/12 4.57 
3-10-59 86 4 1/4 8 11/12 4.35 
4-15-59 201 3 7/8 11/12 4.01 
8-11-59 98 4 7/8 3 4.75 
10-8-59 164 5 1/6 5.00 
12-15-59 118 5 3/8 3/4 5.38 
12-15-59 85 5 1/8 10 1/2 5.00 
1-13-60 150 5.40 5/6 5.40 
1-13-60 82 5 1/8 10 5.09 
4-6-60 100 4 11/12 3.86 
4-6-60 147 4 1/2 4 4.39 
5-12-60 154 4 3/4 1 4.62 
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Estimated yields to maturity on Yield differentials 
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities^ Fixed maturity Callable issues 
Fixed maturity Callable issues Col. 5 minus Col. 5 minus 
(percent per annum) (percent per annum) Col. 6 Col. 7 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
2.78 2.64 .36 .50 
1.74 — . 16 — 
2.83 —- .67 — 
3.54 — .46 — 
3.53 — - .22 — 
3.97 3.94 .60 .63 
4.01 3.98 .34 .37 
3.81 — .20 — 
4.70 4.64 .05 .11 
4.93 — .45 
4.70 4.81 .30 .19 
4.58 — .82 — 
4.54 4.62 .55 .47 
3.82 — .04 — 
4.36 4.22 . 03 .17 
4.05 — .57 
Table 17 (Continued) 
FLB bond issues" 
Par amount Face Offering yield 
Offering (millions of rate , - Term in years (percent per annum 
date dollars) (percent) . (approx.) to first call date) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10-5-60 160 4 5 4.03 
12-7-60 91 3 3/8 • 1 1/6 3.38 
12-7-60 90 4 3 5/6 . 4.07 
3-17-61 104 3 1/4 1 1/2 3.12 
3-17-61 150 3 5/8 4 5/6 3.91 
6-7-61 115 3 5/8 1 2/3 3.78 
6-7-61 115 4 4 5/12 4.25 
9-7-61 193.3 4 1/4 . 4 5/6 4.25 
Average 
(N = 47) 
Average 
(N = 41) 
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Estimated yields to maturity on Yield differentials 
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities^ Fixed maturity Callable issues 
Fixed maturity - Callable issues Col, 5 minus Col, 5 minus 
(percent per annum) (percent per annum) Col. 6 Col. 7 
GO CO 09 (% 
3.67 3.52 .36 .51 
2.72 .66 — —  
3.32 3.22 .75 ,85 
3.01 2.97 .11 .15 
3,58 3.55 .33 .36 
3.25 3.16 .53 .62 
3.71 3.73 .54 ,52 
3,74 3,76 .51 ,49 
.45 
,46 
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The procedure described above incorporates two sources of error. First, the 
dates of the Treasury yield curves and the offering dates of the FLB bonds are not the 
same. For example, for the FLB offering of 1-26-56, the Treasury yield curve used 
was that of 1-31-56, a difference of five days, but for the FLB offering of 1-20-59, 
the Treasury yield curve of 1-30-59 was used, a difference often days. An attempt 
was made to reduce the effects of this variation by taking a sample of ten FLB offer­
ing dates and deriving the measured yield by taking the average of the measurements 
from the Treasury yield curves published on the closest dates before and after the FLB 
offering dates. The difference between these ten "average" estimated yields and 
those presented in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 17 were so small, varying from ,02 to 
.05, that the "average" procedure did not seem to justify the additional labor in­
volved, and it was not used. 
The second source of error in the estimated yields of the Treasury issues de­
rives from the inherent difficulty of attempting to read small numerical values from 
a graph. Despite the careful use of a "T" square, dividers, and an "engineer's 
scale," the estimates in Columns 6 and 7 are subject to error from this source. 
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 17 exhibit the differentials between the offering 
yields on FLB bonds and those of outstanding Treasury securities. As expected the 
differentials are all small but positive, indicating that the market consistently evalu­
ates FLB bonds somewhat lower on the quality scale than Treasury issues. Moreover, 
while the differentials clearly are not constant, there is no obvious indication that 
they have tended to increase consistently over time. 
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Possible candidates for an explanation of the variance of the differentials are 
the differences in the term to maturity, the par amounts issued, and monetary policy. 
The average differential remains relatively constant over the maturity groupings given 
in Table 18 and would seem to indicate that the market evaluation of the quality of 
FLB securities is consistent throughout the range of maturities. 
Table 19 reveals a tendency for the differential to decrease with increases in 
the size of the par amounts issued. This is contrary to expectations; that is, it would 
normally be expected that the system would "sweeten" the yield differential on 
larger issues in order to insure adequate subscriptions. Instead, what seems to have 
happened is that the system increased the size of its issues when market conditions 
were most favorable. 
The most pronounced difference behveer the average differentials are those 
shown in Table 20. The classification of time periods into the two categories of 
monetary ease or restraint is based on cyclical movements in the yields on 3 to 5 
year Treasury securities. ^  Apparently, the difference between FLB offering yields 
and the yields on Treasury securities increases with more stringent market conditions 
^The ending dates of the periods of monetary restraint (July, 1953; October, 
1957; January, 1960) are the months in which yields on 3 to 5 year Treasury secu­
rities reached cyclical peaks. The ending dates of the periods of monetary ease 
(June, 1955, and September, 1958) are the months in which yields on 3 to 5 year 
Treasury securities were at the approximate mid-point of their cyclical upswing. 
While there is no generally agreed upon method of determining periods of mone­
tary ease and restraint, the procedure described above results in beginning and end­
ing dates that fall between those indicated by using the cyclical movements in 
banks' free reserves and the Treasury bill rate. 
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Table 18. Average differentials between offering yields on FLB bonds and Treasury 
securities classified by term to maturity® (in basis points) 
Maturity 
class 
Average 
yield differential 
between fixed 
maturity Treasury 
securities and 
FLB bonds'^ 
Average 
yield differential 
between callable 
Treasury 
securities and 
FLB bonds^ 
1 year or less 50 70 
(13) ( 3) 
1 to 3 years 47 45 
(11) ( 7 )  
3 to 5 years 47 47 
(12) (12) 
5 to 9 years 32 25 
( 6 )  (10) 
Over 9 years 44 57 
( 6) (10) 
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 17. 
^The numbers in parenthesis are the number of observations used to compute 
each average. 
102 
Table 19. Average differentials between offering yields on FLB bonds and Treasury 
securities classified by par amounts of FLB bond issues® (in basis points) 
Par amount 
of FLB bond 
issues 
(in millions 
of dollars) 
Average yield 
differential between 
fixed maturity 
Treasury securities 
and FLB bonds'^ 
Average yield 
differential between 
callable Treasury 
securities and 
FLB bonds'^ 
75 or less 50 61 
( 4) ( 7) . 
75.1 to 100 46 50 
(12) ( 9) 
100.1 to 125 45 42 
(13) (12) 
125.1 to 150 54 49 
( 9) ( 5) 
150.1 to 175 35 44 
( 5) ( 2) 
175.1 to 200 43 24 
( 2) ( 3) 
200 and over 35 21 
( 3) ( 4 )  
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 17, 
^The numbers in parenthesis are the number of observations used to compute 
each average. 
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Table 20. Average differentials between offering yields on FLB bonds and Treasury 
securities classified by periods of monetary ease and restraint® (in basis 
points) 
Average yield Average yield 
differential between differential between 
• fixed maturity callable Treasury 
Treasury securities securities and 
and FLB bonds FLB bonds'^ 
Periods of monetary restraint 
Mar. 1951 to July 1953 64 51 
( 5 )  ( 5) 
July 1955 to Oct, 1957 57 69 
(10) (10) 
Oct. 1958 to Jan. 1960 51 45 
(11) ( 5 )  
Periods of monetary ease 
Aug, 1953 to June 1955 39 29 
( 4 )  ( 4 )  
Nov. 1957 to Sept. 1958 35 51 
( 5) ( 4 )  
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 17, 
^The numbers in parenthesis are the number of observations used to compute 
each average. 
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and declines during periods of market ease. One reason for this may be that during a 
period of rising interest rates, the dominant expectations of the market are that rates 
will continue to rise. Thus, an investor can partially protect himself against a rise in 
rates "tomorrow" by demanding a higher yield "today." Another reason for the higher 
yield differential during "tight" money periods is the method of taxing income under 
the federal income tax system. The coupons on bonds are equivalent to pure interest 
earnings and are taxed as ordinary income, while profits on securities purchased at a 
discount are taxed at lower rates applicable to long-term capital gains. If investors 
have a choice of two securities with the same before-tax yield to maturity, say a 
new FLB offering selling at (or close to) par and an outstanding Treasury issue selling 
at a discount, the discounted issue might well attract the stronger demand because 
many investors purchase on the basis of after-tax yield. Thus, the before-tax yield on 
the discounted Treasury issue will rise less than the yield on the new FLB offering sold 
at (or close to) par. 
Additional information about the market for FLB bonds is provided by the yield 
data plotted in Diagram 2. It was noted earlier that the market rates FLB securities as 
next to direct obligations of the Treasury on the quality spectrum, and this is the main 
explanation of the almost perfect synchronization of the movements in the yields on 
"representative" issues of FLB bonds and those of 3 to 5 year government securities.^ 
^The yield data on "representative" FLB bonds used in constructing Diagram 2 
are given in Appendix B of this study and are based on an average of market quotations 
on the average yields of long, intermediate, and short term FLB bonds. Because the 
average maturity of FLB bonds outstanding varied from a low of about 2 years to a 
high of 5 years, the comparison of the FLB yield data with 3 to 5 year government 
yields is more appropriate than long-term government yields. 
(Percent per annum) 
5 5  
5  5  
4  5  
4 .0  
3  5  
3 .0  
2 .5  
2 .0 
1947 48 50  51 52 53 ' 54 ' 55 56 57 58 59 60 1961 
Fig 2 Market yield on U.S. Government securities, Federal Land Bank bonds, and Moody s Aaa corporate bonds, 
monthly averages, 1947-1961 
g 
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Diagram 2 also indicates an overall decline in the spread between the yields on gov­
ernment and corporate bonds. This decline is generally attributed to a combination 
of the reduction in the default risk on corporate bonds because of the general pros­
perity of the period and the Federal Reserve system's vigorous monetary policy. What­
ever the reason, the net result has been an erosion of the relative advantage of the 
FLB system over corporate borrowers and this provides part of the explanation of the 
system's difficulty in achieving its objective of providing farm mortgage loans at rates 
comparable to those at which the industrial sector of the economy obtains on long-
term crédite 
The data plotted in Diagram 2 also indicate that, in general, the yields on 
outstanding FLB bonds are higher than those of 3 to 5 year governments. The exist­
ence of such a spread can be explained in terms of whatever small amount of default 
risk the market attaches to FLB securities or to the fact that FLB bonds are not as well-
known and, therefore, not as marketable as Treasury securities. What is puzzling is 
that, from 1957 to 1958, the size of spread changes in a pro-cyclical manner but 
then virtually drops to zero over the 1959-1961 period. The tendency for the spread 
to increase during periods in which all rates are moving up is especially intriguing, 
because one would normally expect arbitrage to prevent such differences between 
securities possessing essentially equal risk and maturity. Bond traders are usually 
presumed to be alert to even the smallest of profit opportunities. Yet the widening 
of the spread during a general upswing of yields suggests that traders do not readily 
switch from governments (thereby reducing their price and raising their yields) into 
FLB securities, even though the latter could be acquired at prices below those prevail­
ing on governments. 
It is logical to seek an explanation of the cyclical variability of the spread on 
both the supply and the demand side of the market. Turning first-to the supply side, on 
increase in the supply of FLB securities relative to that of Treasury issues during a peri­
od of generally rising yields would tend to depress the prices of the former securities 
relative to the latter and thereby increase the yield spread. By the same token, a de­
crease in the supply of FLB bonds relative to Treasury issues during a period in which 
yields in general are falling would tend to raise the price of FLB bonds relative to 
Treasury securities and result in a decrease in the yield spread. This hypothetical 
explanation can be tested by comparing the cyclical changes in the ratio of the vol­
ume of outstanding FLB bonds to Treasury issues. 
Utilizing the data on FLB bonds outstanding (Table 31, Appendix B) and the 
data on l-to-5 year Tresury securities outstanding contained in various issues of the 
Treasury Bulletin, the ratio of the volume of FLB bonds to Treasury l-to-5 year secu­
rities were computed for the months in which the peaks and troughs of the yields oc­
curred. From the low point of August, 1949, to the peak of June, 1953, the ratio 
increased slightly from .021 to .026 and then remained constant until the next 
trough was reached in July, 1954. By the next peak of October, 1957, the ratio had 
increased to .034 and then continued to rise untij it reached .042 at the next trough 
in July of 1958. The ratio declined by the time another peak was reached in Janu­
ary of 1960 and then remained relatively constant throughout the remainder of 1960 
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and 1961. Thus, the changes in the ratio of outstanding FLB bonds to equivalent ma­
turity Treasury securities are consistent with the hypothetical supply explanation on 
only one occassion; that is, an increase in the ratio coincided with an increase in the 
spread from August, 1949, to June of 1953. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that one must turn to the demand side of the 
market to explain the cyclical behavior of the yield spread between FLB and Treasury 
securities. More specifically, the increase of the spread during periods when yields 
are rising and the decrease of the spread when yields are falling may reflect differ­
ential demand behavior over the cycle. Therefore, if yields in general are rising, 
and if the demand for FLB bonds declines relative to the demand for Treasury secu­
rities, the prices of FLB bonds would tend to fall more than prices of Treasury secu­
rities and the yield spread would increase. 
Although the available data are not adequate for a definitive test of this dif­
ferential demand hypothesis, there are indications the variability of the yield spread 
is caused primarily by cyclical changes in the demand of commercial banks for FLB 
and Treasury securities. As part of its monthly survey of the institutional ownership 
of marketable United States Government securities, the Treasury also obtains informa­
tion on the ownership of FLB bonds, which is published monthly in the Treasury Bul­
letin, The ownership information is classified according to various types of financial 
institutions plus a residual category of "other holdings" which includes all institutions 
not covered by the particular month's survey. The major flaw in the data is that the 
number of institutions covered by the survey is not constant, although the commercial 
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banks and insurance companies included in the survey account for 90 to 95 percent of 
all Treasury and Agency securities held by these two types of institutions. Despite 
this limitation, there are clear indications that, unlike other institutions, commercial 
banks reduce their demand for FLB bonds during periods of generally rising yields and 
increase their demand during periods when yields are falling. Based on the Treasury 
data, commercial banks' holdings of FLB bonds increased from $609 million in June of 
1953 to $683 million in July of 1954. But as interest rates began to increase, com­
mercial banks' holdings of FLB bonds fell to $509 million by October of 1957 when 
interest rates peaked. As interest rates moved downward, commercial banks' holdings 
of FLB bonds increased and reached a maximum of $550 million in July of 1958—the 
same month in which interest rates reached another lower turning point. The cyclical 
demand behavior was again repeated as interest rates rose from July of 1958 to Janu­
ary of 1960, and commercial banks' holdings of FLB bonds fell from $550 million to 
$398 million. By contrast, the Treasury survey data indicate that commercial banks' 
holdings of 1-5 year governments increased or remained constant throughout each of 
the above cyclical periods. Thus, the cyclical changes in commercial banks' hold­
ings of FLB and Treasury securities are in close agreement with the differential demand 
hypothesis. ^ 
Presumably, commercial banks reduce their holdings of FLB bonds during a 
^ None of the other financial institutions covered in the Treasury's survey be­
haved in the same way. Instead, their reported holdings of FLB bonds either in­
creased or remained constant during the cyclical movements of interest rates. 
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period of rising interest rates in order to obtain funds to meet the increasing demand 
for customer loans that usually accompanies a cyclical upswing. The Treasury survey 
data indicate that the commercial banks reduced their holdings of FLB bonds primarily 
by simply not replacing them as they matured. For example, as interest rates in­
creased from July of 1954 to October of 1957, the FLB system increased its outstand­
ing bonds from about $1 billion to $1.6 billion. Most of this increase was accom­
plished at the maturity dates of particular issues by simply selling a larger amount of 
bonds than necessary to replace the maturing issues. But the Treasury ownership data 
indicate that in six out of the twelve bond sales in which the FLB system increased 
its total bonds outstanding during the period from July, 1954, to October, 1957, 
commercial banks reduced their holdings of FLB bonds. By contrast, during the same 
period commercial banks' holdings of 1-5 year Treasury securities increased from 
about $20 billion to $25 billion, although bank ownership of all maturity categories 
of Treasury securities fell by about $7 billion. The banks behaved in a similar fashion 
in the other periods of rising yields except for the one difference that commercial 
bank ownership of 1-5 year Treasury securities increased slightly during the July, 
1958, to January, 1960, period.' 
'Diagram 2 indicates that, unlike the other periods in which yields rose, the 
yield spread did not increase during the July, 1958, to January, 1960, period despite 
a reduction in commercial banks' holdings of FLB bonds of about $150 million. Part 
of the explanation of the failure of the differential demand hypothesis "in this instance 
is that the bank-held proportion of total FLB bonds outstanding declined throughout 
the years included in Diagram 2. Thus, at the end of 1947, commercial banks held 
about 90 percent of all FLB outstandings but held only about 30 percent by 1958. 
I l l  
The above evidence indicates that when commercial banks desired funds for 
customer loan expansion, they chose to use the maturity run-off from their holdings 
of FLB bonds rather than selling their 1-5 year governments. This technique allowed 
commercial banks to avoid the capital losses associated with an equivalent sale of 
1-5 year Treasury securiJ!;iés'during an upswing of the cycle. Also, outright sale of 
the higher yielding FLB bonds would hove resulted in lower capital losses to selling 
banks than the sale of 1-5 year Treasury securities. This latter proposition implies 
that the Treasury survey data should indicate a shifting of ownership of FLB bonds 
from banks to other financial institutions during a period of generally rising yields. 
However, while the data do indicate moderate reductions in the holdings of FLB 
bonds by banks included in the survey in months other than those in which the system 
refunded issues, there is not an equivalent increase in the reported holdings by the 
other two major classes of institutions (insurance companies and mutual savings banks). 
Instead, the holdings of the residual classification of "other institutions" demonstrate 
increases, and because this classification lumps together the commercial banks, insur­
ance companies, and mutual savings banks who fail to report in the current survey, 
it is impossible to determine bank-to-bank sales from soles by bonks to non-bank 
institutions. 
The conclusion seems established, therefore, that the behavior of commercial 
banks demand for FLB bonds goes a long way toward explaining the cyclical behavior 
of the yield spread between FLB and Treasury securities. The implications of this con­
clusion for the debt management policies of the system are deferred to the next 
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section of this study. 
Changes in the FLB System's Demand for Funds 
The first part of this chapter analyzes some of the major external influences on 
the system's borrowing activity during the 1947-1961 period. The remainder of this 
chapter is devoted to a consideration of the borrowing techniques and policies fol­
lowed by the system. The procedure followed below is to first survey the 1947-1961 
period as a whole and then to concentrate on the appropriate sub-periods. 
Table 21 summarizes the gross and net demand for funds by the system on an 
annual basis. A comparison of Tables 21 and 22 indicate the overall increase in the 
system's loan volume and debt are approximately equal, but the annual net changes 
in debt and loans do not coincide perfectly. The main reason is that the system fol­
lows the practice of increasing the volume of its bonds outstanding at refunding dates 
and utilizes its net worth resources or short-term loans from commercial banks during 
the interim periods. 
This technique has the advantage of giving the system a certain amount of 
discretion as to the timing of the increases in its bonds outstanding. Indeed, if car­
ried to an extreme, this technique could provide the means whereby the system could 
^Data for the years 1947 and 1948 are excluded from Table 21 because no 
changes occurred during those two years. 
^On occasion, the system also has obtained "foreword money" by selling a 
volume of bonds in excess of current needs and then temporarily lending the excess 
to other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Farm Credit Administration. 
Table 21o FLB bonds sold and outstanding in the private market, 1949-1961° (millions of dollars) 
Outstanding Net changes 
at end of issued during Retired during in bonds 
Year year year" year outstanding 
1949 715.7 215.0 176.0 + 39.0 
1950 714.8 none 0.9 - 0.9 
1951 784.5 71.5 1.8 + 69.7 
1952 816.0 229.9 198.3 + 31.6 
1953 935.9 307.1 187.2 +119.9 
1954 1,030.0 379.6 285.6 + 94.0 
1955 1,191.0 236.5 75.5 +161.0 
1956 1,437.1 605.3 359.2 +246.1 
1957 1,599.4 813.0 650.7 +162.3 
1958 1,743.0 800.0 656.4 +143.6 
1959 1,985.9 738.0 495.0 +243.0 
1960 2,201.4 1,177.0 951.5- +215.5 
1961 2,421.7 677.3 457.0 +220.3 
°Source: Table 31 of this study. 
Table 22, FLB loans outstanding, repayments, and net changes, 1949-1960° (millions of dollars) 
Loans Decreases in Net change 
outstanding at loans during in outstanding 
Year end of year year Loans closed loans 
1949 899.5 141.8 184.7 42.9 
1950 946.5 159.9 206.9 47.1 
1951 997.6 164.0 215.1 51.1 
1952 1,078.5 174.6 255.5 80.9 
1953 1,179.9 188.8 290.2 101.4 
1954 1,280.9 205.3 306.4 101.1 
1955 1,497.2 282.2 498.4 216.2 
1956 1,744.0 275.5 522.4 246.9 
1957 1,919.3 223.8 399.0 175.2 
1958 2,088.8 259.9 429.4 169.5 
1959 2,359.8 301.0 572.1 271.0 
1960 2,563.8 . 299.9 503.9 203.9 
^Source; U.S. Department of Agriculture (44, p, 71), 
^Includes repayments of matured and.unmatured principal, foreclosures, voluntary deeds and loans in 
process of foreclosure, less increases in loans by reason of reamortizations and reinstatements. 
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concentrate the largest amount of the increases in its debt to periods in which interest 
rates are low or falling. However, the evidence indicates thùt increases in the sys­
tem's bonds outstanding have not been restricted to periods of low or falling market 
rates. For example, during the rising interest rate period of from July, 1954, to 
October, 1957, the system increased its volume of outstanding debt by $600 million, 
which averages out to about $250 million per year. But as rates declined over the 
subsequent eight month period (October, 1957, to July, 1958), the system increased 
t 
its total borrowing by about $1"00 million. The details differ for the other periods of 
rising and falling rates, but the conclusion is the same; that is, the borrowing flexi­
bility of the system has been utilized mainly to enable it to increase its debt at 
refunding dates. ' 
Cyclical changes in the maturities 
of FLB bond issues 
The borrowing flexibility made possible by the use of net worth resources and 
commercial bank loans provides the means whereby the system can utilize the "cycli­
cal rule," described on page 41, as a guide to its maturity distribution decisions. 
The dominant objective of the cyclical rule is to minimize interest costs and the ra­
tionale seems to be that by borrowing long-term during the contraction phase of the 
business cycle, the borrower obtains the use of funds at a cost which will be lower 
than those prevailing during the subsequent expansion phase. Also, by selling short-
term issues during an expansion period, the borrower is then in a position to refund 
into long-term bonds at low rates during the subsequent contraction phase. 
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The cyclical rule is subject to a number of criticisms. For example,^ it is easy 
to demonstrate that the rule lacks generality. To illustrate, consider a situation in 
which short-term rates fluctuate more than long-term rates, but both fluctuate peri­
odically about an upward sloping, linear trend. Under these conditions, the cyclical 
rule breaks down, because in order to minimize interest costs, a borrower should sell 
long-term bonds even during an expansion phase provided that'both long- and short-
term rates are above the trend line and rising. 
As an operational guideline for debt management, the cyclical rule is useless 
until long-term and short-term are precisely defined. But in order to minimize inter­
est costs, the appropriate definitions would have to change according to the phase of 
the cycle and would require the borrower to accurately predict the future movements 
of all rates. 
The use of the cyclical rule also requires the borrower to have sufficient 
financial flexibility to enable him to switch back and forth between short- and long-
term issues. The relative sizes of the marketing costs associated with the sale of long-
and short-term maturity bonds are also of importance. The FLB system is relatively 
well situated in these regards for it has the ability to sell any definite maturity bond 
it chooses, ^ and, as pointed out earlier, the marketing costs of its bond sales are low. 
The data of Table 23 indicate that in each of the periods of economic 
^For example, the longest maturity bonds sold by the system in the 1946-1961 
period was a 16 year issue in 1956, and the shortest term was a 75 day issue in 1959, 
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Table 23, Cyclical changes in the maturities of FLB bond issues, 1945-1961 
Time 
period® 
Cyclical 
phase® 
Net increases 
in FLB bonds 
outstanding 
(in millions 
of dollars) 
Total 
amour^ 
issued 
(in millions 
of dollars) 
Average term 
of FLB 
bond issues^ 
(months) 
Oct. 1945 to 
Nov. 1948 expansion 32 607.0 73.3 
Dec. 1948 to 
Oct. 1949 contraction 60 215.0 96.0'' 
Nov. 1949 to 
July 1953 expansion 138 529.8 45.4 
Aug. 1953 to 
Aug. 1954 contraction 142 269.5 50.1 
Sept. 1954 to 
July 1957 expansion 583 1,623.7 53.7 
Aug. 1957 to 
Apr. 1958 contraction 46 601.0 87.8 
May 1958 to 
May 1960 expansion 344 1,978.0 41.5 
June 1960 to 
Feb. 1961 contraction 120 595.0 43.22 
^National Bureau of Economic Research Cyclical Chronology as given in 
U.S. Department of Commerce (48, p. 7). 
^Includes only public offerings of FLB bonds. Source: Table 31. 
^Weighted average computed from the data of Table 31. 
*^One issue only. 
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contraction since 1945, the average term of FLB bonds issued exceeded the average 
term of bonds issued in the preceding period of economic expansion. Thus, with one 
important exception, the system has followed a maturity distribution policy that co-
incides generally with the cyclical rule. This raises the question as to the extent 
to which this policy contributed to a reduction, or at least a stabilization, of the 
increase in the system's interest cost. An imperfect answer^ to this question is pos­
sible by means of a comparison of the system's interest costs with those experienced 
by the Treasury. Such a comparison has the advantage that, although the borrowing 
problems and techniques of the system and the Treasury are dissimilar in many respects, 
the Treasury attempted to lengthen the maturity structure of its debt during the 1951-
1961 period and, as a consequence, sold intermediate and long-term mostly during 
periods of economic recession, while nearly all Treasury financing during periods of 
economic expansion has been short-term.^ 
^The exception is that the average term of FLB bond issues in the 1954-1957 
expansion phase exceeded the average term of the 1953-1954 contraction. The sig­
nificance of this exception is discussed on page 122 of this chapter. 
The ideal answer to this question would require a determination of that pat­
tern of maturity distribution over the whole period which would have resulted in the 
absolute minimum of interest costs. However, such a procedure faces a formidable 
array of difficulties. For example, an astronomical number of possible maturity pat­
terns would have to be considered. Also, it would be necessary to estimate the rate 
of interest at which different amounts of bonds might have been sold under a wide 
range of circumstances. These and other difficulties suggest that the ideal answer is 
not feasible. 
o 
As Laird (26, p, 36) has pointed out, the Treasury has sought to achieve the 
dual goals of lengthening the maturity structure of the public debt and to hold down 
the interest cost of the debt. The difficulties of selling long-term Treasury securities 
are described in considerable detail by Gaines (15), 
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The major conclusion that emerges from a comparison of the Treasury's and the 
system's interest costs is that the increases in the system's interest costs compare favor­
ably with those of the Treasury from 1945 to 1954, but the opposite is true for the 1955-
1961 period» At the end of 1945/ the average rate of FLB bonds outstanding was 2.01 
percent compared with an average rate of 1,72 percent on marketable Treasury secu­
rities outstanding, but by the end of 1951, the rate on FLB bonds was below the 
Treasury rate. The reason for this unusual situation is that, unlike the Treasury, the 
system engaged in only two bond sales after 1945, and both were carried out (1946 
and 1949) when rates were below the average for the 1945-1951 period. Thus, in 
1951, the low average rate on FLB bonds outstanding was primarily a result of the 
low rates at which the system had refunded its debt during the year from 1943 to 1945, 
while the average rate on Treasury securities in 1951 reflected the higher rates at 
which it had to refund, as'well as borrow additional funds, during the 1945-1951 
period. The difference between the two rates was reversed over the next few years 
but never exceeded more than one-half a percentage point at any time. At the end 
of 1954, the system was paying an average rate of 2.37 percent, while the compa­
rable rate on marketable Treasury securities was 2.04 percent. However, from the 
beginning of 1955 to the end of 1961 the average rate paid by the system increased 
at a much faster rate than that paid by the Treasury. For example, by the end of 
1958, the average rate on the system's debt had risen to 3.45 percent, while the 
Treasury's rate stood at 2.55 percent. The difference between the two rates con­
tinued to increase for the remainder of the period; at the end of 1961, the rate on 
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marketable Treasury securities was 3.06 percent, and the average rate on FtB bonds 
was 4.08 percent. 
One of the reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the cyclical rule is that, 
despite the substantial borrowing flexibility enjoyed by the system, it was not able to 
concentrate the increases in its debt to periods of economic contraction. Table 23 
indicates that this is especially true for the period following the 1953-1954 contrac­
tion. 
Another reason for the relative ineffectiveness of the cyclical rule is that the 
extent to which the system used it is over-emphasized by the data of Table 23. For 
example, the increase in the average maturity of FLB bond issues from the expansion 
phase of 1949-1953 to the contraction phase of 1953-1954 more accurately reflects a 
shift from short-term to medium-term than from short-term to long-term issues. 
Indeed, the data of Table 24 indicate that the system relied heavily on 
medium-term issues and sold long-term bonds only during the latter part of the 1951-
1961 period. The result was that a substantial portion of the system's debt had to be 
refunded in the latter part of the period when interest rates were relatively higher 
than those prevailing during the earlier years. ^ This was especially unfortunate, be­
cause the system also needed to increase its total debt by a significant amount during 
the latter part of the 1951-1961 period in order to satisfy the increasing demand for 
mortgage credit. 
^For example, in 1951 the system sold a five year maturity issue at an interest 
cost of 2.63 percent per annum and, because interest rates were rising sharply in 1956, 
it had to pay an average rate of 3.45 percent when it refunded the issue. 
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Table 24. FLB bond issues by term to maturity, 1951-1961° (millions of dollars) 
Term to maturity^ 
Total 
amount 0-12 1 to 1 to 5 to More than 
Year issued months 3 yrs. 5 yrs. 9 yrs. 9 yrs. 
1951 70.0 70.0 
1952 459.8 100.5 228.3 131.0 
1953 75.5 75.5 
1954 378.2 255.2 123.0 
1955 236.5 130.0 106.5 
1956 605.0 435.0 170.0 
1957 813.0 341.0 140.0 125.0 207.0 
1958 800.0 120.0 284.0 205.0 108.0 83.0 
1959 738.0 454.0 98.0 86.0 100.0 
1960 1,177.0 368.0 335.0 307.0 167.0 
1961 677.3 219.0 458.3 
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 31, 
^Based on final maturity dates. 
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The system's preference for medium-term securities is at least partly due to the 
rate of differences between medium- and long-term securities that generally prevailed 
from 1951-1954, The yield data on Treasury securities published in the Fermerai Re­
serve Bulletins indicate the magnitude of the differences. From 1951 to 1954, the 
average annual yield on 3-5 year Treasury securities ranged from 88 to 36 basis points 
higher than long-term Treasury securities. However, from 1955 to 1961, the range 
of differences between 3-5 year Treasury securities and long-term Treasury securities 
was consistently smaller, ranging from 46 to 3 basis points. Thus, by relying heavily 
on medium-term issues during the early part of the 1951-1961 period, the system took 
advantage of rate structure differences to reduce its current interest costs below the 
level that would have resulted if it had sold long-term issues. But, this advantage was 
offset in the 1956-1961 period as long- and medium-term rates moved closer together. 
Another reason for the relative ineffectiveness of the system's use of the cy­
clical rule is that after 1956, the system's maturity distribution policy was apparently 
dominated by the objective of lengthening the maturity structure of its debt, ^  While 
the objective of lengthening the maturity composition need not necessarily conflict 
with the objective of interest cost minimization implied by the cyclical rule, recon­
ciliation of the two objectives poses a difficult problem of the appropriate timing of 
long-term bond sales. The system included long-term bonds in five of its seven bond 
^This is the main explanation of why the average term of FLB bonds issued in 
the expansion phase of 1954-1957 exceeded the average term of bonds issued in the 
1953-1954 contraction phase. 
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sales during 1956 and 1957 when interest rates were above the level reached in the 
previous expansion phase and were rising to new highs. But when interest rates were 
falling in 1958, the system included long-term bonds in only one of its four sales in 
that year. The system repeated the same pattern through the 1959-1961 period; that 
is, it included long-term maturities In its bond sales of December, 1959, and Janu­
ary, 1961, when interest rates were at their peaks but did not include long-term 
maturities in its other sales in 1960 and 1961 when rates were falling. Thus, it can 
be tentatively concluded that after 1956, the system attached too much weight to the 
objective of lengthening the maturity composition of its debt and this led to inappro­
priate timing of its long-term bond sales. ^  
The refinancing operation of 1943-1946 
It was argued in the previous section that the rapid increase in the system's 
borrowing costs from 1956 to 1961 is partly attributable to the system's strong inclina­
tion for medium-term bonds during the first half of the 1950's. Actually, this prefer­
ence for medium-term securities was a continuation of the maturity distribution policy 
the system adopted during and immediately following World War II. 
At the beginning of 1943, the FLB system had slightly more than $1.5 billion 
of bonds outstanding. Interest rates on these bonds ranged from a low of 3 percent to 
a high of 4 percent. The low levels at which interest rates were "pegged" by the 
^This conclusion is examined in more detail in a subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
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Federal Reserve System during and following World War II provided a strong motivation 
for the FLB system to refund its debt and thereby reduce its total interest costs. ^ The 
system was hindered in its desire to refinance because all of the bonds outstanding 
had been issued between July, 1933, and May, 1936, with final maturities of 20 
years and call deferments of 10 years. July, 1943, was, therefore, the earliest date 
on which any of the bonds could be refunded or retired, although the system was in 
a financial position to retire a substantial portion of them sooner because of the rapid 
liquidation of mortgages which resulted from the wartime prosperity of farmers. More­
over, because of the low rates then prevailing on government securities, the system 
was unable to invest its surplus funds at rates comparable to those prevailing on its 
outstanding bonds. 
Between January 1, 1943, and June 30, 1944, the FLB system retired slightly 
more than $437 million of its outstanding bonds. This amount included all the bonds 
that were callable during the eighteen month period plus $261 million held by the 
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. By special arrangement, the bonds acquired from 
the corporation were repurchased prior to their call date and were obtained at prices 
equal to those prevailing in the open market at the time of the transactions. Both 
the purchases from the corporation and the redemption of the other bonds were ac­
complished by the use of surplus cash, short-term borrowings from commercial banks, 
^The yields on Treasury securities were "pegged" at levels ranging from 3/8 
to 1 percent at the short end (91-day Treasury bills) to 2 1/2 percent on the longest-
dated Treasury bonds outstanding. 
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and proceeds from the sale of United States Government securities. 
During the fiscal year of 1945, the FLB system retired seven issues, amounting 
to a total of $524 million, by calling outstanding issues or by repurchases from the 
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. Liquidation of United States Government secu­
rities and short-term borrowings from commercial banks provided the major portion of 
the necessary funds. However, on February 1, 1945, the FLB system offered to the 
public a new $114 million issue of 8-10 year, 2,25 percent bonds. This was the 
first public offering of FLB bonds since 1936 and marked the beginning of the system's 
program of refinancing its outstanding debt into publicly held bonds at lower rates of 
interest. 
Completion of the refinancing program required three additional public offer­
ings. The first of these was on August 1, 1945, and consisted of an offering of $176 
million of 1.5 percent bonds, callable in 1948 with a final maturity of 1950. The 
next public offering was in January, 1946, and the $214 million of bonds offered had 
a coupon rate of 1.5 percent and were callable in 1951. The final public offering of 
the post-war refinancing program was in May, 1946. This issue totaled $217 million 
of 1.5 percent bonds that were callable in 1951 with a final maturity of 1952. The 
completion of the refinancing program in 1946 left the FLB system with total outstand­
ing bonds of about $800 million, of which about $721 million were held by the public, 
all of relatively short duration. 
The data of Table 25 indicate that the interest earnings of the FLB system de­
clined by more than 50 percent over the period 1943 to 1947. The decline in interest 
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Table 25. Gross earnings of the FLB system, fiscal years, 1943-1961° (thousands of 
dollars) 
Fiscal Interest Interest Gross 
year earnings^ expenses^ earnings 
1943 85,169 61,444 23,725 
1944 68,795 55,953 12,842 
1945 50,613 31,544 19,069 
1946 44,685 16,612 28,073 
1947 40,466 12,217 28,249 
1948 37,275 11,369 25,906 
1949 35,804 11,409 24,395 
1950 37,222 12,311 24,911 
1951 38,961 12,407 26,554 
1952 41,070 14,526 26,554 
1953 44,368 20,031 24,337 
1954 48,496 23,801 24,695 
1955 53,258 26,290 26,968 
1956 62,039 32,215 29,824 
1957 72,385 43,805 28,580 
1958 81,857 57,836 24,021 
1959 92,800 62,881 29,919 
1960 109,283 82,316 26,967 
1961 124,724 95,212 29,512 
°Data supplied by the Research and Information Division, Farm Credit 
Administration, Washington, D.Ç. 
^Includes interest payments received on mortgage loans, purchase'money 
contracts, and other investments. 
("Includes interest expenses on FLB bonds and borrowings from other sources. 
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earnings, however, was more than offset by the 80 percent decline in interest ex­
penses brought about by the retirement of debt and the refunding into bonds carrying 
lower rates of interest. As a result, the system was able to improve substantially its 
earnings over this period despite the decline in its total loan volume and a reduction 
in its loan rates. In fact, by the end of 1947, the system had attained a level of 
earnings that was not duplicated until 1956 when its loan volume had more than 
doubled. 
The improved earnings position was of significance to the system. By using the 
accumulated earnings and its surplus funds to pay off government capital and by re­
funding all of its debt into publicly held obligations at relatively low rates of inter­
est, the system was able to free itself of direct support of the Federal Government, 
This enabled the system to assert its "independence" by achieving the long sought for 
goal of a privately owned and operated farm mortgage system. 
Of more direct interest to this study is that the FLB system's refinancing opera­
tion marked a radical break with the fixed maturity policy the system had followed 
prior to World War 11, From 1916 to 1936, all of the bonds sold by the system had 
maturities of 20-30 and 10-20 years; by contrast, the maturities of the bonds issued 
In the refinancing operation of 1943-1946 varied from a low of 3-5 years to a high 
of 8-10 years. Presumably, a major reason for the system's shift to medium-term is­
sues was the realization of a larger reduction in current interest costs than would have 
^The first number refers to the first year in which the bonds are callable; the 
second number to year in which they matured. 
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been possible with a continuation of the pre-war policy of issuing only long-term 
bonds. This opportunity for additional interest cost reduction was made possible by 
the Federal Reserve System's policy of "pegging" an ascending rate structure on gov­
ernment securities. Table 26 gives the results of an attempted measurement of the 
differential between the interest rates actually paid on the bonds issued and the rates 
the system might have paid if 20 year bonds had been issued in 1945-1946. Although 
these estimated differentials are at best crude approximations, they do provide an 
indication of the magnitude of the current interest cost reduction the FLB system ob­
tained by funding into medium-term issues. 
The FLB system's debt management policy of issuing bonds with shorter terms 
than Its pre-war issues has continued up to the present time. This raises the question 
as to whether or not the "new" strategy represents a real improvement over the previ­
ous one. As an attempt at answering this question, the refunding "histories" of the 
1945-1946 bond issues were gathered and are presented in Table 27. These refunding 
"histories" consist of following the changes in the interest charges on a dollar of FLB 
debt through a 20 year period. ^ For example, in the first part of Table 27, the re­
funding history of a dollar of FLB debt was traced from an initial refunding date of 
2-1-45 until the arbitrary cut-off date 20 years later. The interest cost correspond­
ing to each funding period was then computed and then summed for the whole 20 year 
period; that is, $0,586 represents the total interest cost of a dollar of FLB debt that 
'whenever the system offered bonds of several different maturities in the 
refunding of a maturing issue, the shortest offering maturity was used. 
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Table 26, Comparison of actual interest costs with estimated interest costs of 
hypothetical FLB bonds 
Par amount 
(millions 
of dol lars) 
Offering 
date Term 
Actual cost® 
(percent per 
annum to first 
call date) 
Estimated cost 
of hypothetical 
issues of 
20 year terms'^ 
(percent per 
annum) 
114 1-9-45 8-10 years 2.26 2.50 
176 7-17-45 3 1/6-5 1/6 years 1.39 2.30 
214 12-17-45 5-7 years 1.46 2.20 
217 4-16-46 4-6 years 1.29 2.45 
°Based on net price received by the FLB system as given in Table 31. 
differential of .20 percent was added to prevailing yields on 20 year 
Treasury securities. The prevailing yields on 20 year Treasury securities were esti­
mated from the yield curves published in the Treasury Bulletin for the months which 
included the offering dates of the actual issues. 
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Table 27, Refunding histories of FLB bonds issued in 1945-1946° 
Net interest 
cost to FLB 
Call and system Interest cost 
Refunding maturity (percent Number per dollar 
dates dates per annum) of years of debt 
2-1-45 2-1-53/55 2.26 10.00 $0,226 
2-1-55 6-1-60 2.78 5.33 0.147 
6-1-60 6-20-61 4.72 . 1.08 0.051 
6-20-61 12-20-65 4.50 3.59 0.162 
Totals 20.00 $0,586 
8-1-45 10-1-48/50 1.39 4.00 $0,056 
10-1-49 10-1-55/57 1.74 8.00 0.139 
10-1-57 2-2-59 4.89 1.33 0.065 
2-2-59 2-1-60 3.85 1.00 0.039 
2-1-60 12-20-60 5.52 0.92 0.051 
12-20-60 2-20-62 3.46 1.17 0.040 
2-20-62 2-1-74 4.46 3.69 0.164 
Totals 20.00 $0,554 
1-2-46 1-1-51/53 1.46 7.00 $0,102 
1-2-53 11-1-54 2.72 1.83 0.050 
11-1-54 11-1-58 2.29 4.00 0.091 
11-3-58 5-1-59 3.60 0.50 0.018 
5-1-59 4-20-60 4.11 1.00 0.041 
4-20-60 4-3-61 3.97 0.96 0.038 
4-3-61 2-21-66 3.97 4.71 0.185 
Totals 20.00 $0,522 
5-1-46 5-1-50/52 1.29 6.00 $0,077 
5-1-52 5-1-56 2.68 4.00 0.107 
5-1-56 5-1-57 3.40 1.00 0.034 
5-1-57 5-1-58 3.98 1.00 0.040 
5-1-58 5-11-66 3.19 8.00 0.514 
Totals 20.00 $0,772 
^Source; Computed from the data given in Table 31. 
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followed the refunding pattern indicated in the first part of Table 27. 
The average interest rate paid per dollar of FLB debt can be computed by 
using the information of Table 27. Thus, .586/20 = 2,93 percent is the average inter­
est rate for a dollar of debt financed via the funding pattern of the FLB bond issue of 
2-1-45. This means that the FLB system could have paid a rate as high as 2.93 per­
cent on a twenty year bond in 1945 and incurred the same total interest cost on each 
dollar of debt as it actually paid by following the policy of issuing the series of 
shorter term bonds. In Table 26, an estimated rate of 2.50 percent was used as an 
approximation of the rate the FLB system would have had to pay if it had issued twenty 
year bonds in January of 1945. Despite the approximation involved in this estimate, 
the fact that it is substantially below the actual average of 2.93 percent raises doubts 
as to the long-run interest cost reduction achieved by the switch from a constant to a 
"mixed" bond maturity strategy. 
A similar conclusion is derived from the other refunding histories of Table 27. 
The averages for the issues of 8-1-45, 1-2-46, and 5-1-46 are 2.77, 2.61, and 3.86 
percent respectively, while the corresponding estimates from Table 26 of the hypo­
thetical issues of twenty year maturities are 2.30, 2.20, and 2.45 percent. The 
resulting differences are .47, ,41, and 1.41 percent. Thus, on the basis of hindsight, 
it is questionable whether the shift from a mixed maturity distribution strategy resulted 
in a significant long-run interest cost reduction. 
Restructuring the maturity 
distribution; 1956-1961 
The borrowing activity of the system during the period from 1956-1961 is of 
special interest for a number of reasons. First, as a result of its more aggressive lend­
ing policy, the system expanded its total debt by more than $1 billion. Second, the 
period was one of generally "tight" market conditions, partly because of the monetary 
policy carried out by the federal Reserve System and partly because of the heavy 
credit demands of the Treasury and other borrowers. Third, because the system had 
relied exclusively on short- and medium-term issues during the previous post-war 
years, the system had to engage in frequent and substantial refunding. Last, but not 
least, the system made a deliberate attempt to lengthen the maturity composition of 
its debt. 
The data of Table 28 summarize the results of the system's efforts to lengthen 
the maturity distribution. It was tentatively concluded earlier that the timing of 
these long-term sales amplified the increases in the system financing costs. This con­
clusion deserves closer analysis because of its implications. 
During the 1956-1961 period, the system sold long-term bonds on nine sepa­
rate occasions. The first two long-term offerings were In April and August of 1956, 
when the system sold $60 million of 15 year and $110 million of 16 year maturity 
bonds. The sale of long-term bonds during 1956 is surprising, because the system had 
consistently avoided selling long-term issues in the previous two years when interest 
rates in general were substantially lower. By the same token, the sale of long-term 
issues on three occasions in 1957 when interest rates continued to increase is equally 
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Table 28, Maturity distribution of FLB oukfonding bonds; 1951-1961° 
Percent of total FLB bonds maturing within: 
Total 
End of (in millions Less than 1 to 3 3 to 9 More than 
year of dollars) 1 year years years 9 years 
1951 720.6 28.4 - 25.8 . 45.8 
1952 818.0 22.7 22.7 54.6 
1953 867.7 59.3 40.7 
1954 1,006.9 32.6 20.7 46.7 
1955 1,160.9 21.6 32.6 45.8 
1956 1,322.0 32.5 45.5 17.4 4.6 
1957 1,552.1 45.0 32.3 8.1 15.6 
1958 1,716.1 30.2 22.4 20.6 26.8 
1959 1,887.9 36.3 17.4 12.2 34.2 
1960 1,984.2 22.7 23.5 17.2 36.6 
1961 2,389.7 14.2 25.6 36.4 23.8 
^Source: Computed from the data given in Table 31, 
4 
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surprising,^ Moreover, except for on $83 million sole of 12 year bonds in January, 
the system did not offer any long-term bonds in its three refunding soles of 1958, 
Only after rates approached historic highs in 1959 and 1960 did the system again in­
clude long-term bonds in its offerings—an issue of $85 million of 10 year bonds in 
December of I960 and on issue of $82 million of 10 year bonds in January of 1960, 
The outsider can only speculate as to the reasons behind the system's decision 
in 1956 to lengthen the maturity composition of its debt. The changes that took 
place in the rate structure undoubtedly had some influence. In 1956 and 1957, and 
to a lesser extent in 1959 and 1960, the yield curve tended to flatten out, and on 
several occasions it sloped downward. As a result, the system could sell long-term 
bonds carrying yields close to or less than short- and medium-term bonds. For 
example, its bond sale of 6-27-57, the system sold 1 year and 12 year bonds priced 
to yield 4.61 and 4.66 percent respectively. Another example is the system's sale of 
9 month and 10 1/2 year bonds on 12-15-59 which were priced to yield 5,38 and 5,00 
percent respectively. 
^The three sales consisted of a $72 million issue of 10-15 year bonds in Janu­
ary, a $60 million issue of 12 year bonds in June, and a $75 million issue of 10-13 
year bonds in August. 
^Aside from an indirect reference to a desire to obtain a "better" maturity 
distribution in its 1956-1957 annual report (59, p. 14), the system has not explained 
why it initiated the sale of long-term bonds in 1956, Personal correspondence (Dec,, 
1963) with Ro C, Engberg, Research Director for the Farm Credit Administration, 
indicates only that the system was concerned in 1955 with the proportion of its debt 
that would automatically move into the short-term category over the subsequent two 
years, . 
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But while the system found it convenient in terms of current interest costs to 
lengthen the maturity of its debt when short and long rates were approximately equal, 
the opportunity risks thereby incurred were substantial. The two sales noted above 
provide good examples. When the system refunded the 1 year bonds sold on 6-27-57, 
it was able to sell 12 year bonds at a yield of 3.53 percent, and when it refunded the 
9 month bonds sold on 12-15-59, it sold 5 year bonds at a yield of 4.03 percent. Thus, 
while it is unfair to criticize the system for lacking perfect foresight, it is not unrea­
sonable to criticize the system for including long-term issues in its offerings when 
; 
interest rotes were known to be at a historical high, such as December of 1959. 
The above criticism of the system's timing of its long-term bond sales largely 
ignores the influence of marketing considerations. It could be argued that the system 
was simply unable to sell long-term bonds during periods of falling interest rates be­
cause of investors' expectations. The converse might also be argued; that is, the 
sale of significant amounts of short-term bonds may have been difficult during periods 
of high interest rates. These and other marketing problems associated with long-term 
bond sales are analyzed below. 
Marketing problems of long-term issues 
In placing its securities with investors, the FLB system must compete with all 
other open-market borrowers. Therefore, its ability to sell securities of a maturity 
consistent with its objectives depends upon the attractiveness of its offerings relative 
to the attractiveness of other outlets for funds of the maturity sought by the system. 
The relative attractiveness of FLB bonds (or any other type of security) is a function of 
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three interdependent factors: (1) rate of return, (2) risk (both market and default), and 
(3) liquidity. 
Since the system presumably prices its issues as close as possible to competing 
securities, the rate of return paid on any given issue of its bonds is to a ! urge extent 
outside of its control. Therefore, the choice of a particular maturity is simultaneously 
a choice of the rate of return to be paid. But the choice of any particular maturity 
also affects the relative attractiveness of FLB bonds, because it involves the risk and 
liquidity factors. 
Under usual market conditions, market risk increases with increases in the 
maturity of a bond, because for any given change in yield, the price of a long-term 
bond fluctuates more than the price of a short-term bond.^ As a result, a long-term 
bond is generally regarded as less liquid than a short-term bond.^ Thus, the liquidity 
of any bond involves market risk as well as marketability. FLB bonds are highly 
marketable since they, along with other Agency securities, are traded in the same 
general market as Treasury issues. However, the long-term market for Treasury secu­
rities is generally regarded as "thin" relative to the market for short-term Treasury 
^There is no obvious relationship between maturity and default risk, although 
it could be argued that under certain conditions default risk may increase with 
maturity. For example, investors may be especially concerned about the maturity of 
bonds issued by firms operating in a declining industry. However, considering the 
quasi-governmental status of the FLB system, default risk can be safely ignored, 
^For present purposes, liquidity can be defined as the property of being able 
to sell an asset easily without significant loss. 
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securities; that is, substantial sales (or purchases) in the long-term market will have 
more of an impact on price than an equivalent amount of trading in the short-term 
market. 
The main point of the above discussion of the relationship between maturity 
and the relative attractiveness of FLB bonds is that a shift in the maturity structure of 
FLB bonds outstanding is accompanied by a corresponding shift in the purchasers of 
FLB bonds. By Issuing only short- and medium-term bonds from 1945 to 1955, the 
system's bonds were most attractive to commercial banks. But, when the system 
began issuing long-term bonds, they had to be sold to investors who were better suited 
to the higher market risk and the reduced liquidity that was involved. In short, when 
the system began selling long-term issues after 1955, it had to deal with the market­
ing problem of attracting non-bank, long-term investors. 
Two different types of evidence indicate that the system was relatively suc­
cessful in resolving the difficulties associated with the marketing of long-term secu­
rities. In Table 18, the average yield differentials between the offering yields on 
FLB bonds and the yields on Treasury securities are classified according to maturity. 
This evidence indicates that the differentials for the long-term (over nine years) 
maturity group are equivalent to those of the one-to-three year and the three-to-five 
year groups. ^ The implication is that in terms of yield, the system was relatively as 
^Compared to the five-to-nine year group, however, the differentials of 
the long-term group are higher for some undetermined reason. 
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successful in competing with the Treasury by selling long-term bonds as it was in sell­
ing one-to-five year bonds. 
Another measure of the relative success of the system in marketing long-term 
bonds can be obtained by a comparison of the FLB yields and those of corporate bonds. 
In order to provide a basis for comparing the rates on a group of corporate issues to 
those on FLB long-term issues, information on thirty-eight corporate bond issues dur­
ing the years 1956-1959 was accumulated. The corporate issues used were those in 
the first three quality grades, Aaa, Aa, and A, Corporate bonds issued on dates 
closely paralleling those of FLB issues were selected. The data presented in Table 29 
indicate that the differences between the offering yields on the corporate bonds and the 
FLB bonds ranged from a low of a minus 10 basis points (Duquesne Light) to a high of 43 
basis points (Southwestern Gas and Electric). The average difference of 18 basis points 
between the average yield of the eight FLB bonds and the average yield of the thirty-
eight corporate bonds indicates that the FLB system has enjoyed a slight but consistent 
advantage over corporations with high quality bond ratings during this four-year peri­
od. ^  It should also be noted that the system was able to realize this cost advantage 
^An unambiguous explanation of this average difference of 18 basis points is 
impossible. Most of the corporate issues in Table 29 are freely callable whereas only 
two of the eight FLB bonds have a deferred call feature. Also, the FLB bonds have 
maturities of 10 to 15 years, while the corporate bonds range from 20 to 50 years. 
Both of these factors tend to narrow the difference between FLB and corporate bond 
offering yields» However, the comparison is biased because the corporate issues are 
mostly public utilities which have elements of governmental privileges that tend to 
give them a preferred status in the bond market. The relatively fixed income of these 
utilities is quite different from-the ups and downs of agricultural income, and this may 
hove influenced the preferences of investors. 
Table 29, Interest paid on selected issues of FLB bonds compared with rates of interest paid on corporate issues, 
1956-1959° 
Offering 
yields 
Size of (percent) 
issue Maturity Offering Call Rating FLB Other 
Name of issuer (millions) date date feature bonds securities 
FLB System $ 60 1971 4/12/56 none 3.50 
Duquesne Light 20 1986 4/5/56 immediate call Aaa 3.40 
So, Calif, Edison 40 1981 4/18/56 immediate call Aa 3.85 
Columbia Gas 40 1981 4/11/56 immediate call A 3.67 
Kentucky Utilities 10 1986 4/11/56 immediate call A 3.68 
FLB System 110 1972 8/29/56 none — — — 3.92 
Consumer Power 40 1986 8/15/56 immediate call Aaa 3.94 
Pacific Tel, & Tel, 78 1988 8/22/56 immediate call Aa 4.23 
Minneapolis Honeywell 25 1976 8/22/56 immediate call Aa 3.79 
Tampa Electric 10 1986 8/30/56 immediate call Aa 4.07 
Jersey Cen, Power & Light 10 1986 8/11/56 immediate call A 4.00 
FLB System 72 1967-72 1/30/57 10 yr. deferment — — — 4.13 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel, 35 1988 1/30/57 immediate call Aaa 4,30 
Pacific Gas & Electric 35 1986 1/23/57 immediate call Aa 4,50 
Atlantic City Electric Co. 10 1987 1/24/57 immediate call Aa 4,40 
Southwestern Gas & Electric 10 1987 1/22/57 immediate call A 4,56 
American Brake Shoe Co. 12 1982 1/30/57 " 10 yr. deferment A 4.50 
FLB System 60 1969 6/27/57 none — — — 4,63 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 70 1986 6/]9/57 5 yr. deferment Aaa 4,85 
Delaware Power & Light 15 1987 6/25/57 immediate call Aa 4.91 
Southern Calif. Gas 35 1983 6/27/57 5 yr. deferment Aa 5,00 
Southern Calif. Edison 40 1982 7/2/57 5 yr. deferment Aa 4.70 
Rochester Gas & Electric 15 1987 7/3/57 5 yr, deferment A 4.80 
FLB System 75 1967-70 9/18/57 10 yr. deferment " " " 4,53 
New Jersey Bell Tel. 30 1993 9/12/57 immediate call Aaa 4.75 
Philadelphia Electric 40 1987 9/13/57 5 yr, deferment Aaa 4.63 
Consolidated Natural Gas 30 1982 9/18/57 immediate call Aaa 4.86 
Consumer Power 35 1987 9/24/57 immediate call Aaa 4.71 
Niagara Mohawk Power 51 1987 9/17/57 5 yr. deferment Aa 4.82 
FLB System 83 1970 1/29/58 none •vnM 3,53 
Bell Tel. of Penn. 50 1989 1/29/58 immediate call Aaa 3.65 
Pacific Gas & Electric 75 1978 1/22/58 5 yr, deferment Aa 3.65 
Iowa Power & Light 10 1988 1/23/58 immediate call Aa 3.60 
Alabama Power 23 1988 \ 1/19/58 immediate call A 3.85 
West Texas Utilities 85 1988 . 1/21/58 immediate call A 3.80 
FLB System 100 1969 1/20/59 none — — —  4,57 
Commonwealth Edison 20 2009 1/14/59 5 yr, deferment Aa 4.55 
Gulf States Utilities 10 1989 1/20/59 immediate call Aa 4.60 
Ind. & Mich, Electric 20 1988 1/22/59 immediate call Aa 4.60 
Cen. Ill. Public Service 12 1989 1/28/59 immediate call Aa 4.65 
Southern Natural Gas 35 1979 1/20/59 immediate call A 4.75 
^Source: The corporate bond data were taken from Hess and Winn (19, pp. 140-162). The data for FLB 
bonds are from Table 31. 
Table 29 (Continued) 
Offering 
' yields 
Size of (percent) 
issue Maturity Offering Call Rating FLB Other 
Name of issuer (millions) date . date feature bonds securities 
FLB System $ 85 1970 12/15/59 none 5.04 
Dallas Power & Light 20 1989 12/15/59 immediate call Aaa 5.10 
Bell Tel. of Penn. 30 1994 12/16/59 immediate call Aaa 5.21 
Worcester County Electric 75 1989 12/8/59 immediate call Aa 5.30 
Arkansas Power & Light 15 1989 12/9/59 immediate call A 5.45 
Average - 8 FLB issues 
Average - 38 corporate issues 
4.23 
4.41 
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during a period in which market conditions were not favorable to the sale of long-
term issues at low rates of interest. The FLB long-term bond sales of 1956 and 1957, 
for example, were carried out during a time in which the .Federal Reserve System was 
exerting an increasing degree of monetary restraint and other borrowers were increas­
ing their demands on the market, ^ Of equal significance, however, is the fact that 
the system was able to successfully market an $83 million issue of long-term bonds 
when interest rates dropped substantially in early 1958, Obviously, this sample of 
one is inadequate proof that the system could have sold long-term bonds exclusively 
during 1958 or any other period of low interest rates. Nevertheless, the successful 
sale of long-term bonds in 1958 does indicate thct additional sales of long-term 
bonds during periods of low interest rates was not outside the realm of possibility. 
A discussion of the system's marketing techniques during the 1956-1961 period 
would be incomplete without consideration of the system's practice of including both 
long- and short-term bonds in many of its bond sales. This technique was used most 
frequently during periods of rising rates. For example, all but one of the system's 
sales during 1956 and 1957 included either short- and long-term or short- and medium-
term maturities. 
One of the reasons for offering short- and long-term securities at the same 
time was the increasing demand of non-financial corporations for temporary investment 
^Marketable public debt, for example, increased by $8.4 billion from the end 
of 1955 to the end of 1961. 
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of surplus funds. ^ The large amount of FLB bonds of one year or less maturity indicated 
in Table 28 reflect the system's deliberate attempt to exploit this market development. 
One of the results was that the system could reduce its reliance on commercial banks' 
demand for its bonds. For example, in 1956, the system effectively strodled the 
maturity range (1 to 9 years) in which commercial bank demand is predominant by of­
fering bonds with maturities either greater than nine years or less than one year. Thus, 
by combining the goal of lengthening the maturity distribution of its debt with in­
creased sales of bonds to non-financial corporations the system was able to reduce 
its reliance on the cyclically unstable demand of commercial banks. However, the 
apparent success of the system in selling its short-term bonds to non-financial corpo­
rate investors during the 1956-1961 period again raises the question of why the system 
did not rely even more extensively on short-term issues during periods of rising inter­
est rates and thereby facilitate the lengthening of the maturity distribution during peri­
ods of falling interest rates. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this rather lengthy chapter can be quickly summarized. 
Although the system attained the goal of complete ownership by its borrower-members 
at the end of World War II and thereby became at least technically independent of the 
federal government, the market continued to rank FLB bonds as second only to direct 
obligations of the Treasury. Despite this advantage, the increases in the interest costs 
^The increasing importance of non-financial corporation's demand for Agency 
securities was noted earlier in this chapter. 
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of the FLB system compare unfavorably with those of the Treasury and other private 
financial intermediaries, especially during the latter part of the 1945-1961 period. 
The increases in the system's interest cost were basically due to the upward 
trend of all market rates during the 1945-1961 period. However, the increases were 
also affected by the maturity distribution policies of the system. In its refunding 
operation of 1943-1946, the system realized a substantial reduction in current inter­
est costs by selling short- and medium-term bonds instead of long-term bonds. But 
when the subsequent upward movement of market rates is taken into account, the 
long-run advantages of the system's refunding into short- and medium-term bonds is 
questionable. The system's use of the cyclical rule was also found to be relatively 
ineffective, especially in the latter part of the 1945-1961 period—partly because of 
the system's heavy reliance on medium-term bonds in the early part of the period and 
partly because of the inappropriate timing of its long-term issues in the latter part 
of the period. 
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CHAPTER V. OPTIMAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
The main theme of the preceding chapters is that the effectiveness of the FLB 
system as an instrument of public policy is handicapped by difficulties inherent in its 
bond method of borrowing. These difficulties are at least partly beyond the control 
of the system and derive from the nature and circumstances of the bond market. But, 
it is also true that the difficulties experienced by the system are partly attributable 
to its debt management decisions. More specifically, the preceding chapters make 
the argument that the absence of a clearly defined maturity distribution policy led 
to the early post-war emphasis by the system on current interest cost minimization 
and the subsequent emphasis on lengthening the maturity distribution which ampli­
fied both the rise and the variability in the system's loan rates, especially during 
the latter part of the 1946-1961 period. In short, the findings of this study suggest 
that the system's debt management inhibited the full realization of its objectives of 
providing farm mortgage credit at low and stable rates. 
The basic purpose of this chapter is to analyze the possibility of adapting. 
some of the recent advances in the area of optimal portfolio selection to the type of 
debt management decision faced by the FLB system. The conclusion is reached that 
at least in principle the type of decision making model used by Markowitz (30) and 
Cheng (4) is applicable to FLB debt management. However, it is also concluded 
that a modification of the efficiency criterion used by both Markowitz and Cheng 
improves the reasonableness and the potential usefulness of their approach. 
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Many of the technical problems associated with the application of the 
Markowitz-Cheng model are not discussed below. The only defense offered for this 
incompleteness is that the combined efforts of statisticians and bond market analysts 
would be needed to correct it and such skills are beyond the resources of this study. 
The presentation of this chapter consists of five parts. The first part consists 
of basic definitions and assumptions with respect to the debt management problem 
faced by the FLB system. The second part is a summary of the work of Markowitz and 
Cheng in the area of optimal portfolio selection. The third part consists of a demon­
stration of how the Markowitz-Cheng apparatus can be adapted to meet the needs of 
a borrower rather than an investor. Next, the argument is made that a modification 
of the efficiency criterion used by both Markowitz and Cheng improves the reason­
ableness and the usefulness of the adaptation of their approach to debt management. 
The last part is an assessment of some of the problems and prospects of the actual use 
of the proposed techniques. 
Definitions and assumptions 
Contemplation of the FLB system's debt management reveals two conceptually 
distinct kinds of decisions that must be made, namely, decisions as to "how much to 
borrow" and "what is the best way to borrow," The first decision is of vital impor­
tance to the overall success of the system's intervention in the farm mortgage market. 
The second kind of decision involves suboptimization in the sense that it entails 
"second-level" action within the framework provided by the first-level decision. 
Both types of decisions are inherently related to the overall success of the system. 
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Nevertheless, only the second kind of decision is the main topic of this chapter; that 
is, the assumption is made throughout this chapter that at the moment of decision as 
to the proper maturity distribution, the system has previously decided the appropriate 
amount that it must borrow. 
The basic elements of the maturity distribution problem can be summarized 
as follows: Given the" objectives of the system and. its ability to sell securities rang­
ing from short- to long-term, should the system sell only bonds with long maturities 
and consequently stable costs for relatively long periods of time, or should it sell 
only bonds with shorter maturities that offer more frequent opportunities for refunding 
at uncertain but possibly lower rates? Or, should the system allocate its debt among 
bonds with long as well as short maturities, and, if so, how should this allocation be 
determined? 
It is obvious that the answers to the above questions require criteria to pro­
vide the tools which maximize (or minimize) whatever it is the system wants to 
maximize (or minimize). These criteria are defined by the objectives and structure 
of the FLB system. In general, effective intervention by the system in the farm 
mortgage market requires the ability to provide funds at costs less than or equal to 
those of other lenders, regardless of conditions prevailing in the market for FLB bonds. 
Moreover, the concern of the system with stabilization requires a debt management 
policy which reduces the transmission of cyclical changes in bond interest rates to 
loan rates. Selling long-term bonds contributes to stable loan rates, but often this 
method of stabilizing interest costs entails a higher opportunity risk than financing by 
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means of short term. Also, the system presumably seeks to insure that it is able to 
meet sudden increases in the demand for its loans, while substantial decreases in loan 
demand can be matched with appropriate reductions in total bonds outstanding. 
These considerations suggest the necessary ingredients for a general definition 
of optimal maturity distribution; that is, a maturity distribution for a given amount of 
debt which achieves the lowest possible level of interest costs, the minimal degree of 
opportunity risk and cost variation, and the maximum degree of debt flexibility. How­
ever, this general definition is not very satisfactory. One objection is that it is 
unwieldy because of the four different attributes involved. A more basic objection is 
that the attributes conflict with one another. For example, because of the behavior 
of interest rates over the business cycle, the simultaneous minimization of interest 
costs and opportunity risk is possible only under very special circumstances. The more 
usual case is that the minimum level of costs will occur with a maturity distribution 
which results in more than the minimum level of opportunity risk. Because of these 
and other objections, it is useful to work with a restricted definition of optimal matu­
rity distribution; that is, a maturity distribution which results in a given, desired 
level of interest costs consistent with the minimal level of opportunity risk. 
This restricted definition of optimal maturity distribution is inadequate be­
cause no precise meaning is attached to the concept of minimization. Usually, 
minimization is related to a finite time interval—"a planning period." However, the 
use of a finite planning period does not mean that the peculiarly continuous nature of 
debt management problems can be ignored. Decisions reached today as to the 
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appropriate maturity structure are influenced by similar decisions made in past periods 
and will influence the setting in which tomorrow's decisions must be reached. For 
example, past decisions influence today's decision as to the appropriate replacement 
maturity of a bond maturing today and today's decision will have a bearing on tomor­
row's replacement decisions. Not only is it impossible to make decisions on the chain 
of replacements separately, it is equally impossible to make them one at a time, 
proceeding from the present toward the future. In its most abstract terms, "the" matu­
rity problem of FLB debt management involves the entire chain of decisions and their 
consequences. But in reality, the entire chain of decisions and their consequences 
cannot be perceived because the uncertainty surrounding the "correct" interpretation 
of the past is exceeded only by the uncertainty of the future. By establishing certain 
conditions that must be satisfied at some limit as of a given moment in the future, the 
need for considering the whole chain of decisions is eliminated. 
Such conditions are arbitrary in the sense that they are not derived from the 
anticipated circumstances of the intervening period between the present and some 
given future moment. Indeed, in order to be useful, these limiting conditions must 
be derived independently of the particular circumstances of a given moment in time. 
In short, these limiting conditions are derived from the objectives of the system and 
are independent of time. 
Several factors must be taken into account in determining the length of the 
planning period. On the one hand, because of the fact that once a bond is issued, 
it remains as a part of the debt structure until it matures, it can be argued that the 
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planning period must be as long as the longest maturity previously issued or currently 
under consideration. On the other hand, concern with opportunity risk and the level 
of interest costs implies explicit predictions of interest rate movements and such pre­
dictions become increasingly vague as longer periods of time are considered. For 
example, consideration of the opportunity risk associated with the issue of a twenty-
year bond would necessitate predictions of interest rates twenty years into the future. 
Such predictions are probably impossible or meaningless. Nevertheless, for the 
moment, the problem of prediction is deferred, and a planning period is defined as a 
finite number of years over which interest rate predictions are made, and the longest 
maturity of any potential bond issue is equal to this number of years. Thus, the sys­
tem is assumed to seek an optimal maturity distribution in the sense of attaining the 
minimum level of opportunity risk consistent with a fixed desired level of interest cost 
with reference to a certain planning period. 
The analytical framework 
Frequent attempts have been made by economic theorists to provide an ex­
planation or the establishment of norms for asset diversification by investors. ^  One 
approach used by many theorists, although emphatically rejected by others, is to 
treat subjective probabilities as identical to their objective counterparts and then 
analyze investor behavior in terms of the statistical concepts of expected value and 
variance. This procedure translates the problem from one of an uncertain situation to 
^An incisive summary of these attempts is given by Farrar (7, Chap. 1). 
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a risk situation,^ One of the most successful uses of this basic approach is that of 
the "Markowitz model" which was initially presented in a journal article (29) and 
repeated with more detail and completeness at a later date in book form (30), Be­
cause Markowitz's model is the basis of the proposal presented in this study, it is 
necessary to briefly summarize it. 
Basic to Markowitz's model is the argument that a rational investor can be 
induced to accept an increase in the risk attached to a portfolio of given size only 
if he is compensated by a rise in the yield of that portfolio. In terms of the statis­
tical concepts of mean and variance, an increase in the expected return (R), repre­
senting the most likely net portfolio return, must be forthcoming in order for an 
investor to accept an increase in the variance (V^), representing the undependabil-
ity of the yield. From this argument, Markowitz derives a criterion of efficient port­
folio diversification: the combination of securities obtainable with a given sum of 
money which attains the minimum variance for a specified .expected rate of return. 
2 Accepting this criterion of efficiency for the moment, the rationale Markowitz pro­
vides for diversification can be presented most effectively by employing simple 
mathematical notation. 
Let Z'l represent the current price of the i— security and assume there are 
risk situation is defined as one in which on "experiment" is repetitive and 
possesses a frequency distribution. An uncertain situation is present when the experi­
ment cannot be repeated, 
2 A modification of this criterion is offered in the fourth part of this chapter. 
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i = l ,  2 ,  .  .  n  s u c h  s e c u r i t i e s .  I t  i s  a l s o  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  i n v e s t o r  h a s  a  f i x e d  
number of dollars (I) available for investment. Let Xj represent the proportion of I 
invested in the iîb_security. Let Yj represent the yield (stated as a rate) on the iîlL 
security and if uj = E (Y;) is the expected yield on the iÉL security, 
X UiX; = R 
i 
represents the total expected yield of the portfolio. 
The variance of the portfolio can be represented as 
V 2 = 5 ; X ? S ? + 2  X i : i j  X : ;  
i i<' i 
2 2 
where sf = E (Yj - uj) and sjj = E (Yj - uj) (Yj - u.) . This expression im­
mediately brings out the possibility that the variance of a diversified portfolio may be 
smaller than the variance of a portfolio composed of a single security and thereby 
justifies diversification as rational behavior. The necessary condition is that there are 
sufficiently small (or negative) covariance elements. ^ 
The technical application of Markowitz's approach consists of deriving an 
"efficient portfolio line" on which each point represents a portfolio with a given 
^Markowitz did more than simply point out this possibility. He proceeded to 
show that achievement of efficient portfolio selection is a problem suitable for 
quadratic programming methods in which is minimized subject to the restraints: 
^ Xj = 1 and R < R, where R is the desired level of return. 
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expected yield and the minimum variance of that yield. Once such a set of port­
folios is derived, an investor can choose that desired yield and minimum variance 
combination which best suits his preferences. ^  
9 . Markowitz illustrates his apparatus with a diagram similar to Figure 3 in 
which the expected portfolio return (R) is plotted on the horizontal axis and the 
standard deviation, V = is plotted on the vertical axis. Suppose portfolio 
Pi offers an expected return, R^, and a standard deviation, Vj, Assuming that all 
portfolios available with a given amount of money have been similarly represented 
in the enclosed area of the diagram, it is easy to see that P-j is not an "efficient" 
portfolio because other portfolios, P2 for example, offer a higher expected return 
and a lower standard deviation. Thus, the locus of all efficient portfolios is the 
lower right segment (abc in the diagram) of the enclosed area, because these points 
represent all the lowest and highest (R, V) combinations. However, it is important 
to note that Markowitz does not provide a mechanism for making a final choice be­
tween the alternative efficient portfolios. He suggests that in the absence of specific 
knowledge of the investor's preferences, only "judgment" can be used in deciding 
^Alternatively, the investor could choose a fixed level of variance and the 
efficient portfolio line then denotes the mcp<imum yield possible for that variance. 
^See Markowitz (29, p. 82). 
^Farrar (7, p. 14) asserts without proof that if cash is considered as one of 
the securities the efficiency locus can then be represented graphically as a straight 
line from the origin tangent to the "no-cash" combinations. This is indicated by the 
dotted line (ob) in Figure 1 line (obc). 
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V A 
Attainable portfolios 
Fig. 3. The Markowitz (R, V) efficiency criterion 
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whether one efficient portfolio is better than others,^ 
Although the (R, V) criterion has proved to be useful, there is no obvious rea-
2 son why some other efficiency standard might not serve in its stead. For example, 
a complete analysis of the implications of substituting the mode for the expected 
value might prove to be interesting. But, the mean and the standard deviation are 
relatively well-known concepts, statisticians and economists in particular are ac­
customed to their use, and the fruitfulness of their past usage argues in favor of fur­
ther developing their use in financial decision making before exploring the use of 
alternative concepts. However, the argument is made in the last part of this chapter 
that Markowitz's use of the variance as a measure of risk is not completely adequate 
and that a modification of the (R, V) criterion improves the potential usefulness of 
3 his overall approach. Before developing these points, it is necessary to demon­
strate how Markowitz's analysis of portfolio selection can be adapted to the problems 
of debt management. 
In an important contribution, .Cheng (4) points out that a financial manager 
has a number of possible ways sequencing bonds of different maturities during a plan­
ning period. For example, given n = 3 years as the length of a planning period, one 
^At the normative theoretical level one of the appealing aspects of the 
Markowitz criterion is that it is consistent with the basic properties (expected value 
preference and risk aversion) usually ascribed to investors' utility functions. 
Indeed, a portion of Markowitz's book (30, pp. 50-54) is devoted to examin­
ing alternative criteria. 
^The same comment applies to Cheng's contribution. 
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sequence can-be represented as 
(0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 1) 
where (0, 1) means the issue, at the beginning of the first period or "year," a bond 
of one-year maturity; (1, 1) means the issue of a one-year bond one year from now; 
(2, 1) means the issue of a one-year bond two years from now. Designating the pos­
sible sequences as tactics, Cheng demonstrates conceptually how the Markowitz model 
can be applied to the problem of achieving the optimal maturity diversification of an 
investor's bond portfolio, ^  The essence of Cheng's approach is the substitution of 
the expected values and variances of all the individual tactics for those of the individ­
ual securities used in Markowitz's model. This substitution allows Cheng to adopt 
Markowitz's efficiency criterion; that is, Cheng (4, p. 496) defines an optimal 
diversification of a bond portfolio as one which minimizes the variance for the ex­
pected rate of growth of the bond portfolio desired by the investor over a given plan­
ning period. 
The conceptual framework for optimal debt management which is outlined 
below relies heavily on Cheng's device of substituting tactics for the individual secu­
rities of Markowitz's model. However, because this study does not attempt to elabo­
rate or detail operationally the necessary computational techniques, the presentation 
employs a simpler form of mathematical notation than that used by Cheng. Hope­
fully, the loss of mathematical elegance is repaired by a clearer statement of the 
^Markowitz dealt only with the problem of an optimal selection of equities. 
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substance of this study's suggested modification the efficiency criterion used by both 
Markowitz and Cheng. 
The Applicability of the Markowitz-Cheng Model 
to Debt Management 
Analogous to Cheng's investor, a borrower such as the FLB system has a number 
of ways of sequencing bonds of different maturities. In fact, the number of such se­
quences or tactics is determined by the formula m=2"~^ where m is the number of 
tactics and n is the number of "years" or sub-periods in the planning period. ^  
The choice of which tactic or combination of tactics to employ is the essence 
of the problem. The following factors must be considered in formulating decision 
rules: 
1. The level of current rates and the differentials between rates on long, 
intermediate, and short maturities. 
2o The structure of rates expected to prevail at the time the short and inter­
mediate term bonds mature. 
3. The anticipated behavior of interest rates in the time period encompassed 
by the longest term bond under consideration. 
4. Differences between the selling costs of short and long maturities. 
5. The expected fluctuation of loan demand over the planning period. 
^The proof of this formula is given in Appendix A. The formula is subject to 
the condition that the summation of the terms of the different sequences do not exceed 
n, the number of years or periods in the planning period. 
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6. The volume of any given maturity class of bonds that can be readily mar­
keted without affecting the rate prevailing in each maturity class. 
Nothing essential is lost by eliminating by assumption the last three of these 
factors. Thus, it is assumed that selling costs are the same for all maturities, a con­
stant amount of debt is to be financed over the planning period, and that there exists 
a perfectly elastic demand for bonds of any given maturity. With the aid of these 
simplifying assumptions, we can now give a more precise, abstract statement of the 
maturity distribution problem faced by the FLB system. 
Let Xj represent the number of dollars borrowed by means of the jJIL tactic. 
The financing strategy must therefore be carried out such that 
m 
where D represents a given dollar amount of debt. The consequences of the various 
tactics, in terms of their expected interest costs, may be represented as follows. 
There are b mutually exclusive series of events (e.g., all rates increase, all rates 
increase and then decrease, etc.), and it is expected that if the il!l series of events 
occurs, the consequence of one dollar financed by means of the j— tactic will be 
ajj. This implies that although it is not known which series of events will occur, the 
matrix (ajj) is known. 
It is now supposed that market experts are able to attach subjective probabil­
ities, pj, to the various series of events. If 
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b 
®i " Z Pi°ii 
' i-1 
is the expected cost of one dollar financed via the j— tactic, then 
t  Z  P i ' i r i  =  t  Y i  =  '  
i i ' i=i ' ' 
represents the expected interest cost on the debt by the end of the planning period. 
Similarly, the anticipated variance of the interest cost of the debt follows 
the well-known statistical rule, 
= 3: 4i + 2 Z E "jXk^ik 
i k<:i i 
where sj is the standard deviation of one dollar placed in the tactic and Sj|^ 
is the covariance of the outcomes of the {— and k— tactics. Since the a-matrix 
and the probabilities are given, all the s's are given. 
The technical problem can be formally stated as follows: Minimize the ob­
jective function. 
2 X? S? + 2 2 E XTX^S; A ^kSik 
k< i i 
subject to the constraints. 
_ " m m 
E = > X; e. and V x. = D 
M ' ' M ' 
where E represents a fixed level of the expected cost of borrowing desired by the sys­
tem and all other notation is the same as before. The solution^ gives the "optimal" 
^Markowitz (30) uses quadratic programming, while Martin (31) uses Lagrangi-
an multipliers to trace out the efficient portfolio line. 
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fractions of the debt that should be allocated to the bonds of different maturities. It 
should be noted, however, that there are "optimal" amounts only in the sense that S 
is minimized consistent with E and therefore may not meet the utility preferences of 
the debt managers. This means that if a different level of S is desired, a new level 
of E must be specified. In short, the procedure gives only the possible (E, S) combi­
nations, and the debt managers must then exercise their choice in terms of their 
preferences. 
The application of the Markowitz-Cheng model to the maturity distribution 
model is summarized in the top portion of Figure 4 where E is plotted on the horizon­
tal axis and S on the vertical axis. The enclosed area represents the values of E and 
S for all the maturity distributions.^ If the Markowitz rationale is now applied to a 
borrower rather than an investor, of all attainable maturity distributions, a rational 
borrower restricts his realm of choice to those distributions which minimize the stand­
ard deviation for a fixed (desired) level of cost. Thus, the Markowitz efficient matu­
rity distributions are represented by those whose standard deviation and expected cost 
lie along the curve (BCA) in the top portion of Figure 4. 
So far we have not dealt with the "rïskless" tactic. Recall that of the m 
tactics there is one (say the mî!l) which entails the role of bonds with a maturity 
spanning the whole planning period. The variance of this mîh. tactic is zero by 
^For the moment, assume exclusion of the tactic which entails the sale of 
bonds with maturities spanning the whole planning period; that is, the enclosed area 
represents possible distributions when all S|>0« 
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Fig. 4. Derivation of the prediction limit efficiency criterion 
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definition; therefore, if all the debt is borrowed by means of this tactic, a "riskless" 
maturity distribution (Mq) results. ^  The concept of a "riskless" maturity distribution 
allows a demonstration of the fact that if the mlb_ tactic has zero variance, the 
lower segment of the Markowitz efficiency locus is linear. 
Consider q situation in which the system borrows a fraction (OC ) of its debt 
by means of M and the remainder (1 -QC ) by means of a "risky" maturity distribution 
Ml which excludes the mî!l tactic. The expected cost of such a "hybrid" distribu­
tion would be: 
EH = a EMo - CC ) EM, • 
The standard deviation of the hybrid distribution would be: 
SH =[a'4. +('-«:4, OC (1 -OC)=M,] • 
However, s^ = 0 and therefore 
Sh = (1 - OC ) SM^ . 
This last expression implies that all the hybrids involving any risky distribution plus a 
riskless distribution must have values of E and S which lie along a straight line be­
tween the points representing the two components. Thus in the upper portion of 
^It is important to note that (Mq) is "riskless" only in the sense that the ex­
pected cost is known with certainty (Sq=0). Obviously the maturity distribution 
(Mq) is not free of opportunity risk as defined on page 40 of this study. Dissatis­
faction with the standard deviation as a measure of opportunity risk motivated this 
study's suggested modification of the Markowitz efficiency criterion. 
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Figure 4, if the point A represents the values of and the point the 
values of (Ey^ , = 0), all the values of E and S lying along the straight line 
from Eq to A are attainable by varying the value of CC , However, a similar linear 
relationship exists between E^ and C and it is obvious that the corresponding distribu­
tions ore preferred, on the basis of the Markowitz criterion, to those represented on 
a line from Eq to A. Therefore, C represents the limiting possibility of attaining 
reductions in E proportional to increases in S by adding the risky but less costly distri­
butions, Because of the linear relationship between points C and Eq of the upper di­
agram of Figure 4, the Markowitz efficiency locus is the curve (BAEq), 
Modification of the Markowitz Efficiency Criterion 
The application of the Markowitz model to debt management which was out­
lined above incorporated without question the mean-variance efficiency criterion. 
It is proposed below that a modification of this criterion is necessary and useful. 
The modification proposed by this study is useful because under most circum­
stances it greatly reduces the number of maturity distributions from which the debt 
managers must choose. Using the (E, S) criterion, the debt managers would have to 
choose from the very large number of maturity distribution represented by the curve 
EqB in Figure 4, whereas use of the criterion suggested by this study reduces that 
number under most circumstances. 
The exposition of this modification is facilitated by assuming that the basic 
random variable, interest cost, is normally distributed. It is a well-known statis­
tical proposition that if a random variable is normally distributed, a prediction limit 
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can be stated in terms of the mean and the standard deviation. For example, there 
is a 32 percent probability that a r Tnaily distributed random variable will take on 
a value above or below the "limits" of one standard deviation above or below the 
mean. Thus, in terms of the notation employed earlier, there is about a 32 percent 
probability that for a given maturity distribution the interest cost will take on a 
value greater than or less than (E+S). 
In the lower part of Figure 4 the upper and lower prediction limits associated 
with the curve EqB are represented by the curves = E + (1)S and = E - (1)S 
respectively. According to the Markowitz criterion, a debt manager would have to 
select his optimal maturity distribution from the set of all possible distributions 
represented by the curve E^B. However, by examining the curves and Cl it be­
comes obvious that there is instead a smaller set in which a manager would be inter­
ested. Consider, for example, two maturity distributions, say M2 and M^, repre­
sented by (E2, $2) and (E3, S3) in Figure 4. Both M2 and M3 are efficient accord­
ing to the Markowitz criterion. But If all values greater than (E +(1)S) are con­
sidered as the highest costs that can occur (with a given probability), the curve 
implies that a rational debt manager would always choose M3. The reason is that 
the upper limit is the same for both M2 and M3 but E3 is less than E2, Put another 
way, there is about a 16 percent probability of the "worst" outcome (a cost greater 
than Z) for both M2 and M3, but the expected cost is less for M3 than M2. There­
fore, even though both M2 and M3 are efficient according to the Markowitz criterion, 
they are not equally efficient according to the prediction limit criterion. 
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Figure 4 also indicates that the Markowitz criterion and the prediction limit 
efficiency requires that the managers restrict their choice to those maturity distribu­
tions defined by the negatively sloped segment of the curve. In general, predic­
tion limit criterion efficiency requires that the derivate of with respect to E be 
negative. 
The rationale of the prediction limit criterion can be illustrated in still an­
other way. Consider the maturity distributions M2 and M-] corresponding respec­
tively to (E2/ S2) and (E], S^), If (E2 +(1) S2) is considered the highest plausible 
interest cost and (E^ - (1) S-j) the lowest plausible interest cost, then M2 will al­
ways be preferred because E2 < E^, in words, the "worst" plausible outcome of M2 
is ihe some as the "best" plausible outcome of M-j, but the most likely outcome of 
Mo !3 a lower interest cost than that associated with M-j. 
The argument thus far has considered only the prediction limit estabiished_py 
one standard deviation above or below the mean; that is, C = E + A S where A = 1. 
Higher values of A would indicate more "conservative" debt management. For 
example, A = 1 indicates about a 16 percent probability that the interest cost would 
be above (E + S); A = 2 represents a 2 percent probability of the cost being higher 
than (E +2S). In graphic terms, moving from A = 1 to A = 2 results in a shift of 
curve to CJj and a corresponding change in the set of maturity distributions the debt 
managers would have to choose from. 
Of course, the value of A actually used depends upon the subjective risk 
preferences of the debt managers. This means that the use of the prediction limit 
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criterion requires a specification from the debt managers which would not be neces­
sary if the Markowitz criterion were used. The extra effort, however, would seem to 
be worth it because of the reduction of the number of maturity distributions needed in 
reaching the ultimate selection. 
If the normal distribution assumption is not met, the choice of an appropriate 
value for A would be more complicated. The primary difficulty would be that of 
providing the debt managers with a meaningful interpretation of alternative values 
of A. Undoubtedly, the services of a statistician would be required to calculate and 
explain how the probability of values outside (and inside) of given limits would change 
with changes of A. 
Regardless of the nature of the probability distribution, the prediction limit 
criterion does not require radically different computational methods. Indeed, one 
of the advantages claimed for the prediction limit criterion is that all of the ad­
vances stemming from the work of Markowitz are utilized. The prediction limit 
criterion differs only in the final steps of the decision making process. 
Prospects and Problems 
The method of determining optimal maturity distribution outlined above is sub­
ject to a number of criticisms. One major source of criticism is the use of restrictive 
and unrealistic assumptions. Another source of criticism is that the necessary addi­
tional costs implied in the implementation of the proposal may exceed the possible 
gains. A detailed treatment of these criticisms cannot be accomplished without adding 
unreasonable length to this study, but a few comments on the most obvious criticisms 
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are in order. 
Criticism based on the assumption of equal selling costs for all maturities is 
the simplest to meet. The commission selling method employed by the FLB system en­
tails a definite schedule of rates based on maturity categories. Therefore, it is a 
relatively simple matter to add the selling costs associated with the particular maturi­
ty to the relevant expected rates of interest. 
The assumption of a constant amount of debt to be financed over the planning 
period is a more serious source of criticism. As a single-purpose lender, the FLB sys­
tem is subject to the adverse effects of sudden and substantial changes in the demand 
for its loans. The substantial net worth accumulated by the system in the past twenty 
years mitigates these adverse effects but does not eliminate them. Of particular con­
cern to the system is the possibility that the demand for new loans might suddenly in­
crease or decrease. An unexpected decline, for example, might generate a situation 
in which its outstanding debt exceeded its holdings of mortgages. A formal approach 
to this problem would consist of deriving estimates of possible reductions in loan vol­
ume and use these estimates as constraints as to the minimum amount of bonds issued 
of certain maturity classes. For example, the system could specify that all the ef­
ficient maturity distributions meet the constraint that 10 percent of the total debt be 
of one-year (or less) maturity, 20 percent of one to three years maturity, etc. Of 
course, it would be possible to cpmpare the set of efficient portfolios with such a 
constraint to the set that did not use them and thereby evaluate the relative "cost," 
in terms of (E) and (E + AS), of imposing the constraints. 
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The assumption of a perfectly elastic demand for bonds of any given maturity 
is unrealistic. However, it is not unrealistic to assume that bond dealers could pro­
vide reasonably accurate limits to the amounts of bonds of particular maturities that 
could be sold without affecting current market rates and such limits could be intro-
duced as constraints in a manner similar to that of the preceding paragraph. 
A fundamental objection to the decision model proposed by this study is that 
it requires the decision makers to "predict" in the form of specifying the relative 
probabilities of the future, possible "states" of the yield curve. Even If It Is con­
ceded that the decision makers are willing to specify probabilities over the next 
year on the basis of the current (known) yield curve. It Is unrealistic to expect them 
to attach probabilities to alternative series of events extending over ten or, perhaps, 
twenty years. One approach to this problem is to use the concept of "the expected 
normal range of interest rates." For example, the debt managers may decide that the 
historical ranges of interest rates of given maturity categories will prevail In the 
future. The debt managers could then employ the Laplace principle of Insufficient 
reason In assigning relative probabilities. This principle asserts that if decision makers 
are Ignorant of the probabilities of various possible future events, all should be treated 
as equally likely. A more complex approach would be to attach unequal probabilities 
to the range of rates over the near future (say a year) so as to reflect the managers 
more firmly held predictions and then assign equal probabilities to the range of rates 
beyond one year. For example, if current rates appear to be high relative to the 
normal range, the debt managers may attach higher subjective probabilities to lower 
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rates over the next year and equal probabilities to the range of rotes beyond one year. 
Even the simplest use of the Laplace principle, however, is confronted with 
serious difficulties from an operational point of view. In reality, there are an infi­
nite number of future "states" of the yield curve and relatively little Is known about 
the appropriate probability distributions. Malkiel (28, p. 209) points out that singling .. 
out the extremes of the possible ranges is equivalent to using a uniform distribution 
over the entire range. Thus, by attaching equal probabilities to the extreme .values 
for the ranges of each maturity category, the debt managers in effect would be assum­
ing a specific probability distribution to interest rates of different maturities. The 
validity of this (or any other) assumption about the probability distribution is open to 
question. 
The inherent difficulty of deriving appropriate probability estimates, however, 
is not a sufficient basis for discarding the model proposed in this study in favor of the 
traditional rules of thumb. The major difference between these two approaches to the 
maturity distribution problem is that model proposed by this study requires the explicit 
formulation of expectations, while the traditional rules of thumb incorporate implicit 
expectations. In short, criticism of a formal decision model based on the cost or dif­
ficulty of deriving explicit expectations about the future should not be confused with 
criticism based on the use of expectations. 
Another major source of objection to the approach proposed by this study is 
that the complex and time-consuming analysis is not worth the additional effort and 
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cost, A definitive answer to this objection is impossible, but its validity partly 
depends upon the magnitude of the interest rate changes in the bond market. 
Table 30 indicates the cyclical changes in rates on Treasury that have taken place 
since 1953, Similar changes—and, therefore, opportunities for interest costs reduc­
tion—have taken place with respect to FLB securities. One specific example is the 
FLB bond sale of 6-27-57 in which $60 million of twelve year securities were sold 
at an effective rate of 4,66 percent. Six and one-half months later, the system 
again offered a twelve year issue but had to pay only 3.55 percent. Equivalent 
changes have occurred on short-term issues. The system offered a 10 1/2 month is­
sue at a yield of 5,40 percent on 1-13-60, and only three months later, it sold an 
11 1/2 month issue at a yield of 3,86 percent. Of course, realization of the cost 
reductions made possible by these cyclical changes in interest rates is not guaran­
teed by the use of the decision model outlined by this study. Nevertheless, the 
fact that substantial interest cost reductions are possible at least imposes the obliga­
tion of exploring.alternative methods of obtaining them. 
The expense of implementing and utilizing a formal decision making model 
must also be taken into account. Certainly the rudimentary model of this study needs 
considerable development and refinement even before reasonable cost estimates of 
its actual use could be made. Perhaps the most exigent need in this regard is to find 
^It should be clear, however, that the problem of maturity distribution is 
inherently complex, and the alternative use of "rules of thumb" do not eliminate the 
complexity but simply ignore it. 
Table 30, Declines in rates on Treasury securities from peaks to lows during selected periods^ (in percentage 
points) 
Three month Nine to twelve month Three to five year Long-term 
Treasury bills Treasury issues Treasury issues U.S. bonds 
Part A: Declines from peak levels 
June 1953 June 1953 June 1953 June 1953 
June 1954 1,581 Aug, 1954 1,82 July 1954 1,23 Aug. 1954 .69 
Oct, 1957 Sept, 1957 Oct, 1957 Aug. 1957 
June 1958 2,710 June 1958 3,04 May 1958 1,74 Apr. 1958 ,52 
Dec, 1959 Dec, 1959 Dec, 1959 . Jan, 1960 
July 1961 2,304 Jan, 1961 2,28 May 1961 1,67 May 1961 .64 
Part B: Percentage declines from peak levels 
June 1953 June 1953 June 1953 June 1953 
June 1954 70,9 Aug. 1954 74,0 July 1954 42,1 Aug. 1954 21,0 
Oct, 1957 Sept, 1957 Oct. 1957 Oct, 1957 
June 1958 75,5 June 1958 75.6 May 1958 43.6 Apr. 1958 14,1 
Dec, 1959 Dec, 1959 Dec. 1959 Jan, 1960 
July 1961 50,4 Jan. 1961 45,8 May 1961 33.7 May 1961 14,6 
^Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bulletin (various issues). 
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a way to reduce substantially the large number of inputs (tactics) that would be in­
volved in even a relatively short planning period. ^ In this respect, the analysis of 
this study has nothing to contribute. But even if the number of inputs could be re­
duced substantially, the basic intent of the Markowitz-Cheng model is to reduce, 
by means of defining an efficient set, the astronomically large number of possible 
' choices a borrower (or investor) has to face. Hopefully, the contribution of this 
study is that the use of the prediction limit definition of efficiency achieves a still 
smaller set of alternatives and thereby further facilitates the difficult and compli­
cated decision process involved in the maturity distribution problem. 
^Cheng (4, p. 499) suggests that dynamic programming is a promising tool to 
deal with this problem. 
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CHAPTER VII. APPENDIX A 
The formula m = 2" ^ is used in the text (p. 157) to determine the number of 
tactics or maturity sequences (m) where n represents the number of "years" in the 
planning period, the possible maturities of the bonds correspond to the order of the 
numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . n, and the sum of the years in any sequence must be equal 
to n. 
It is easy to show by trial that the formula is true in simple cases. Thus, 
when n - 1, the only possible sequence is the issue of a one year bond and 
m = 2"~1 = 2^ = 1. If n =2, there are two sequences—an issue of a one year bond 
followed by another one year bond and the initial issue of a two year bond—so that 
the formula holds; that is, m = 2^-1 =2. 
The formula can be proven by mathematical induction which requires: 
(a) verification that it is true for one integral value of n; (b) proof that if k is any 
integral value of n for which it is true, then k + 1 is also a value for which it is 
true. To satisfy (a), let n = 1 and it is obvious that m = 2""^ = 2^ = 1 is true. To 
satisfy (b), let k be a positive, integral value of n; that is, n = k. Then, by hypoth­
esis, m = 2^"^. Next, consider the case of n = k + 1 for which the formula implies 
m = 2'^'*"^"^. But, identically, m = 2^ = 2""^ and therefore, by induction, the 
formula holds for all positive integral values of n. 
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CHAPTER VIII. APPENDIX B 
Table 31. Public offerings of FLB bonds, 1945-1961° 
Par amount Face. Call and 
Offering (millions of rate maturity 
date dollars) (percent) date 
1945 
1/9 • $114.0 2 1/4 • 2/1/53-55 
7/17 176.0 1 1/2 10/1/48-50 
12/17 214.0 1 1/2 1/1/51-53 
1946 
4/16 217.0 1 1/4 5/1/50-52 
1949 
9/13 215.0 1 3/4 10/1/55-57 
1951 
10/18 70.0 2 1/2 11/1/54 
1952 
4/15 228.3 2 5/8 5/1/56 
12/9 100.5 2 1/2 11/1/54 
131.0 2 3/4 5/1/58 
1953 
10/14 75.5 2 3/4 2/1/55 
Cost to Bonds outstanding 
FLBs^ after sale 
(percent Average 
per annum cost Average 
Term Offering to first (percent life 
(years) price call date) per annum) (years) 
8-10 100 3/8 2.26 2.95c 10.60 
3-5 100 5/8 1.39 2.45c 8.88 
5-7 100 3/8 1.46 2.01c 7.61 
4-6 100 1.29 1.52 6.25 
6—8 100 1/4 1.74 1.62 4.80 
3 100 2.55 1.71 2.77 
4 100 2.68 2.08 3.31 
1 5/8 99 3/4 2.72 
5 1/3 99 5/8 2.88 2.41 3.28 
1 1/4 100 1/8 2.75 2.44 2.59 
1954 
• 4/14 71.0 2 1/4 5/1/50 5 100 2.28 2.43 2.28 
7/14 123.0 2 1/4 2/1/60 5 1/2 100 1/8 2.25 2.43 2.63 
10/13 184.2 2 1/4 11/1/58 4 100 2.29 2.37 3.07 
1955 
1/13 106.5 2 1/2 6/1/60 5 1/3 98 3/4 2.78 2.38 3.27 
9/13 130.0 2 7/8 9/14/56 11/12 99 7/8 3.12 2.46 2.42 
1956 
1/26 130.0 3 • 2/15/57 1 100 3.10 2.53 1.94 
4/12 170.0 3 3/10 5/1/57 1 100 3.40 
60.0 3 1/2 5/1/71 15 100 3.53 2.66 2.54 
8/29 135.0 3 3/4 7/15/57 5/6 100 3.86 
no.o 3 7/8 9/15/72 1.6 99 1/2 3.95 2.83 3.33 
1957 
1/30 140.0 3 7/8 2/14/58.. 1 99.95 4.03 
72.0 4 1/8 2/15/67-72 10-15 100 4.17 2.98 3.50 
4/10 78.0 3 7/8 5/1/58 1 100 3.98 
125.0 4 5/1/62 . 5 100 4.06 3.07 3.69 
6/27 123.0 4 3/8 , 7/15/58' 1 99 7/8 4.61 
60.0 4 5/8 7/15/6C' 12 100 4.66 3.18 3.87 
9/18 140.0 4 5/8 2/2/59 1 1/3 99 26/32 4.89 
75.0 4 1/2 10/1/67-70 10-13 99 3/4 4.58 3.59 4.42 
1958 
1/29 83.0 3 3/8 4/3/61 3 1/12 100 1/8 3.40 
83.0 3 1/2 4/1/70 12 1/12 99 3/4 3.55 3.54 4.80 
^Source: Finance Division," Farm Credit Administration, Washington, D,C, 
^Based on net price received. 
cAverage face rate. 
Table 31 (Continued) 
Par amount Face Call and 
Offering (millions of rate maturity 
date dollars) (percent) date 
1958 
• 
4/16 $122.0 2 3/4 5/1/63 
108.0 3 1/4 5/2/66 
7/1 - 164.0 1 3/4 10/20/59 
10/15 120.0 3 1/2 5/1/59 
120.0 4 9/20/61 
1959 
1/20 89.0 3 3/4 2/1/60 
100.0 4 3/8 3/20/69 
3/10 86.0 4 1/4 3/20/68 
4/15 201.0 3 7/8 4/20/60 
8/11 98.0 4 7/8 8/25/59 
10/89 ,164.0 5 1/5/60 
12/15 118.0 5 3/8 10/20/60 
85.0 5 1/8 7/20/70 
1960 
1/13 150.0 5.40 12/20/60 
82.0 5 1/8 . 2/20/70 
4/6 100.0 4 4/3/61 
147.0 4 1/4 4/20/64 
Term 
(years) 
Offering 
price 
Cost to Bonds outstanding 
FLBs after sale 
(percent Average 
per annum cost Average 
to first (percent life 
call date) per annum) (years) 
5 100 2.79 
8 100 3/4 3.19 3.49 5.39 
1 1/4 99 26/32 2.00 3.26 5.07 
1/2 100 3.60 
2 5/6 100 4.08 3.45 4.97 
1 100 3.85 
10 1/12 98 1/2 4.60 3.42 5.21 
8 11/12 99 1/4 4.39 3.46 5.22 
11/12 99 7/8 4.11 3.57 5.22 
3 100.35 . 4.82 3.63 4.80 
1/6 100 5.24 3.90 4.66 
3/4 100 5.47 
10 1/2 101 5.04 3.93 4.85 
5/6 100 5.52 
10 100 1/4 5.13 4.20 5.22 
11/12 100 1/8 3.97 
4 100 3/8 4.46 4.21 5.20 
1960 
5/12 154.0 4 3/4 6/20/61 
10/5 160.0 4 10/20/65 
12/7 91.0 3 3/8 2/20/62 
90.0 4 10/20/64 
1961 
3/17 104.0 3 1/4 10/22/62 
150.0 3 5/8 2/21/66 
6/7 115.0 3 5/8 2/20/63 
115.0 4 12/20/65 
9/^ 193.3 4 1/4 7/20/66 
1 100 1/8 4.72 4.32 5.07 
5 99 7/8 4.08 4.24 4.94 
1 1/6 100 3.46 
3 5/6 99 3/4 4.13 4.12 4.91 
1 1/2 100 6/32 3.22 
4 5/6 98 3/4 3.97 4.10 4.90 
1 2/3 99 3/4 3.89 
4 5/12 99 4.31 4.06 4.83 
4 5/6 TOO 4.31 4.08 4.81 
Table 32, Average market yields on representative issues of Federal Land Bank bonds, monthly averages, 
1946-1961° (percent per annum) 
Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr, May June July Aug, Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1947 1.48 1.44 1.43 1.42 1.43 1.44 1.43 1.40 1.37 1.43 1.55 1.67 
1948 1.86 1.91 1.91 1.88 1.84 1.76 1.80 1.84 1.89 1.93 1.91 1.88 
1949 1.81 . 1.72 1.67 1.66 1.62 1.54 1.37 1.31 1.37 1.46 1.49 1.48 
1950 1.48 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.57 1.59 1.61 1.62 1.77 1.88 1.93 1.95 
1951 1.98 2.02 2.13 2.25 2.33 2.37 2.41 2.29 2.20 2.24 2.30 2.36 
1952 2.37 2.25 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.28 2.34 2.47 2.51 2.49 2.54 2.64 
1953 2.73 2.72 2.73 2.76 2.94 3.08 2.92 2.82 2.79 2.60 2.47 2.32 
1954 2.01 1.69 1.54 1.48 1.52 1.57 1.40 1.53 1.59 1.82 1.92 1.99 
1955 2.32 2.41 2.54 2.59 2.64 2.67 2.74 2.89 3.01 2.97 2.96 3.11 
1956 3.01 2.87 2.96 3.21 3.33 3.24 3.11 3.35 3.70 3.55 3.59 3.83 
1957 3.72 3.65 3.68 3.73 3.81 3.98 4.14 4.19 4.24 4.34 4.08 3.61 
1958 3.16 2.95 2.77 2.61 2.61 2.57 2.81 3.18 3.60 3.76 3.64 3.70 
1959 3.78 3.81 3.89 4.03 4.20 4.27 4.37 4.46 4.77 4.81 4.73 4.95 
1960 5.03 4.71 4.44 4.37 4.42 4.05 3.80 3.57 3.69 3.69 3.68 3.66 
1961 3.50 3.55 3.55 3.57 3.51 3.84 3.78 3.85 3.87 3.70 3.74 3.81 
°Based on daily market quotations published by dealers in Treasury and agency securities. Source; Research 
and Information Division of the Farm Credit Administration, Washington, D, C. 
